1. Diamond, Larry, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), p. 25, Table 2.1.Google Scholar For the orginal formulation and the trends through 1990, see Huntington, Samuel P., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).Google Scholar

2. For the most recent data, and reflections on the trends in recent years, see Diamond, Larry, “The end of the third wave and the beginning of the fourth,” in Espada, João and Plattner, Marc F. (eds.), The Democratic Invention (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000).Google Scholar

3. For the seminal formulation, see O'Donnell, Guillermo and Schmitter, Philippe C., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).Google Scholar

4. Diamond, , Developing Democracy, p. 10.Google Scholar

5. This draws from Elklit, Jorgen and Svensson, Palle, “What makes elections free and fair?” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 8, No. 3 (1997), pp. 32–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6. Diamond, , Developing Democracy, pp. 10–12.Google Scholar

7. Ibid. p. 15.

8. Ibid. p. 28, Table 2–4. Following Diamond's categorization, we take here as the empirical indicator of liberal democracy a rating of a state as “free” by Freedom House in its annual survey. The number of liberal democracies in the world did increase during 1998, but a substantial gap between liberal and electoral democracy persists. See Diamond, , “The end of the third wave.”Google Scholar

9. See Diamond, , Developing Democracy, ch. 2 (pp. 62–63)Google Scholar for why many third wave democracies have retrogressed but not yet become authoritarian regimes. The next paragraph is also based on Diamond's account.

10. Dahl, Robert A., Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 33–37.Google Scholar

11. Thomas A. Metzger used the concept political centre to describe his three systemic relationships between the political centre and society in Myers, Ramon H. (ed.), Two Societies in. Opposition: The Republic of China and the People's Republic of China after Forty Years (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1991), pp. xvii–xviii.Google Scholar Metzger's ideal types were also used by Chao, Linda and Myers, Ramon H., The First Chinese Democracy: Political Life in the Republic of China on Taiwan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), pp. 7–9.Google Scholar

12. Myers, , Two Societies in Opposition, pp. xvii–xviii.Google Scholar

13. The concept of the “inhibited political centre” bears some important similarities to Robert Scalpino's model of “authoritarian pluralism.” This “can be defined as a system wherein political life remains under the unchallenged control of a dominant-party or single-party regime; strict limits are placed on liberty (albeit with some circumstantial variations possible); and military or national security organs keep a close eye on things.” At the same time, however, there exists a civil society with some autonomy from the state and some capacity to express diverse interests, as well as a mixed or increasingly market-oriented economy. Both South Korea and Taiwan experienced long periods of authoritarian pluralism, in Scalapino's view, on the way to democracy. Scalapino, Robert A., “Will China democratize? Current trends and future prospects,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1998), pp. 38–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

14. Metzger, Thomas A., “Will China democratize? Sources of resistance,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1998), p. 20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar During the 1949–78 period, China's political development displayed all the attributes of an “uninhibited” political centre's total control over society. Therefore, the systemic switch in political centre policies after 1978 was a momentous event for China, reversing the development path taken by Mao Zedong, which radically diverged from that taken by Taiwan's Chiang Kai-shek's very inhibited political centre of the 1950s. For a comparison of these divergent development paths and expressions of different political centre's power, see Myers, Two Societies in Opposition.

15. We acknowledge Thomas A. Metzger for his conceptualization of the first three marketplaces. See note 3 in the article in this volume by Linda Chao and Ramon H. Myers for reference to the works in which those concepts are developed. We have added here the notion of an organizational marketplace as well. Civil society consists of independent organizations, networks, and media of communication and expression acting in the public sphere. For further discussion, see Diamond, , Developing Democracy, ch. 6.Google Scholar

16. For recent fieldwork confirming these activities by the PRC's inhibited political centre see White, Gordon, Howell, Jude and Xiaoyuan, Shang, In Search of Civil Society: Market Reform and Social Change in Contemporary China (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

17. For the example of Taiwan, see Metzger, Thomas A., “The Chinese reconciliation of moral-sacred values with modern pluralism: political discourse in the ROC, 1949–1989,”Google Scholar in Myers, , Two Societies in Opposition, pp. 3–56.Google Scholar For Hong Kong, see the article in this volume by Suzanne Pepper.

