¹ This article, prepared with the generous support of the East Asian Research Center of Harvard University, is part of a forthcoming book on the origins of the rural revolution in the 1920s tentatively titled Chinese Communists and the Peasant Movement.

² “Early days of the Chinese Red Army,” Peking Review, August 3, 1962, p. 9. This article is a translation, with some changes, of one which appeared four years earlier in Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily) of July 31, 1958. “Uprising” is of course a latter-day substitution for the contemporary term pao-tung (insurrection).

³ The most detailed post-1949 account published in China is that of Hua, Hu, Chung-kuo Ko-ming Shih Chiang-i (Lectures on Chinese Revolutionary History) (Peking: Chung-kuo Jen-min Ta-hsueh, 1959)Google Scholar where it is given two pages. By contrast the pre-1958 general histories, such as Kan-chih, HoChung-kuo Hsien-tai Ko-ming Shih (History of the Modern Chinese Revolution) (Peking: San-lien, 1957)Google Scholar, yield only a paragraph or two on the insurrection. This difference reflects the recent, post-Great Leap re-emphasis of the “correct” role of Mao during and before 1927.

⁴ For the debate between Borodin and Roy, see North, Robert C., M. N. Roy's Mission to China (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963)Google Scholar.

⁵ “Circular Letter of the Central Committee to All Party Members,” August 7, 1927. In Brandt, , Schwartz, and Fairbank, , A Documentary History of Chinese Communism 1921–1950 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 113CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶ For the text of this resolution, see Yung-ching, Chiang, Pao-lo-t'ing yu Wu-han Cheng-ch'uan (Borodin and the Wuhan Regime) (Taipei: Committee to Aid Chinese Scholarly Publication, 1963), p. 340Google Scholar. Stalin's, telegram can be found in North, op. cit., pp. 106–107Google Scholar.

⁷ The confusion is clearly revealed in Wilbur's, C. M. “The Ashes of Defeat,” The China Quarterly, No. 18 (04–06 1964), pp. 3–64CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸ See Guillermaz, J., “The Nanchang Uprising,” The China Quarterly, No. 11 (07–09 1962), pp. 161–168CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹ The texts are found in Hupeh Nung-min Pao-tung Ching-kuo chih Pao-kao (Report on the Events of the Hupeh Peasant Insurrection—hereafter called Hupeh Report), leaves 4B–6B and 7B–10A.

¹⁰ Interestingly, this point is made explicit in the explanation of the slogans: “Insurrection means the thorough implementation of the land revolution. That means the confiscation of the land of the middle and large landlords. But the result in practice will be the confiscation of all landlords”: Hupeh Report, leaf 9A, para. 10. Italics mine.

¹¹ Whereas the earlier plan provided for action in 65 hsien in Hupeh, by August 7 this number had been reduced to a more modest 38, doubtless reflecting reservations about the extent of Party influence in the province.

¹² Hupeh Report, leaf 9B, para. 13. Italics mine.

¹³ Hupeh Report, leaf 8A, para. 3.

¹⁴ Kwangtung and Kiangsi were dropped from the schedule around the time of the Nanch'ang uprising.

¹⁵ In Hu-pei Nung-min Pao-tung Ching-kuo chih Pao-kao (Report on the Events of the Peasant Insurrection in Hupeh), issue No. 11 of Chung-yang T'ung-hsun (Central Newsletter), found in Keio University Library, Tokyo. Also translated by Taichō, Mikami et al. as Kohoku Shūushū Bōdō Keika no Hōkoku (Osaka: Kansai University Institute of Oriental and Occidental Studies, 1961)Google Scholar.

¹⁶ The figures for June 1927 were:

(from Hupeh Report, leaves 1A–2B).

¹⁷ Hupeh Report, leaf 21 A.

¹⁸ Ibid., leaf 6B.

¹⁹ ”Political Report of the Hupeh Provincial Committee,” Chung-yang T'ung-hsun, No. 5.

²⁰ Hupeh Report, leaf 14B.

²¹ The following paragraphs rely on these reports: Hupeh Report, leaf 11B et seq.

²² Hupeh Report, leaves 10B–11A.

²³ Ibid., leaves 11B–13B passim.

²⁴ Ibid., leaf 12A.

²⁵ ibid., leaf 12B.

²⁶ Ibid., leaf 13B.

²⁷ Shen Pao, September 31, 1927. The story of the incident is told in Hupeh Report, leaves 15A–B.

²⁸ See, for example, Li-jung's, I letter of September 13 in Shen Pao, 10 4, 1927Google Scholar, and Comrade Ma's letter of September 16 cited below. The Hupeh Provincial Committee, however, accused the local operatives of “disregarding the entire schedule for the insurrection” and alerting the enemy in Ch'angsha in advance: Hupeh Report, leaf 15B.

²⁹ Hupeh Report, leaf 13A.

³⁰ ibid., leaf 13B.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid., leaf 15B.

³³ Ibid. The towns of Hsienning and P'ucb'i each had less than 20,000 inhabitants in 1953.

³⁴ These at least are the motives attributed to him by the Communists. See ibid., leaf 16A.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Hupeh Report, leaf 14. Italics mine.

³⁷ Kuo-wen Chou-pao, V, No. 3 (01 15, 1928), pp. 6–7Google Scholar. Other parts of this resolution are translated in Wittfogel, Karl A., “The Legend of ‘Maoism,’” The China Quarterly, No. 2 (04–06 1960), pp. 32–33Google Scholar. Lu Shen, presumably a member of the provincial committee, was also deprived of his Central Committee membership status, but specifically for work he failed to perform while acting the North Hupeh special committee.

³⁸ Snow, Edgar, Red Star over China (New York, Random House, 1938), p. 151Google Scholar.

³⁹ See Schram, Stuart, “On the Nature of Mao Tse-tung's ‘Deviation’ in 1927,” The China Quarterly, No. 18 (04–06 1964), pp. 55–66CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁰ See its August 23 reply to the Hunan Provincial Committee, Chung-yang T'ung-hsun (Central Bulletin) No. 2.

⁴¹ See Yung-ching, Chiang, Pao-lo-t'ing yu Wu-han Cheng-ch'uan, pp. 286–287Google Scholar.

⁴² August 23 letter, Chung-yang T'ng-hsun, No. 2.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ They represented only a portion of the 12 hsien assigned by the Party Central originally to East Hunan district, which Mao preferred to call “Central Hunan.” None of Mao's actual plans is available, but the shrinkage is admitted in presentday sources: Hunan Chin—100 Nien Ta-shih Chi-shu, p. 537.

⁴⁵ August 23 letter, Chung-yang T'ung-hsun, No. 2.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Letter of August 30, Chung-yang T'ung-hsun, No. 5.

⁴⁸ Letter of September 5, Chung-yang T'ung-hsun, No. 5.

⁴⁹ Hsin, T'ieh, “Mao Tse-tung Lo-ts'ao Ching-kang-shan” (“Mao Tse-tung plants grass (becomes a bandit) on Chingkangshan”), Hsien-tai Shih-liao, III, pp. 232–252Google Scholar. This article, written by an eyewitness under an assumed name (“Iron Heart”) for the pro-Chiang Kai-shek magazine She-hui Hsin-wen (Social News), appears substantially accurate and reveals some inside information about the Lu regiment's exploits.

⁵⁰ These miners formed a company under the command of either Kao Tzu-li or Wu Ch'ang-hao. Liu Hsing, “Hui-i Ching-Kang-shan te Tou-cheng” (“Memoirs of the Chingkangshan Struggle”), Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an-tang Ling-tao Hu-nan Jen-min Ying-yung Tou-cheng-te 30 nien, (Thirty Years of Communist Leadership of the Hunan People's Heroic Struggle) p. 40.

⁵¹ Kuo-t'ao, Chang, “Wo-te Hui-i” (“My Reminiscences”), Ming Pao, No. 17 (05 1967), p. 99Google Scholar.

⁵² The best source on the P'ing-Liu-Li uprising is Lewis, Charlton M., “The Opening of Hunan” (Ph.D. dissertation, Berkeley, California, 1965)Google Scholar. On Hung-chiang-hui (the Flood River Society) involvement in 1904–06 see Kuo-t'ao, Chang, Ming Pao, No. 3 (03 1966), pp. 4–10Google Scholar. P'ingchiang-Liuyang were centres of fireworks manufacture, and explosives experts from this industry joined readily into both units. The third regiment's non-peasant make-up is attested to by the continuous operations of the unit from May 21 down to autumn—through the entire tilling season. Its extra-societal origin is hinted at in the Party Central's accusation of excessive reliance on “bandits” as well as in Mao's later assessment that his Red Army was “too lumpenproletarian.” Revolutionary leadership in P'ingchiang was headed from 1925 on by young students: see Wales, Nym (ed.), Red Dust (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1955), p. 102Google Scholar.

