1. Despite our concentration on the term “great power triangle” we do not intend to suggest either that triangular great power politics is the only relevant manner in which international relations can be understood, or that other events are necessarily explained by reference to triangular relations. In addition, the development of the triangle clearly was not a uniform process, nor perceived in the same manner or at the same time by all the actors concerned. Nevertheless, it is hoped that emphasis on this particular aspect will assist us in understanding the functioning of the broader international political scene.

2. Kissinger, Henry, The White House Years (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979)Google Scholar. For earlier periods see especially Reardon-Anderson, James, Yenan and the Great Powers (Columbia: University of Columbia Press, 1980)Google Scholar.

3. Armstrong, J. D., Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977)Google Scholar.

4. Zhou said his message to the “highest American authorities on (a) top secret level” would be denied if it was attributed to him. He described intense factional politics in the CCP between his “liberal” faction and a Liu Shaoqui-led “radical” pro-U.S.S.R. group. Zhou urged heavy U.S. aid for China and good bilateral relations. See Clubb, O. E. to Sec. State, 1 June 1949 in Foreign Relations of the United States 1949, Vol 8, “The Far East: China” (Washington: USGPO, 1978), pp. 357–9Google Scholar. Clubb's response was neither to view Zhou's offer as a ruse nor to accept it at face value. Rather he saw the CCP as attempting to gain U.S. aid while retaining a pro-Moscow political line. He urged the U.S. to wait and see what developed while carefully encouraging the initiative. Clubb to Sec. State, 2 June 1949. Ibid. pp. 363–64.

5. Mao told members of the Democratic League, apparently in June 1949, according to the report of the League's leaders to Clubb. Clubb to Sec. State, 19 July 1949. Ibid. pp. 443–45.

6. Reports of important discussions in the U.S. about the possibility of Mao emerging as another Tito were viewed as leaks by CCP leaders. Clubb to Sec. State, 18 Aug. 1949: ibid. pp. 496–98. Most officials also did no fully understand the subtlety of CCP signals, especially in the period of obviously intense Chinese factional politics. For some of the intensely argued positions see Clubb to Sec. State, 27 June 1949: ibid. p. 398; Kohler to Sec. State, 27 June, pp. 399–400. The actual breakdown in talks is in Clubb to Sec. State, 24 June, pp. 397–98. Mao's 1 July speech on the People's Democratic Dictatorship marked another major negative stage in the process. Stuart to Sec. State, 6 July, pp. 405–407 and 12 July, p. 424, on discussions with Huang Hua, Zhou's alleged protégé in the “liberal” group. It should be added that the issue of whether the U.S. missed an opportunity to pry China away from the U.S.S.R. in the 1940s is a complicated issue, but these last-ditch contacts are simply yet another case where it seems that some possibilities to prevent a Sino-Soviet alliance were missed.

7. On the role of the pivot, see Segal, Gerald, “From Bipolarity to the Great Power Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Washington, 1961–1968,” unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, The London School of Economics and Political Science, 1979Google Scholar. More generally on the “balancer” see Wight, Martin, Systems of States (London: Leicester University Press, 1977), Chap. 7Google Scholar.

8. Although the U.S. and U.S.S.R. had essentially agreed on a formula to end the fighting by 9 March, the super powers were unable to impose their will. Dept. of State Telegram No. 2139, 10 March 1961 from Ambassador Thompson: President's Office Files: U.S.S.R., Security, January-May 1961, Box No. 127, John F. Kennedy Library. On the role of China as noted by Great Britain, see New York Times, 16, 17 April 1961; and on Soviet attempts to bypass Chinese influence, see Hilsman, Roger, To Move a Nation (N.Y.: Dell, 1964), p. 133Google Scholar.

9. Crazier, Brian, “Peking and the Laotian Crisis: An Interim Appraisal,” CQ, No. 7 (07–09 1961), p. 128CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10. Interview with Averell Harriman, 17 January 1965, Washington. By Arthur Schlesinger Jr for the JFKL, pp. 109, 144.

