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Great Powers and Atomic Bombs are “Paper Tigers”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

Ralph L. Powell
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Extract

In terms of Western political science or military doctrine it seems somewhat irrational that the leaders of Communist China should refer to great powers as “paper tigers.” It appears even more illogical that they should call atomic bombs “paper tigers,” especially when they themselves place the highest priority on the development of a nuclear capability. Yet, since the first Chinese nuclear explosion on October 16, 1964, the official Communist Press has again referred to the United States, Great Britain and the “revisionists” (both Khrushchev and the present leaders of the Soviet Union) as “paper tigers.” This same metaphor has also been applied to “imperialism” and “all reactionaries,” as well as to nuclear weapons, air-power and sea-power.

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Type
Research Article
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The China Quarterly , Volume 23 , September 1965, pp. 55 - 63
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1965

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References

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