⁵³ Some sources claim Mao was assigned to lead this particular regiment alone. He may have been especially interested in it personally, but his later role clearly indicates he was given a larger responsibility. As we shall see, he may never have met the erstwhile leaders of the “Peasant Army.”

⁵⁴ Wales, , Red Dust, p. 84Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ The Autumn Harvest was not the last wave of recruitment. In 1930 when P'eng Teh-huai led the attack on Ch'angsha he passed through again and mustered even more jobless miners for his corps: Red Dust, p. 86. Ts'ai Shu-fan's observation that “Had the (Hanyehp'ing) mine not been closed down, there would not have been this full proletariat for revolutionary action and perhaps no Red Army movement” thus has the ring of truth.

⁵⁶ Both Communist sources and T'ieh Hsin agree on this general strategy: Hunan Chin—100—Nien, p. 538Google Scholar; Hua, Hu, Chiang-i, p. 215Google Scholar.

⁵⁷ We have mention of a letter from Su Kuang-chün of that date giving his “military plans.” I Li-jung's letter of September 13, in September 25 Ch'angsha datelined article in Shen Pao of October 4, reveals the exact dates and times of the planned movements. Yurev says these plans were laid before Mao arrived in East Hunan—in the first 10 days of September: Krasnaia Armiia Kitaia.

⁵⁸ Shen Pao, September 16, Ch'angsha. There is some disagreement on the details of the Hunan insurrection, but I have extracted what I believe to be the most coherent account. No fact is presented here without some backing in documentation. The main sources are:

(1) The Shanghai Shen Pao, September 1927, passim, which has accounts of various battles fought against “Communist armies,” often unidentified. These can be relied upon for the dates and locations of battles which the Hunanese authorities considered important. It is significant that the manoeuvres of the first and second regiments never reached the Shanghai press.

(2) Two important contemporary letters written by Communist participants in the heat of battle: one by I Li-jung of the evening of September 13 (reprinted in Shen Pao of September 30) and one by the mysterious “Comrade Ma” of September 16, found in the Party bulletin Chung-yang T'ung-hsun, No. 5. Both these accounts, though giving differing interpretations, corroborate nicely with the known details.

(3) Recent Communist historical accounts: often these are full of errors of fact and interpretation, but the most reliable, Hunan Chin—100 Nien Ta-shih Chi-shu, is relatively free of mistakes of commission.

(4) The eyewitness account of T'ieh Hsin (see note 12, above).

⁵⁹ T'ieh Hsin is our only source for this detail.

⁶⁰ The story of his narrow escape is told in Ch'en, Jerome, Mao and the Chinese Revolution (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 132Google Scholar. That he arrived after the action was over is admitted explicitly for the first time in Jung-huan, Lo, “Early Days of the Chinese Red Army,” Peking Review, 08 3, 1962, p. 10Google Scholar.

⁶¹ There is no indication that Mao made this decision “after obtaining the approval of the Party”—if that apologistic expression means the approval of the Central Committee. However, he may well have relied on the CP “front committee” organization to overcome the opposition of his military commander, Yü Shai-tu. The bitterness of the first of Mao's many disputes with his military counterparts may explain why Yü has become an unperson in the official Peking accounts.

⁶² His letters had to be translated into Chinese for publication in the Communist newsletter. Some of his errors in place names the Party Central itself was unable to decipher.

⁶³ This passage, with its claims of major victories, has been cited often in the official Communist accounts, beginning with Hua Kang's famous Chung-kuo ta Ko-ming Shih, though without reference to the source. The rest of the letter has been conveniently forgotten. The claim that P'ingchiang and P'inghsiang cities fell into CP hands was false.

⁶⁴ Ma does not acknowledge that the Anyuan unit was proceeding according to plans—a fact which may have been concealed from him. Party Central's letter of September 19 betrays the same ignorance.

⁶⁵ Cheng, Wang in Wales, , Red Dust, p. 94Google Scholar.

⁶⁶ Chung-yang T'ung-hsun, No. 5 (letter to Hunan Provincial Committee).

⁶⁷ “Chi-hui-chu-i Shih” (“History of Opportunism”) in Min-hun, Li, ed., Ch'ih-se Tang-an (Red Archive), n. p., 1928, p. 101Google Scholar.

⁶⁸ Hung-se Wu-t'ai (Red Stage) (Taipei: Sheng-li, 1954), p. 24Google Scholar.