¹ For a systematic discussion of these factors, see Swaine, Michael D., China: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy(Santa Monica: RAND, National Defense Research Institute, 1995).Google Scholar

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³ This figure does not present all the actors within each subarena. These are found in the more detailed figures for each subarena below. Also, all the figures in this report are intended to depict actual authority relationships or reporting channels among key individuals or organizations within or between each of the national security policy subarenas, not formal staff-line relationships among leading actors within the Party, government or military systems as a whole. In some instances, however, organizations are simply grouped within a box to show their common function or level of importance within a particular policy subarena. Details on the specific relationships among such organs are provided in the text, to the extent possible.

⁴ Domestic security is viewed by the Chinese as part of overall national security and certainly as critical to the interests of the military. However, the analysis herein focuses primarily on national strategic goals and objectives concerning aspects of China's external security environment.

⁵ Shambaugh, “Elite politics and perceptions,” p. 104. This group did not include an indeterminate number of personal assistants to the senior leadership, including both personal secretaries (mishu)and personal guards. Such individuals have often exerted a decisive influence over the policy perceptions and views of senior leaders, as advisers, ghost writers, personal representatives, etc. (and reportedly continue to do so today). For details, see Wei Li and Lucian W. Pye, “The ubiquitous role of the mishuin Chinese politics,” The China Quarterly,No. 132 (December 1992), pp. 913–936.Google Scholar

⁶ Lieberthal, Governing China,pp. 187–88. The paramount leader exercised a unique role within this senior policy group. He had the final word on core strategic issues and also largely determined the make-up and division of authority of the senior Party leadership in the PBSC. Also see Shambaugh, “Elite politics and perceptions,” pp. 108–109 and Hamrin, “The Party leadership system,” pp. 99–100. Hamrin distinguishes between the “top tier” of the leadership, consisting solely of the paramount leader and a “second tier” of PBSC members and key elders.Google Scholar

⁷ Barnett, The Making of Foreign Policy in China,pp. 99–100.Google Scholar

⁸ Several Chinese informants have insisted to the author that Zhao and Hu were not privy to deliberations between Deng and senior military leaders during the 1980s, despite their high positions.

⁹ A “quasi-military” figure with significant ties to the PLA, Yang had been placed in charge of the military reform effort in the 1980s by Deng and served as a critical conduit between the civilian Party and professional military leaderships, and between the civilian and military sides of the national security bureaucracy. However, although such responsibilities and experience provided Yang with critical influence over the national strategic objectives subarena as Deng's aide and ally, his overall level of political power was significantly less than that of senior elders such as Chen Yun and Li Xiannian. For a summary of Yang Shangkun's background and duties, see Swaine, Michael D., The Military and Political Succession in China(Santa Monica: RAND Project Air Force, 1992), pp. 33–35.Google Scholar

¹⁰ In addition, one Hong Kong source states that Deng Xiaoping issued orders in 1992 mandating an increased role for the PLA in governmental affairs and various policy organs. As a result, ten generals were allegedly allowed to attend meetings of the Politburo and PBSC as non-voting members. See Xin bao,11 December 1992, p. 26, in FBIS-CHI 92–240, 14 December 1992, pp. 28–29.

¹¹ For major examples, see Xin bao,15 October 1992, p. 22, in FBIS-CHI 92–202, 19 October 1992, pp.4–6;Zhengming,1 June 1993, pp. 14–16, inFBIS-CHI 93–104,2 June 1993, pp. 33–36; Zhengming,1 September 1993, pp. 12–13, in FBIS-CHI 93–171, 7 September 1993, pp. 46–48; Jing bao,5 October 1993, p. 54, in FBIS-CHI 93–196, 13 October 1993, pp. 41–42; Zhengming,1 January 1994, pp. 16–18, in FBIS-CHI 94–016, 25 January 1994, pp. 4–6; Jing bao,5 January 1994, pp. 38–39, in FBIS-CHI 003, 5 January 1994, p. 3; SouthChina Morning Post,25 June 1994, in FBIS-CHI94–123,27 June 1994, pp. 40–41; Xin bao,8 July 1994, p. 23, in FBIS-CHI 94–134, pp. 1–2; Zhengming,1 July 1994, pp. 6–8, in FBIS-CHI 94–143, pp. 33–36; and Zhengming,1 September 1994, pp. 22–23, in FBIS-CHI 94–172,6 September 1994, pp. 37–38. Many of these articles are summarized in John Garver, “The PLA as an interest group in Chinese foreign policy,” paper prepared for the Sixth Conference on the Chinese People's Liberation Army, Coolfont, West Virginia, May 1995.Google Scholar

