Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-wxvwp Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-16T23:52:37.950Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Wittgenstein on Representation, Privileged Objects, and Private Languages

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Meredith Williams*
Affiliation:
Wesleyan University

Extract

In this paper, I shall investigate Wittgenstein's ‘private language argument,’ that is, the argument to be found in Philosophical Investigations 243-315. Roughly, this argument is intended to show that a language knowable to one person and only that person is impossible; in other words, a ‘language’ which another person cannot understand isn't a language. Given the prolonged debate sparked by these passages, one must have good reason to bring it up again. I have: Wittgenstein's attack on private languages has regularly been misinterpreted. Moreover, it has been misinterpreted in a way that draws attention away from the real force of his arguments and so undercuts the philosophical significance of these passages.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1983

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable