¹ For example, Hao-ssu, Chao, “Will the Aggressive Policy of American Imperialism against China Undergo a Change?—From Dulles to Herter,” World Culture, No. 11, 06 5, 1959Google Scholar; Lo-fu, Wu, “The Geneva Conference at the Decisive Stage,”Google Scholaribid. No. 12, June 20, 1959; Chao-li, Yu, “Peaceful Competition: An Inevitable Trend,” Red Flag, No. 16, August 16, 1959, and Peking Review, No. 33, 08 18, 1959Google Scholar; Yuan, Cheng, “U.S. Imperialist Policy Viewed from the Exchange of Visits between Heads of the Soviet and U.S. Governments,” Research on International Problems, No. 6, 10 3, 1959.Google Scholar

² “The Chinese People's Great Victory in The Fight Against Imperialism,” Peking Review, No. 38, 09 22, 1959Google Scholar, from Red Flag, No. 18, 1959.Google Scholar

³ The learned editor of China News Analysis remarks that he “rarely reports these sections of the Peking Press about the international situation. We are not editing a comic paper.” I shall show below my agreement as to the fantastic character of Peking's public account of the state of the world, but I shall argue that the purpose is serious.

⁴ See Whitney, Thomas P. in Washington Post, 10 25, 1959.Google Scholar

⁵ Alternatively, but less characteristically, a “camouflage for an aggressive policy.”

⁶ During February 1960, however, the Chinese Press reverted to some extent to assertions of the permanent military superiority of the socialist camp and to denigration of U.S. efforts in the missile field. It is possible that by this time the public needed some reassurance.

⁷ Published in Red Flag, No. 1, 1960.Google Scholar The translation used here is from Peking Review, 01 5, 1960.Google Scholar

⁸ In November 1957.

⁹ Italics added.

¹⁰ Some possible implications for Sino-Soviet relations are adverted to below.

¹¹ Italics added.

¹² One guesses from this (a) that they were faced with a problem or an argument for which they had no ready-made answer, and (b) that their leadership was not, possibly is not, unanimous in its judgment of the matter.

¹³ Italics added.

¹⁴ Peking, NCNA, Radioteletype in English to Europe and Asia, February 13, 1960. Italics added.

¹⁵ Quoted from Peking Review, 02 9, 1960. Italics added.Google Scholar

¹⁶ For significant presentations of this theme prior to October 1, 1959, see Chao-li, Yu, “The Chinese People's Great Victory in the Fight Against Imperialism,” Red Flag, No. 18, 1959Google Scholar, translated in Peking Review, 09 22, 1959Google Scholar, and Hao-shih, Mei, “The Victorious Struggle of the Chinese People Against American Imperialism in the Past Decade,” International Problems Research, No. 6, 10 3, 1959, translated in Extracts from China.Google Scholar

¹⁷ See Rosenthal, A. M. in New fork Times, 11 24, 1959.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Ta Kung Pao article, November 8, and Radio Peking International Service in Japanese, November 9.

¹⁹ Some key references, giving precise details of the Japanese military budget, investment in munitions industries, numbers and types of missiles planned to be available in given years, plans for missile research and training of personnel in missile use, are: People's Daily, 11 27, 1959Google Scholar; Peking Radio, November 27, 1959; Ta Kung Pao, 11 29–30, 1959Google Scholar; Peking Radio, December 8, 1959, and January 11, 1960; and Peking Review, No. 8, 02 23, 1960Google Scholar (quoting Red Flag, No. 4, 1960Google Scholar), especially a map of the main U.S. and Japanese military bases in Japan. The high point of propagandist activity was January 23, 1960, when a mass rally was held in Peking to denounce the revised security treaty. The main speech, by Kuo Mo-jo, is reprinted in Peking Review, No. 4, 01 26, 1960.Google Scholar

²⁰ The Chinese were considerably concerned about NEATO during the summer of 1959, but in terms of a U.S. intent to set it up. One is puzzled over the exact significance of the difference between a subjective and an objective NEATO, but the latter is evidently more of a menace than the former.

²¹ Though perhaps the Chinese would use the term empiricism instead.

²² Incidentally, the virtual disappearance of this and other similar Maoist slogans from Chinese statements during the period under consideration underlines the seriousness with which the Chinese take the situation.

²³ The main body of this paper was written early in April. This epilogue is added early in July.

²⁴ See especially Chao-li, Yu, “Imperialism—Source of War in Modern Times—and the Path of the Peoples' Struggle for Peace,” Red Flag, 04 1, 1960Google Scholar, translation in Peking Review, 04 12, 1960Google Scholar; Red Flag, “Long Live Leninism,” translation in Peking Review, 04 26, 1960Google Scholar; “Forward Along the Path of the Great Lenin,” People's Daily editorial, 04 22, 1960Google Scholar; and Red Flag, “Form a Broad United Front to Defeat Imperialism,” 05 16, 1960Google Scholar, translation in Peking Review, 05 24, 1960.Google Scholar

²³ Red Flag, 04 1, 1960, previously cited.Google Scholar

²⁶ May 16, 1960, loc. cit.

²⁷ Peking Review, 04 12, 1960.Google Scholar To the best of my knowledge, only a summary version of this report has been released.

²⁸ Peking Review, 06 14, 1960.Google Scholar

²⁹ There are many post-summit Chinese statements. I shall not here identify them. As a matter of personal taste, I regard Tung-hsiang, Shin, “Refuting the Fallacy that the Nature of Imperialism Has Changed,” Red Flag, 06 15, 1960Google Scholar, as particularly revealing. He states, for example:

There are also some others who say that though not all those who are in power in the imperialist countries have mended their ways, there have emerged among them some “sober-minded” and “sensible” men and this after all is a new thing.… But Lenin and Stalin never held that the inner contradictions of imperialism would enable imperialism to change its nature.… Facts have proved to the hilt that it is nothing but wishful thinking to regard Eisenhower, Herter and their ilk as forming the sensible group of the American ruling clique… and to place hope on diplomatic negotiations with them.… [There are still people who say that] it is possible that imperialism, for its own sake, will give up aggressive war.… All this is subjectivist logic which has nothing to do with reality.…

All this is independent of human will. Any attempt to write off or avoid the struggle against imperialism by advancing such arguments… can only undermine the morale of the broad masses of the people.

³⁰ For extracts from Red Flag's “Long Live Leninism” and Khrushchev's Bucharest Speech see pp. 115–120.