Moral claim-rights possess three important relational features: direction, standing, and status. I set out an analysis of the structure of moral claim-rights that accounts for these three features. The compound relational account I defend comprises two theses. The independence thesis denies any entailment between the first two features of claim-rights—direction and standing are two conceptually independent normative relations. The integration thesis asserts that moral claim-rights consist in the substantive justificatory union of these two relations. The third feature of claim-rights inheres in the nature of this union.

Stephen Darwall argues that the conditions of the possibility of addressing demands second-personally entail a commitment to Kantian moral principles. He also argues that previous attempts to vindicate Kantian morality, as a necessary presupposition of agency, have failed. I defend both of Darwall’s arguments against recent objections. But my replies help to bring out a dilemma: either Darwall’s account collapses into previous versions of Kantianism, or it renders morality problematically contingent. I reject the first horn, and then argue that the contingency worry is either not as serious as it seems or affects other versions of Kantianism more severely.

It seems morally wrong to be cruel to animals, to wantonly destroy a redwood, or to pollute rivers. Such obligations are often perceived as counter-examples to relational approaches to ethics. Call this the Nature Objection. My aim in this paper is to tackle the Nature Objection. I argue that when a relational ethics is anchored in the perfectionist tradition, the objection is bypassed, for our obligations with regard to other living beings are, in fact, relational. At the same time, centering relational ethics in perfectionism transforms our understanding of relational ethics as well.

Wallace aims to interpret all of morality in relational terms. The paradigmatic features of his relational interpretation derive from the case of promising. I agree both that morality has a rich and interesting relational core and that promises illustrate it well. Against Wallace, however, I argue that other significant elements of morality resist assimilation to his relational interpretation. In some cases, this is because their relational character differs notably from that of promising. In other cases, important elements of morality lack a relational character altogether. Wallace’s interpretation therefore stands to be improved by sharply reducing the scope of its ambition.

The irreducibility thesis is the view that there are some reasons for action whose normative force is not explained by the value of the actions for which they are reasons, but which must instead be explained in terms of some relation between agents. This view has been developed influentially by Stephen Darwall, Margaret Gilbert, and R. Jay Wallace. In this article, I argue that the normative force of any reason must be explained by the value of the action for which it is a reason, and so that the irreducibility thesis is false.

Can I wrong someone to whom I stand in no social relation? After specifying the sense of “wronging” I have in mind, I consider agreements, and offer an account of them that explains their providing a context for wronging. This account appeals to a joint commitment of the parties. I go on to review and counter arguments from H. L. A. Hart and Stephen Darwall for the possibility of wronging someone in the state of nature, understood as a situation lacking any pertinent joint commitment. I then emphasize the practical importance of joint commitments enjoining morally sound actions.

There is a straightforward conceptual distinction between “relational” and “nonrelational” obligations (obligations that are not conceived in explicitly relational terms).1 Unlike nonrelational obligations, it is intrinsic to relational obligations that they are owed to others. In addition to the person subject to the obligation, the obligor, there is also an obligee (or obligees) to whom the obligation is owed. With nonrelational obligations, there need only be an obligor; no obligee is required. Similarly, when a nonrelational obligation is violated, something wrong has been done. When, however, the violated obligation is relational, not only is a (pro tanto) wrong done, someone to whom the obligation is owed is wronged.

What is the difference between a reason to do something and a duty to do it? This paper develops a relational account of duties, locating the distinction between duties and nonduty reasons in how others should react to the agent’s will: duty-contrary willing deserves distinctively diminished respect from others, when compared to the respect owed to willing contrary to nonduty reasons. It is also a “reasons-first” account, revealing a duty (and indeed a right) to be composed of a specific nexus of reasons for the agent and for others. The account has important implications for how to understand duty-creation in promising and legislation.

My aim in this paper is to offer some constructive suggestions about the deontological conception of moral value, taking the relational account as my example of a deontological approach. I identify two different kinds of moral values that might be elucidated by the relational approach, which I shall call compliance values and status values. I discuss the role that these moralized values play within the relational theory, tracing the contributions they make to the larger interpretative case for understanding interpersonal morality in relational terms.

There is a difference between doing something that is wrong and wronging someone in particular. Texting while driving is wrong; injuring a pedestrian because you were texting while driving is a wrong against that particular pedestrian. It has been common to think that wrongs just are violations of the wronged party’s rights, but recent arguments suggest otherwise: there can also be wrongs without rights violations. Supposing these arguments are correct, what is it to wrong someone?