¹² Such irregular and infrequent PLA policy interventions thus relate more to the subarena of foreign policy formulation and implementation, discussed below.

¹³ The views of Qiao, Li, Zhu and Hu expressed in this and other national security policy subarenas probably reflect in large part their broad responsibilities within the party-state system: Qiao Shi supervises the National People's Congress (NPC) and public security sector; Li Ruihuan supervises propaganda and united front work; Zhu Rongji supervises the state industrial and foreign economic relations sectors (the latter is reportedly shared with PB member Li Lanqing, chair of the state council leading group for foreign investments); and Hu Jintao supervises internal Party affairs and party-to-party relations.

¹⁴ General Liu was already a CMC member before the Party Congress.

¹⁵ Zhang was previously chief of the PLA general staff and Chi remains as Minister of Defence.

¹⁶ Many observers expect Liu and Zhang to retire by the 15th Party Congress of 1997 at the latest. One should not assume, however, that Zhang Wannian and Chi Haotian will exercise the same level of power as their predecessors. The future role of the PLA leadership in determining national strategic objectives is discussed in the conclusion.

¹⁷ Zhang Wannian and Chi Haotian are likely to be joined, in this role, by the CMC Secretary General, when the latter office is reactivated (it has been inactive since the removal of its last occupant, Yang Baibing, in 1992). This post will probably go to GSD director Fu Quanyou, a strong supporter of Jiang Zemin.

¹⁸ Garver, “The PLA as an interest group in Chinese foreign policy,” p. 5.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Liu and Zhang were also selected by Deng because of their importance to the balance of political forces within the PLA. The former, a leading member of the Second Field Army system, is completely loyal to Deng and enjoys support among a wide spectrum of PLA groups, including both the defence industry and naval sectors. The latter is closely associated with the predominant factional grouping within the PLA, centred on the Third Field Army system and most closely identified with the defence science and technology sector. Zhang also developed extensive contacts within the PL A officer corps through his long tenure as President of the National Defence University. See Swaine, The Military and Political Succession in China,pp. 197–198.Google Scholar

²⁰ Hence, what are known in China as diplomatic state relations (waijiao zhengce)constitute only one component of this much larger (and rapidly expanding) foreign policy or foreign affairs subarena.

²¹ External activities that include both civilian and military officials (e.g. the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and Sino-Japanese security dialogues) also fall within the defence policy subarena and hence are undoubtedly influenced by the military. Exactly how civilian and military leaders and organs interact to determine and implement policies concerning such activities remains unclear to the author, however.

²² Some analysts of China's foreign affairs claim that each PBSC member is charged with overseeing foreign policy towards a particular country or region. This might have been the case in the past. However, well-placed Chinese informants deny that such an informal distribution of leadership responsibilities exists today.

²³ Wei Li, The Chinese Staff System,pp. 32–34, Lieberthal, Governing China,pp. 193–94, Hamrin, “The Party leadership system,” pp. 104,116. The formal membership of the FALSG normally includes the Premier (a PBSC member), the Foreign Minister, the director of the State Council Foreign Affairs Office, the head of the Party International Liaison Department, the Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation, the Minister of State Security, a PLA representative (discussed below), and the head of the Xinhua news agency.

²⁴ Leading small groups such as the FALSG are sometimes referred to by the leadership as “advisory bodies” for the Party Secretariat or Politburo, and their decisions are often issued in the name of those bodies. However, they may also bring finished policy packages to the Party leading organs at times, and can sometimes issue orders and instructions directly to line departments and units. See Wei Li, The Chinese Staff System,pp. 33–34.

²⁵ A bridge leader heads a major functional area or gateway (kou)between the Politburo and various relevant subordinate organs, co-ordinating relations between those bureaucracies and the top elite. See Lieberthal, Governing China,p. 188.

²⁶ Li reportedly relies primarily on Liu Huaqiu, a Vice-Foreign Minister and head of the State Council Office of Foreign Affairs, to provide critical administrative and secretarial support for the FALSG. However, Liu also wields significant power over the foreign policy bureaucracy on behalf of Li, in some areas rivalling the influence of Foreign Minister Qian Qichen.

²⁷ The membership of the TALSG reported includes Jiang Zemin (as bridge leader), Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, Wang Zhaoguo, director of the State Council's Taiwan Affairs Office (and the parallel office within the CCPCC), Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai, Minister of State Security Jia Chunwang, and Wang Daohan, chairman of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait. Jiang Zemin and Qian Qichen reportedly serve as the head and deputy head of the TALSG. For more details, see Xingdao ribao.Hong Kong, 7 February 1996, p. A4, in FBIS-CHI 96–026, 7 February 1996, p. 23. Jiang Zemin's influence over Taiwan policy is further enhanced by the fact that Wang Daohan, chairman of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait, is his long-term associate and confidante.

²⁸ Wei Li, The Chinese Staff System,pp. 32–34.Google Scholar

²⁹ Barnett, The Making of Foreign Policy in China,pp. 102–104.Google Scholar

³⁰ Hamrin, “Elite politics and the development of foreign policy,” p. 90.Google Scholar

³¹ Currently there are five Deputy Chiefs of the GSD, each responsible for (1) regular troop and militia training and equipment, (2) operations, (3) administration, (4) intelligence and foreign affairs and (5) political work. I am indebted to Tai Ming Cheung for this information.

³² Xiong's role on the FALSG suggests that the FALSG's proceedings are probably conveyed in some detail to Jiang Zemin, since Xiong is reportedly very close to the Party General Secretary.

³³ See Li, Wei, The Chinese Staff System,p. 18.Google Scholar

³⁴ For a summary of nationalist views expressed in both the military and society, see Swaine, China: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy,pp. 7–9, 32–33 and 52–53.Google Scholar

³⁵ For a similar listing of such areas of PLA concern, see Shambaugh, “To engage or contain China?” p. 15. PLA sentiments toward Taiwan expressed in the CMC would probably exert a particularly strong impact on Party leadership views because of Jiang Zemin's concurrent duties as CMC chair and head of the Taiwan affairs small leadership group.

³⁶ The foreign policy apparatus usually exerts greater control over a policy if it is denned as being within the “foreign affairs” (waishi)realm, as opposed to the “military affairs,” (junshi)realm. Many of the above issues probably fall within a grey area (i.e. neither purely waishinor junshi),and thus require intervention and a formal “ruling” from higher leadership levels. Friction between the foreign and defence policy subarenas is to a great extent unavoidable, however, stemming from the differing priorities and approaches to foreign affairs adopted by the PLA and the MoFA.

³⁷ The most recent and highly notable example of PLA criticism of MoFA policy was occasioned by Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui's visit to Cornell University in June 1995, which precipitated a crisis in U.S.-China relations. Many in the PLA blamed this event and the ensuing crisis on MoFA's overly conciliatory stance toward Washington on Taiwanrelated issues.

³⁸ Virtually every informant with whom the author spoke stressed that senior serving officers of the PLA do not write letters or otherwise circumvent the chain of command to voice any form of policy dissent. However, PLA strategists have at times criticized elements of China's foreign policy in their writings, and the specific views of civilian strategists.

³⁹ The anticipated revival of the post of CMC Secretary General would add a sixth figure to the CMC executive committee.

