1. See, e.g. Gerald, Segal and William, Tow (eds.), Chinese Defense Policy Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984).Google Scholar

2. See Lucian, Pye, Chinese Commercial Negotiating Style (Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Haiti, 1982Google Scholar); Richard, Solomon, Chinese Political Negotiating Behavior (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1985).Google Scholar

3. For further exposition of this contrast see Wilhelm, Alfred D. Jr,. “National security-the Chinese perspective,” in Alexis Johnson, U. et al. , China Policy for the Next Decade (Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, , Gunn and , Hain, 1984), pp. 181–219Google Scholar; and Pollack, Jonathan D., Security, Strategy, and the Logic of Chinese Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of California Institute of East Asian Studies, 1982Google Scholar).

4. Halperin, Morton H., Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974).Google Scholar

5. Doak Barnett, A., The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985Google Scholar). For more dated assessments see Daniel, Tretiak, “Who makes Chinese foreign policy today (late 1980),” Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 5, pp. 137–57Google Scholar; Roger, Dial, “The New China News Agency and foreign policy in China,” The Contemporary Asia Review, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1977), pp. 39–54Google Scholar; Donald, Klein, “The management of foreign affairs in Communist China.” in John, Lindbeck (ed.), China: Management of a Revolutionary Society (Seattle: University of Washington Press. 1971Google Scholar); Donald, Klein, “Peking's evolving Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” The China Quarterly (October-December 1960Google Scholar); Donald, Klein, “The men and institutions behind Chinese foreign policy,” in Roderick, MacFarquhar (ed.), Sino-American Relations 1949–1971 (New York: Praeger, 1972Google Scholar); Melvin, Gurtov, “The Foreign Ministry and foreign affairs during the Cultural Revolution.” The China Quarterly (October-December 1969).Google Scholar

6. There are different levels in this classification system. It appears that the lowest is guonei faxing (domestic circulation), followed up the hierarchy by neibu faxing (internal circulation), xian neibu faxing (limited internal circulation), neibu cankao ziliao (internal reference materials), neibu kanwu (internal examination), zhuyi baocun (carefully protect), and a range of higher designations in the system of secret (baomi or jimi) government and military documents. The baomi/jimi system is described at more length in Kenneth, Lieberthal, Central Documents and Politburo Politics in China (Ann Arbor: Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies, No. 33, 1978)Google Scholar. The neibu system is discussed at greater length in Gilbert, Rozman, “China's Soviet watchers in the 1980s: a new era of scholarship,” World Politics (July 1985), pp. 435–74; and my “A profile of international relations on Chinese campuses and IR associations and publishing in the PRC,” China Exchange News (June 1985), pp. 11–17.Google Scholar

7. During this period I was an advanced research student (gaoji jinxiusheng) in the International Politics Department at Beijing University, and a participant in the National Program for Advanced Research and Study in China sponsored by the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the P.R.C.

8. A. Doak Barnett's early account of this system remains accurate. See his Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967).

9. For a general discussion of these characteristics see Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967). For a discussion of these characteristics in the Chinese context see Michel, Oksenberg, “Economic policy-making in China: summer 1981,” The China Quarterly (June 1982), pp. 65–94Google Scholar; Kenneth, Lieberthal and Michel, Oksenberg, Bureaucratic Politics and Chinese Energy Development (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1986Google Scholar); Lampton, David M. (ed.), Policy Implementation in the People's Republic of China (Berkeley: University of California Press, forthcoming).Google Scholar

10. Much has been written on this subject. Perhaps the classic exposition of the impact of guanxi on the policy process is Lucian Pye, The Dynamics of Chinese Politics (Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, , Gunn, and Hain, , 1981Google Scholar). For the classic assessment of guanxi networks in the Chinese military see William, Whitson with Chen-hsia, Huang, The Chinese High Command (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973).Google Scholar

11. James, Huskey, “USIA Conference on PRC research institutes and their impact on foreign policy,” United States Information Agency Office of Research Research Memorandum, 28 02 1986.Google Scholar For an elaboration of Chinese “policy arenas” see Michel Oksenberg, “The Chinese policy process and the public health issue: an arena approach,” Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Winter 1974), pp. 359–408.