18. See the essay in this volume by Linda Chao and Ramon H. Myers as well as their The First Chinese Democracy, chs. 2–4. See also Myers, Ramon H., “A new Chinese civilization: the evolution of the Republic of China on Taiwan,” The China Quarterly, No. 148 (12 1996), pp. 1072–90.Google Scholar We acknowledge Thomas A. Metzger for describing how different systemic relationships between the inhibited political centre and society (the four marketplaces) can evolve and change.

19. In the 1950s and 1960s, Professor David Nelson Rowe of Yale University's Department of Political Science was one of the few academics who argued that local elections in the ROC on Taiwan were significant and meaningful for the evolution of democracy. We thank Lucian Pye for this information.

20. For classic treatments of the process of transition from authoritarian to democratic rule, see O'Donnell, Guillermo and Schnitter, Philippe, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978)Google Scholar; and Huntington, , The Third Wave, pp. 121–163.Google Scholar

21. These ideas and the analysis that follows owe much to our discussions with Thomas A. Metzger.

22. Inkeles, Alex, “Continuity and change in popular values on the Pacific Rim,” Hoover Essays (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1997), p. 7.Google Scholar

23. ibid. pp. 8–12. Referring to Thomas A. Metzger's research findings and writings, Inkeles points out these key attributes of traditional Chinese elite thought: utopianism as a way of defining the goal of human life, epistemological optimism “holding that a total, objective, systematic understanding of human life can be obtained to guide action,” history perceived as a teleological process moving inexorably toward the ultimate goal of humankind, and agency of a socially prominent group, usually seen as the intellectuals, who can grasp the right theoretical system (tixi) and use it to influence the course of development of China and perhaps the whole world (p. 12).

24. Ibid. p. 13.

25. Almond, Gabriel A. and Verba, Sidney, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1963)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Inkeles, Alex and Smith, David, Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Nations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Inkeles, Alex, “Participant citizenship in six developing countries,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 63, No. 4, pp. 1120–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

26. Bendix, Reinhard, Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), introduction and ch. 8.Google Scholar

27. Lipset, Seymour Martin, “The social requisites of democracy revisited,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 59, No. 1 (02 1994), pp. 1–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

28. For a review of the literature on these cultural correlates of democracy, see Diamond, , Developing Democracy, pp. 165–174.Google Scholar

29. For a description and analysis of the crises confronted and overcome by this young democracy, see Chao, and Myers, , The First Chinese Democracy, chs. 2–4.Google Scholar

30. A pro-government bloc of Legislative Council politicians formed in summer 1999, with the blessing of Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa. If this informed, pro-government bloc can deliver future votes and become a ruling party, the democratic parties will be severely challenged. For recent developments of this bloc, see Gilley, Bruce, “United we stand,” Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 162, No. 29 (22 07 1999), p. 26.Google Scholar

31. For a recent example of Chinese Communist Party instructions to Party ganbu to avoid Western-style “peaceful evolution” and properly follow the Party line to build a Chinese-style socialism, see dangxiao, Zhongguo zhongyang (Chinese Communist Central Party School), Dangqian dangzheng ganbu guanzhu ti shencengci sixiang lilun wenti (The Profound Ideological and Theoretical Issues That Our Present Party Cadres Should Pay Close Attention To) (Beijing: Dangjian duwu chubanshe, 1998).Google Scholar

32. For a brief description of these Communist Party committees and their functions since 1996, see yanjiuhui, Zhongguo guoqing (Chinese Association for Research on National Conditions), Zhongguo guoqing baogao (Report on National Conditions in China) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1998), pp. 3–7.Google Scholar But an interesting new development occurred in Guangdong in autumn 1999: for the first time, a provincial People's Congress allowed members of the public to express their opinions and criticism of proposed legislative changes. See Ching, Frank, “China: seeds of change,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 09 1999, p. 22Google Scholar