11. Ibid. pp. 11–14.

12. For the references to Sino-Soviet conflict at Geneva see Cooper, Chester, The Lost Crusade (N.Y.: Dodd Mead and Co., 1970), p. 185Google Scholar, and William Sullivan interviewed by Dennis O'Brien, 16 June 1970, Washington for the JFKL, pp. 16–22.

13. Hilsman, , Move a Nation, p. 344Google Scholar, and Papers of James Thomson, Far East, Communist China. 1/62–3/62, Box No. 15, JFKL. Recently there has been a mass of declassified information on this subject. See Segal, “From Bipolarity to the Great Power Triangle” especially section 2.31.

14. Hilsman, , Move a Nation, pp. 316–19Google Scholar. Papers of Roger Hilsman, Country: China, Offshore Islands Crisis, 6/62, Box No. 1, JFKL.

15. “Offshore Islands Chronology,” President's Office Files: Security, 1962–1963, Box No. 113, JFKL.

16. Pravda, 25 October and Izvestia, 26 October 1962 in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. 14, No. 43, pp. 16–18.

17. Pravda, 5 November 1962, editorial in CDSP, Vol. 14, No. 43, pp. 18–19.

18. Red Flag, No. 17, Peking Review, Vol. 6, No. 41, 11 October 1963, pp. 12–15.

19. People's Daily Observer, 14 July 1963. Peking Review, Vol. 6, No. 29, 19 July 1963, p. 10.

20. Schurmann, Franz, The Logic of World Power (N.Y.: Random House, 1974), pp. 353–54Google Scholar.

21. Schram, Stuart, Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed (London: Penguin, 1974), pp. 188–96Google Scholar and People's Daily Editorial, 21 January 1964. Peking Review, Vol. 7, No. 4, 24 January 1964, p. 7.

22. Yahuda, Michael, “China's Conception of Their Role in the World” in Robson, William and Crick, Bernard, eds., China in Transition (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1975), p. 87Google Scholar.

23. Pravda, 2 September 1964 in CDSP, Vol. 16, No. 34, pp. 3–4.

24. On “united action” debates and the academic debate see Segal, Gerald, “Chinese Politics and the Soviet Connection,” Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, Vol. 2, No. 1, Autumn 1976Google Scholar.

25. Gottlieb, Thomas, Chinese Foreign Policy Factionalism and the Origins of the Strategic Triangle, R-1902-NA (Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corp., 11 1977)Google Scholar.

26. The shifts in the anti-China forces in Vietnam are visible for example in the description of the secret MARIGOLD contacts, especially in early 1967. U.S. Dept. of Defense, United States-Vietnam Relations 1945–1967 (Washington: USGPO, 1971)Google Scholar, Negotiations, Vol. VI.C.3. Sunflower, Chronology. The Negotiation volumes of the Pentagon Papers were obtained by Morton Halperin's Project on National Security and Civil Liberties in a law suit and kindly made available to the author.

27. Ibid. and contacts in late 1966 between Gromyko, , Johnson, and Rusk, reported in the New York Times, 22, 23 11 1966Google Scholar.

28. Gottlieb, Chinese Foreign Policy Factionalism.

29. Kissinger, The White House Years. On the coincidence of interests, especially as seen from the U.S., see Szulc, Tad, The Illusion of Peace (N.Y.: Viking Press, 1978), pp. 203–205Google Scholar, 395–420. Also Safire, William, Before the Fall (N.Y.: Doubleday, 1975), especially pp. 366–80Google Scholar.

30. This at least is the view of James Schlesinger quoted in Yahuda, Michael, “Problems of Continuity in Chinese Foreign Policy,” Asian Affairs, Vol. 8, Part 3, 10 1977, p. 320CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

31. Szulc, , The Illusion, p. 204Google Scholar, for one of the first such contacts.

32. Pollack, Jonathan, “The Logic of Chinese Military Strategy,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1 01 1979, pp. 23–24Google Scholar.

33. Liberthal, Kenneth, Sino-Soviet Conflict in the 1970s: Its Evolution and Implications for the Strategic Triangle, R-2342-NA (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corp., 07 1978)Google Scholar.