⁴⁰ For example, see Shambaugh, David, “China's Commander-in-Chief: Jiang Zemin and the PLA,” revised version of paper prepared for the Sixth Annual AEI Conference on the People's Liberation Army, 9–11 June 1995, Coolfont, West Virginia.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Zhang's and Chi's status as “first among equals” among senior officers stems from their professional competence and relative emphasis on military matters over factional intrigue, the senior status of the bureaucracies each officer has headed, and, in the case of Chi Haotian, a probable personal tie with Jiang Zemin.

⁴² The Defence Ministry is not included because it is not a true organization. It does not have a large internal structure of bureaus and offices. Its major function is the management of China's system of military attaches and PLA contacts with foreign militaries. The level of influence exerted by the Defence Ministry within the PLA as a whole is therefore largely a function of the personal authority of the officer leading it.

⁴³ Lewis et al., “Beijing's defense establishment,” p. 89.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Other senior PLA officers who do not head major military bureaucracies probably also exert significant influence over aspects of military policy, by virtue of their personal relationships with senior Party leaders. This would include officers such as Generals Wang Ruilin and Xiong Guangkai.

⁴⁵ See Lieberthal, Governing China,pp. 204–207, for a discussion of this system.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ With the exception of AMS, NDU and the Ministry of Defence, each of the above major PLA organs heads a vertically-structured system of subordinate units.

⁴⁷ Godwin, Paul, The Chinese Communist Armed Forces(Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1988), p. 41Google Scholar and Pollack, “Structure and process in the Chinese military system,” p. 166.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Godwin, The Chinese Communist Armed Forces,p. 41.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ These forces are viewed by many within the PLA as primarily designed for use against threats along China's interior borders, and to quell internal disturbances. They are not viewed primarily as forces for use along China's eastern and southern maritime strategic frontiers.

⁵⁰ For a general discussion of these differences, see Chu Shulong, “China and strategy: the PRC girds for limited, high-tech war,” Orbis(Spring 1994), pp. 177–191.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Allen, Kenneth W., Kenneth, Glenn and Pollack, Jonathan D., China's Air Force Enters the 21st Century(Santa Monica: RAND Project Air Force, 1995), pp. 181–88.Google Scholar

⁵² Because of these factors, the PLAAF has reportedly received the most funding of the three services. Such funds are being used to develop an array of improved and some entirely new capabilities, including more modern indigenously produced fighters and fighter bombers, small numbers of advanced foreign-supplied fighters, attack and transport helicopters, aerial refueling capabilities, air-to-surface missiles, improved surface-based defences, and an airborne early warning capability. For further details, see Swaine, Michael D., “Strategic appraisal: China,” in Khalilzad, Zalmay (ed.), Strategic Appraisal 1995(Santa Monica: RAND, 1996), pp. 185–222.Google Scholar

⁵³ Pollack, “Structure and process in the Chinese military system,” p. 172 and personal correspondence with Bates Gill and Alastair Johnston. Within COSTIND, an informal “wise-men's group” composed of leading officials and scientists from several of its internal departments reportedly plays an important role in developing the commission's position on arms control issues.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Pollack, “Structure and process in the Chinese military system,” p. 172.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Personal correspondence with Bates Gill.

⁵⁶ COSTIND does not directly manage most applied military R&D programmes or weapons procurement programmes. The Equipment Department (zhuangbeibu)of the GSD takes the lead in funding and managing most weapons development programmes, in co-operation with relevant defence industrial factories and supervisory offices within the government.

⁵⁷ The head of COSTIND, General Ding Henggao, is married to Nie's daughter, until recently a COSTIND deputy director. General Zhang was reportedly a leading proponent in the late 1980s of greater funding for defence R&D activities and closer military security ties with the United States. See Johnston, Alastair I., “China and arms control: emerging issues and interest in the 1980s,” Aurora Paper No.3 (Ottawa: The Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, 1988), p. 76.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Other leading PLA DP organs also influence the development of China's nuclear doctrine. These include the GSD (through its Operations and Chemical Defence Departments), the AMS (through its Strategy Department), and the PLAN (through its Naval Military Studies Research Institute, which develops sea-based nuclear strategies). I am indebted to Alastair Johnston for this information.