12. For a general discussion of the roles of specialists in the Chinese political process, and economic specialists in particular, see Nina, Halpern, Economic Specialists and the Making of Chinese Economic Policy, 1955–1983, Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Michigan, 1985.Google Scholar

13. For analysis of the communications process in the Chinese Government see Michel, Oksenberg, “Methods of communications in the Chinese bureaucracy,” The China Quarterly (01–03 1974), pp. 1–39Google Scholar; Lieberthal, Central Documents and Politburo Politics in China.

14. For a complete listing of these associations see my “A profile of international relations on Chinese campuses.”

15. See Jacobson, Harold K., “First steps toward U.S.-Chinese collaboration in international studies research: the National Science Foundation” China Exchange News, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 4–6.Google Scholar

16. For an overview of these exchange activities in general see Lampton, David M. et al, A Relationship Restored: Trends in U.S.-China Educational Exchanges, 1978–1984 (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1986)Google Scholar. For an overview of bilateral activities specifically in the area of international relations see my Wingspread Conference on Sino-American Dialogues (New York: Conference Report issued by the Committee on International Relations Studies with the People's Republic of China, 1986).

17. Barnett, The Making of Foreign Policy.

18. For discussion of the symbiotic relationship between the Chinese state and intelligentsia see Jerome, Grieder, Intellectuals and the State in Modern China (New York: The Free Press, 1981Google Scholar); Carol Lee, Hamrin and Timothy, Cheek (eds.), China's Establishment Intellectuals (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1986Google Scholar); Merle, Goldman, China's Intellectuals: Advise and Dissent (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981)Google Scholar; Merle Goldman with Timothy Cheek and Carol Hamrin (eds.), China's Intellectuals and the State: The Search for a New Relationship (forthcoming).

19. In addition to my “Profile,” see David, Shambaugh and Wang, Jis, “Research on international studies in the People's Republic of China,” PS, Vol. 7 No. 4 (Autumn 1984), pp. 758–64.Google Scholar

20. See e.g., my Coverage of the United States in Key Chinese Periodicals During 1984 (Washington, D.C.: United States Information Agency, 1985), and Gilbert, Rozman, “China's Soviet watchers in the 1980s.”Google Scholar

21. The most thorough account of the functioning of the State Council, its “inner cabinet,” and its informal “foreign affairs coordinating point” is Barnett, The Making of Foreign Policy in China, pp. 51-73.

22. See Murray, Douglas P., “CIRSPRC's first year,” China Exchange News, Vol. 13 No. 2 (06 1985), pp. 2–4.Google Scholar

23. See Johnson, Alastair I., China and Arms Control: Emerging Issues and Interests in the 1980s (Ottawa: The Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, 1986).Google Scholar

24. These are the Americas (North and South); the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; Western Europe; Middle East/Africa/South Asia; East Asia and the Pacific; International Economics; and a Comprehensive Research Section.

25. For a more detailed assessment of the substance of these articles see my Coverage of the United States in Key Chinese Periodicals During 1984.

26. These are, respectively, Guoji xingshi nianjian (Yearbook of the International Situation) (Shanghai: Zhongguo baike chubanshe, 1982–1985); Ji Guoxing et ai, Zhanhou Zhongdong sici zhanzheng (The Four Middle East Wars in the Post- War Era) (Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 1979); Chen Peiyao et al., Qinlue yu suijing zhengce: dierce shijie dazhan shi zenmayang qilaide? (Aggression and Appeasement Policy: How did the Second World War Begin?) (Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 1978); Liu Guangqing et al., Liang da junshi jituan de duizhi - beiyue yu huaye (The Two Big Military Bloc's Confrontation: NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation) (Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 1983).

27. Previous studies of the Chinese military establishment by Whitson, Nelson, Gittings, Godwin, Jencks, George, Whiting, Gurtov and Huang, Segal and Tow, and others contain little discussion of this topic.

28. To be sure, this may not be unique to the PLA, but can be considered prevalent throughout Chinese society where information is a prized commodity and the most basic data is considered a state secret. This has been a major problem for foreign social scientists and humanists trying to conduct research in China.