34. Ibid. and Michael Pillsbury, “Future Sino-American Security Ties: The View from Tokyo, Moscow and Peking,” International Security, Vol. 1, No. 4, Spring 1977, pp. 137–42.

35. This turn to the U.S. pivot was in certain respects not unlike the Chinese alignment with the U.S.S.R. (the pivot in the 1950s).

36. Time Magazine, 5 February 1979, p. 14.

37. The Guardian, 5 February 1979.

38. New York Times, 23 May 1979 and The Guardian, 11 May 1979.

39. The Economist, 16 June 1979, pp. 14–15, and the International Herald Tribune, 19 June 1979.

40. Segal, “ From Bipolarity to the Great Power Triangle.”

41. Simmel, Georg, Wolff, Kurt trans., The Sociology of Georg Simmel (N.Y.: Free Press, 1950), pp. 154–62Google Scholar and Mills, Theodore, “Power Relations in the Three Person Group,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 11, No. 4, 08 1953, p. 356Google Scholar.

42. International Herald Tribune, 20 January 1979.

43. International Herald Tribune, 4, 11 July 1979.

44. International Herald Tribune, 20, 22 February 1979.

45. Sino-Soviet détente need not be on an anti-U.S. basis as Sino-American détente need not be on an anti-U.S.S.R. basis. See Arbatov, Georgi interviewed, The Observer (London), 12 11 1978Google Scholar.

46. Xiangqian, Xu, 14 July 1979, cited in International Herald Tribune, 16 07 1979Google Scholar.

47. Segal, “Chinese Politics”.

48. See especially Zorza, Victor in The Guardian, 9 02 1976Google Scholar, 26 October 1977, 5 January 1978, 27 January 1979. The International Herald Tribune, 11 March, 6 May, 8 October, 11 November 1976, 25 August, 26 October, 21 December 1977, 22 February 1978.

49. For example, Gottlieb, Chinese Foreign Policy Factionalism and Lieberthal, , Sino-Soviet Conflict in the 1970s, pp. 95–142Google Scholar.

50. The literature on this issue is extensive. Aside from note 54 below, see two major examples in Ivkov, I., “USA: Playing the ‘Chinese Card’ in Asia,” Far Eastern Affairs, No. 2, 1979Google Scholar, and Apalin, G., “Peking, the West and Détente,” International Affairs, No. 2, 02 1979Google Scholar.

51. Deng Xiaoping to Donovan, Hedley in Time Magazine, 5 02 1979Google Scholar.

52. Yahuda, Michael, China's Role in World Affairs (London: Croom Helm, 1978), Chap. 9Google Scholar.

53. Note 51 and “Interview With Vice-Premier Deng,” Peking Review, Vol. 22, No. 7, 16 02 1979, p. 19Google Scholar.

54. Observer, 12 November 1978 and Brezhnev's reaction to U.S.-China normalization cited in the International Herald Tribune, 22 December 1978.

55. When Beijing describes the contention and collusion in super power relations, it has indicated that the concept is not entirely foreign to the Chinese.

56. Kissinger, The White House Years, and Safire, , Before the Fall, especially pp. 432–39Google Scholar.

57. See for example President Carter on 12 February 1979 in International Herald Tribune, 13 February 1979 and 8, 27 January 1979 for other statements.

58. The same process can be seen in the U.S. embarrassment caused by Deng Xiaoping's talk of the need to “punish” Vietnam and his having informed President Carter of China's intention to invade Vietnam. So as to avoid the appearance of having at least tacitly acquiesced with the Chinese move, the U.S. may well have taken a harder line against China (and a more pro-U.S.S.R. line) than it otherwise would have done. The Guardian, 19, 20 February 1979 and the International Herald Tribune, 28 February 1979.

59. On Chinese concessions see the International Herald Tribune, 10, 31 January 1979. On the normalization see Ambassador Woodcock's statement in 19 December 1978, 2 January 1979 and Newsweek, 1 January 1979.