⁵⁹ In this capacity, the AMS has primary responsibility for warfighting analysis.

⁶⁰ There is one possible caveat to this last statement. The commanders of coastal military regions (e.g. the Guangzhou, Nanjing and Jinan MRs) probably hold a broader perspective toward defence policy, reflecting their concern with defence against maritime-based attacks.

⁶¹ Godwin, The Chinese Communist Armed Forces,p. 37 and Shambaugh, “China's national security research bureaucracy,” p. 298.Google Scholar

⁶² Lieberthal, Governing China,p. 205.Google Scholar

⁶³ According to informants, Jiang Zemin does not attend most of these regular CMC meetings. However, a close aide serves as his representative on such occasions.

⁶⁴ Pollack, “Structure and process in the Chinese military system,” p. 167.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ The influence of the CMCGO will probably increase considerably after a new CMC Secretary General is named. This individual, responsible for the daily operation of the CMC, will exercise control over the GO.

⁶⁶ Lewis et al., “Beijing's defense establishment,” p. 90.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Ibid. This includes the military's attempt to use foreign relations to strengthen arguments for improved force projection capabilities, as in the South China Sea.

⁶⁸ Ibid. pp. 88–90. Lewis states that specific defence allocations, for example, are influenced only modestly, and in many cases not at all, by decisions of the State Council.

⁶⁹ For further details, see Shambaugh. “China's national security research bureaucracy,” pp. 278–280.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ See especially Ibid,and Barnett, The Making of Foreign Policy in China.

⁷² In general, strategists and researchers attached to the MoFA, MSS and Xinhua have access to critical internal policy documents and usually attend the most important internal leadership meetings. In contrast, researchers and strategists associated with CASS or various universities do not have such access and involvement. Hence, the latter's analysis is less influential. However, CASS agencies routinely submit analysis and reports to the MSS, as part of their reporting responsibility on contacts with foreigners. This link to MSS must serve to increase CASS's importance in the policy process.

⁷³ The GSD Operations Department is usually supervised by the first-ranking Deputy Chief of Staff.

⁷⁴ Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations,pp. 46,94. The Third Department has a much longer history than the Second Department, pre-dating the Sino-Soviet alliance of the 1950s.

⁷⁵ For further details on the Second, Third and Fourth Departments, see Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence OperationsGoogle Scholar, and Ball, Desmond, “Signals intelligence in China,” Jane's Intelligence Review,Vol. 7, No. 8 (August 1995), pp. 365–370.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ The former organ primarily studies various military technologies while the latter focuses on disarmament and arms control issues. Several government agencies under the State Council also provide various types of (primarily technical) input on arms control policy. These include the China Institute of Engineering Physics (Ninth Academy), the Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics, and the Beijing Institute of Systems Engineering. I am indebted to Alastair Johnston for this information.

⁷⁷ However, the CMCGO (discussed below) has independently commissioned strategic analysis on a few occasions in the past. Such behaviour usually generated strong resistance from strategic analysis units within the GSD, however, which regarded the GO's actions as encroachment on its “turf.”

⁷⁸ On the other hand, some informants have indicated that military and civilian research units vie with one another to get their views expressed directly to the leading organs.

⁷⁹ Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations,p. 75.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ According to several informants, the greatest level of (and most significant) interaction occurs between strategists of the Second Department and the Chinese Institute for Contemporary International Relations. Each unit often tries to influence the views of the other, in part because their impact on the thinking of senior leaders increases appreciably if they can achieve some level of consensus.

⁸¹ For further details on such institutional concerns, see Swaine, China: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy,pp. 25–30.

⁸² One indication of PLA unanimity on defence issues was provided in early 1994. Over 100 military deputies to the March 1994 meeting of the National People's Congress signed a proposal requesting that China's defence budget be fixed as a specific proportion of GNP. See The Liberation Army Daily,17 March 1994, p. 1.