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China and the Bomb—Chinese Nuclear Strategy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

Morton H. Halperin
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The detonation of a nuclear device by the People's Republic of China on October 16, 1964, made it unmistakably clear that China attached a very high priority to becoming a militarily effective nuclear power as soon as possible. Although the effect on Chinese economic development has probably been relatively limited thus far, the Chinese are devoting substantial resources to their nuclear programme and may be expected to have militarily effective systems within this decade. The Chinese appear to be considerably further along in the development of nuclear weapons and delivery systems than had been previously anticipated.

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Type
Research Article
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The China Quarterly , Volume 21 , March 1965, pp. 74 - 86
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1965

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References

* This article draws on material prepared for the Council on Foreign Relations Project, “The United States and China in World Affairs.” I am grateful to Robert Blum, Director of the China Project, for support of my research and for permission to use the material. I am also grateful to the Center for International Affairs and the East Asian Research Center, Harvard University for support of my research. Many of the points made here are discussed in greater detail and documentation in my forthcoming book China and the Bomb, to be published by Praeger.

1 NCNA Statement, text in New York Times, October 17, 1964, p. 10.Google Scholar

2 The Chinese have sometimes argued that any increase in the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons was desirable. See, for example, Ch'en Yi's interview with Reuter's manager, Walton Cole, October 5, 1961.Google Scholar

3 Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily), August 9, 1962 Google Scholar, abridged translation in Peking Review, No. 33, 1962.Google Scholar

4 “Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government—A Comment on the Soviet Government Statement of August 3,” August 15, 1963, translated in Peking Review, No. 33, 1963.Google Scholar

5 Ouyang, Hsing, “Imperialist Contradictions Around the Question of Great Nuclear-Power Status,” Chinese Youth, Nos. 3–4, February 10, 1963.Google Scholar Translation in Selections from China Mainland Magazines (SCMM) (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate-General) No. 355, p. 18.Google Scholar

6 Ibid.

7 Among the large number of programmes and despatches that might be cited, see, for example, Peking Home Service broadcast, January 8, 1963 (printed in BBC Summary of World Broadasts (SWB), FE/1145/A1/2); and NCNA despatch from London of January 10, 1963 (printed in SWB, FE/1147/A1/1); and a Peking Home Service broadcast, February 21, 1963 (printed in SWB, FE/1183/A1/2).Google Scholar See also Yang, Chun-fong, “A Nuclear Force Without a Name,” Peking Review, No. 24, 1963.Google Scholar

8 NCNA despatch broadcast, July 24, 1963, and on the Peking Home Service (printed in SWB, FE/1310/A1/1).Google Scholar

9 However, the Chinese have also been influenced by the great difficulties that the French have encountered in developing their own national nuclear force. In a sense the quoting of the French experience highlights the difficulties in resisting these pressures as well as the analogous existence of the pressures in the Western camp. For an analysis of the French nuclear programme, see Ciro Elliott, Zoppo, “France as a Nuclear Power,” in Rosecrance, R. N. (ed.), The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons: Strategy and Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, forthcoming).Google Scholar

10 “The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves, Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU,” People's Daily, September 6, 1963. Translation in pamphlet (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), p. 26.Google Scholar

11 “Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government—a Comment on the Soviet Government's Statement of August 3,” August 15, 1963, translated in Peking Review, No. 33, 1963.Google Scholar

12 “Two Different Lines on the Question of War and Peace, Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU,” People's Daily, November 19, 1963. Translation in pamphlet (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), p. 27.Google Scholar

13 “A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement. The Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in Reply to the Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of March 30, 1963,” June 14, 1963. Translation in pamphlet (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), pp. 31–32.Google Scholar

14 The Chinese statements following the signing of the test-ban treaty are remarkably similar to those which they issued following their own detonation. It was clear that when they issued these statements in the summer of 1963 they were doing so partly to lay the groundwork for their justification for their own nuclear test a year later. The Chinese statements following the test ban have been reprinted in the pamphlet People of the World, Unite, For the Complete, Thorough, Total and Resolute Prohibition and Destruction of Nuclear Weapons! (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963).Google Scholar

15 See, for example, Scalapino, Robert A., “Sino-Soviet Competition in Africa,” Foreign Affairs, July 1964, p. 643.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

16 “The Differences between Comrade Togliatti and Us,” People's Daily, December 31, 1962. Translation in pamphlet (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), pp. 15–16.Google Scholar