60. Segal, “From Bipolarity to the Great Power Triangle,” Chap. 7. In particular McNamara's, Robert view of the ABM and the U.S.S.R. in New York Times, 19 09 1967Google Scholar.

61. The growing concern in the U.S. about increased Soviet defence spending appears to be a reaction to the Kremlin's effort to improve its forces facing China. According to the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, intelligence study (January 1979), the U.S.S.R. had 650,000 troops facing China, more than are deployed in Eastern Europe and an increase of 63 per cent since 1969. Eighty per cent of the increase in Soviet military manpower in the past decade went to forces on the Chinese border. The International Herald Tribune, 27 January 1979.

62. Willis, Richard and Long, Norma, “An Experimental Simulation of an International Truel,” Behavioral Science, Vol. 12, 1967CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

63. For example defence minister Xiangqian, Xu in Red Flag, Peking Review, Vol. 21, No. 32, 11 08 1978Google Scholar and Communiquè of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 22 December 1978, Peking Review, Vol. 21, No. 52.

64. Segal, “From Bipolarity to the Great Power Triangle,” Chaps. 3, 5. For the 1962 Sino-Indian case see Khrushchev's, 12 December speech to the Supreme Soviet in the CDSP, Vol. 14, No. 52, p. 7Google Scholar. For the 1965 India-Pakistan case see a Czech radio statement on 26 September 1965 quoted in Griffith, William, Sino-Soviet Relations 1964–1965 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1967), p. 115Google Scholar and Polish radio on 22 September 1965 cited in BBC SWB/E./1968/1.

65. The Military Balance (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Volumes covering 1970–1980)Google Scholar.

66. Interview with Army General Graham, D., until November 1975 the director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence, the International Herald Tribune, 26 02 1976Google Scholar.

67. The Military Balance, 1979–1980 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979), p. 59Google Scholar. Also on the new advances in the Chinese programme see the statement of General George S. Brown, chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Congress of the United States on the Defense Posture of the United States for FY 1979. Prepared 20 January 1978, pp. 41–43.

68. On the latest test see Western sources in Japan, The Guardian, 3 October 1979.

69. Joffe, Ellis and Segal, Gerald, “The Chinese Army and Professionalism,” Problems of Communism, Vol. 27, No. 6, 11–December 1978Google Scholar. See also Middleton, Drew, The Duel of the Giants (N.Y.: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1978)Google Scholar, especially Chaps. 8–10 and “Statement of General Brown” for extensive comments on the new developments.

70. Pollack, , “The Logic of Chinese Military Strategy,” p. 25Google Scholar.

71. There are numerous articles indicating the change in strategy and although a full analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, see the following examples for evidence: Deng Xiaoping at the Army Political Work Conference, 2 June 1978, in Peking Review, Vol. 21, No. 25, 23 06 1978Google Scholar; defence minister Xiangquan, Xu in Red Flag quoted in Peking Review, Vol. 21, No. 32, 11 08 1978Google Scholar; Wen Hui Pao, Hong Kong, 24 April 1978 cited in JPRS, No. 71212, 31 May 1978; Editorial Dept. of “ Academic Study in Military Affairs,” BBC SWB/FE/6007/BII/7–9; Su You's lecture to the PLA Military Academy cited in No. 6023/BII/5; 1 August Editorial in Liberation Army Daily cited in No. 6184/BII/2–4. On the Sino-Vietnamese war see for example the Liberation Army Daily on peace and war, Xinhua, 26 03 1979, No. 7648, p. 2Google Scholar.

72. New York Times, 7 June 1979. The International Herald Tribune, 16 March, 11, 12, 15 May, 21 June, 20 September 1979.

73. International Herald Tribune, 26, 28 February, 8 March 1979.

74. The distinction between card playing and tilts is complex and one of degrees, but suffice it to say that the “hard” tactic of card playing involves such steps as military co-operation and major economic arrangements whereas the “soft” tactic of tilting is only a slight leaning to one side which may be accomplished by a subtle and sophisticated process of signalling including policy statements biased in favour of one power and small scale economic agreements.