29. See, e.g., Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zhanshi jianbianfConcise History of the Wars of the People's Liberation Army) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1983); Guofang xiandaihua: xiandai keji zhishi ganbu duben (Defence Modernization: A Reader for Cadres on Modern Scientific and Technological Knowledge) (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zhanshi chubanshe, 1983); Jiefangjun jiangling zhuan (Biographies of Liberation Army Generals) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1984).

30. Chinese People's Liberation Army Academy of Military Sciences' Foreign Military Research Group (eds.), Waiguo wuqi fazhan jianjie (Introduction to the Development of Foreign Weapons Systems) (Beijing: China Foreign Translation Press, 1983).

31. Wang, Gangyi, “Beijing's academic brain trust,” China Daily, 8 01 1986.Google Scholar

32. Zhang, Chunting and Zhang, Qinsheng, “Beijing's 'military salon',” Liaowang Overseas Edition, 25 11 1985Google Scholar, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), China Daily Report, 5 December 1985, p. K10.

33. Wang Gangyi, “Beijing's academic brain trust.”

34. For an extended discussion of the CMC's structure, functions, and responsibili-ties see Harvey Nelsen, The Chinese Military System (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977), pp. 45-58.

35. ibid. p. 11.

36. FBIS-China, 18 December 1985, p. Kl.

37. Those not considered to belong to the NSRB but doing related research on international affairs, are the World History Institute, Political Science Institute, Law Institute, Information Institute, Japan Institute, West Asian and African Institute, Latin America Institute, South Asia Institute, and the Western Europe Institute. In their pre-Cultural Revolution incarnation the last five institutes last mentioned were under the control of the CCP International Liason Department, which has responsibility for China's relationships with communist parties and insurgencies in these regions. For details of the composition of all CASS institutes prior to the 1985 personnel changes see Zhongguo shehui kexueyan (The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) (Beijing: n.p., 1983), translated in China Report: Economic Affairs (JPRS-CEA-85-018), 19 February 1985.

38. Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan, ibid. p. 103.

39. Wei, Lin (ed.), Dierci shijie dazhan hou guoji guanxi dashiji (Chronicle of International Relations Since the Second World War) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1983).Google Scholar

40. See, e.g., Wang, Shengzu (ed.), Guoji guanxi shi (History of International Relations) (Wuhan: Wuhan Daxue chubanshe, 1983); Hong Yuyi, 1931-1939 guoji guanxi jianshi (Concise History of International Relations from 1931 to 1939) (Beijing: Sanlian chubanshe, 1980); Liu Xinghan et al., Xiandai guoji guanxi shi (Shanghai: Zhishi chubanshe, 1984).Google Scholar

41. See, e.g., Zhu, Jieqin, Zhongwai guanxi shi lunwenji (Essays on the History of Chinese Foreign Relations) (Henan: Renmin chubanshe, 1984). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also in the process of compiling a multi-volume official history of Chinese foreign policy since 1949; Xue Mouhong is the chief editor and compiler.Google Scholar

42. For development of this distinction in the Soviet case see Seymour Lipset, M. and Dobson, Richard B., “The intellectual as critic and rebel: with special reference to the United States and the Soviet Union,” Daedalus (Summer 1972), pp. 137–98.Google Scholar

43. See supra, fn. 28.

44. See, the multi-volume series Geguo shouce congshu (Series of Handbooks on Various Countries) published by the Shanghai baike chubanshe, and the Shijie Baikuang (World Series) series published by Zhishi chubanshe in Beijing.

45. Zhang, Haitao, Jimi Kate zai baigong (Jimmy Carter in the White House) (Sichuan: Renmin chubanshe, 1982).Google Scholar

46. Xinhua chubanshe publishes an annual almanac of key domestic and international events entitled Guo nei wai dashiji (Chronicle of Events at Home and Abroad). In addition, see the annual Yearbook of International Affairs (Guoji xingshi nianjian) edited by the Shanghai Institute of International Studies and published by Zhongguo baike chubanshe.