To save this undefined to your undefined account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you used this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your undefined account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Climate change presents a paradox for moral judgment: its harms are immense and predictable, yet they arise from diffuse collective processes that seem to frustrate attributions of blame. Thus, many believe responsibility can only be coherently understood in forward-looking, structural terms. I argue, however, that a small but powerful group of actors, which I call the “Carbon Axis,” bears responsibility in a thick, backward-looking sense. The standard excuses (e.g., insignificance, ignorance, and lack of intent), which may exculpate some ordinary contributions to harm, afford this group scant moral cover. If anyone is culpable for the climate crisis, the Axis is.
John Broome and Duncan Foley argue that future generations should shoulder the full burden of climate mitigation. To achieve this, they propose that economists design a new institution they dub “the World Climate Bank.” Their argument appeals primarily to self-interest and to the idea of making a Pareto improvement that delivers “efficiency without sacrifice.” This article argues against their strategy on both ethical and pragmatic grounds. In general, “making the grandchildren pay” poses a serious threat to future generations and humanity’s progress. What is needed is a “Climate Justice World Bank” that respects principles of global and intergenerational ethics.
Loss & Damage involves the impacts of climate change that are beyond our ability to adapt. Losses and damages are those relevant impacts. That distinction is less commonly applied to adaptation and mitigation such that the impacts that are “adaptable” are beyond limits to mitigation. This article points out that these conceptual distinctions mean impacts should be indexed to (a) the time of evaluation (what is currently adaptable might not be in the future) and (b) the capacities of the society (abilities to adapt and mitigate are relative to capacities). Implications are drawn about responsibility based on these twin indices.
Empirical evidence suggests that decoupling economic growth from greenhouse gases is impossible, thus requiring zero growth. What principles of distributive justice does a zero-growth economy call for? This article focuses on two distribuenda in a zero-growth economy. We argue that firm limits both on income inequalities and on individual emissions are required by justice. Concerning income, we argue that its distribution in a zero-growth economy should respect a suitably reinterpreted version of John Rawls’s difference principle. As to emission rights, contrary to the conventional wisdom that is insensitive to who reduces their emissions, we call for individual emission caps.
We can avoid severe environmental degradation only if we reduce our population numbers. While some believe that reduction in individual consumption could be sufficient to stop climate change, water shortages, habitat destruction, and other environmental problems, evidence shows that that is not a successful strategy. We can, however, accomplish population reduction and without destroying the economy or infringing on human rights.
Carbon competence refers to individuals’ knowledge and understanding concerning the causes and impacts of greenhouse gas concentrations. Using a robust and expansive version of the concept, this essay poses the question of whether contemporary democratic theory demonstrates carbon competence. I argue that prevailing approaches reveal low carbon competence in two respects: implicit or explicit underestimation of the scope and severity of the ecological crisis, and commitment to normative strictures that actively discourage the possibility of rapid decarbonization. As exemplary models, I foreground the work of Nadia Urbinati, Cristina Lafont, and Hélène Landemore.
Normative theories often fail when applied to future generations, creating counterintuitive results in climate change policy. This paper explores these challenges to explain why many sophisticated arguments initially seem implausible. It divides normative ethics into consequentialist and deontological approaches, showing how both schools struggle to provide a coherent framework for intergenerational justice and climate change.
This primer essay explores the disconnect between the empirical reality of our ecological predicament and the discourse surrounding it at both mainstream and specialist levels. Broadly, it is intended to provide orientation for subsequent discussions in climate ethics and politics. More specifically, it acts as an introduction to the article “Is Democratic Theory Carbon Competent?” included in the present volume.