1. Books on the history of Macau in English include the works of Boxer, Charles Ralph, Seventeenth Century Macau in Contemporary Documents and Illustrations (Hong Kong: Heine-mann, 1984)Google Scholar, The Great Ship from Amacon: Annals of Macao and the Old Japan Trade, 1555–1640 (Macau: Instituto Cultural, Centro de Estudos Maritimos, 1988)Google Scholar, and Fidalgos in the Far East 1550–1770: Fact and Fancy in the History of Macao (The Hague: Marinus Nijhoff, 1948)Google Scholar as well as the book by de Jesus, Carlos Augusto Monalto, Historic Macao (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1984)Google Scholar, and there are numerous works by Portuguese authors including Benjamim Videira Pires and Manuel Teixeira as well as a smaller number in Chinese and other languages. For more on the historical literature see: Edmonds, Richard Louis, Macau (Oxford: Clio Press, 1989)Google Scholar and Edmonds, Richard Louis, “Resources for research: a bibliography,” in Cremer, R. D. (ed.), Macau: City of Commerce and Culture, 2nd Edition: Continuity and Change (Hong Kong: API Press, 1991), pp. 353–58Google Scholar.

2. Although its importance has increased due to rapid economic growth since the 1970s most discussions of Greater China to date have ignored the territory. As an example see Baldinger, Pamela, “The birth of Greater China,” The China Business Review (05–06 1992), pp. 13–17Google Scholar.

3. Pereira, Francisco Gonçalves, “The political status of Macau,” in Cremer, , Macau, pp. 270–72Google Scholar points out the Chinese government's attitude that the Macau issue should be mutually settled at an appropriate time was contradictory to its calls for revolution in places such as Portuguese Africa. Hungdah, Chiu, “Introduction,” in Hungdah, Chiu, Jao, Y. C. and Yuan-li, Wu (eds.), The Future of Hong Kong (New York: Quorum Books, 1987), p. 8Google Scholar notes that according to the Baltimore Sun (2 February 1977), p. A4, Portugal offered to turn Macau over to China on three occasions between 1974 and 1977. Reasons why China wished to delay reversion included a desire not to upset Hong Kong which would upset the United Kingdom which could upset the United States, the fact that Macau was a good place for Chinese gold transactions as Portugal had not signed the Bretton Woods agreement of 1946, and the fact that the existence of Macau as a colony could be beneficial as a scapegoat if the government needed to take attention away from domestic problems.

4. The contents of this February 1979 Paris agreement were kept secret until the signing of the Sino-Portuguese joint agreement over Macau in 1987.

5. Pereira, , “The political status of Macau,” p. 275Google Scholar. At the same time as the special administrative region idea was promulgated, Deng Xiaoping put forward the now famous idea of one country, two systems.

6. After the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration over Hong Kong in 1984 Chinese officials repeatedly stated that the Hong Kong situation was not relevant to the future of Macau. These words, plus Macau's small size and the Portuguese government's admission that it was Chinese territory raised hopes amongst those wishing that Macau's status would remain un-changed. However, the Chinese had merely put aside the issue until Hong Kong's reversion was resolved. In contrast to the two years of negotiations over the future of Hong Kong, the Macau talks were finished in nine months. The Portuguese negotiating team included no China experts. It is said that the Portuguese approached the U.K. Foreign Office for advice on how to negotiate with the Chinese. Consultations between Portuguese and British officials continue although there has been no attempt at concerted efforts in negotiating the Macau and Hong Kong issues with China.

7. Although the Portuguese wanted to remain in Macau until 2007 in order to make their stay in the territory an even 450 years, China insisted that the country should “reunified” prior to 2000. In any case, it is not clear in which year the Portuguese first arrived in Macau.

8. According to Macau, Ser. 2, No. 5 (Setembro 1992), pp. 93–94Google ScholarPubMed the 101,223 Portuguese citizens in Macau were being issued identity cards identical to those issued in Portugal.

9. Afonso, and Pereira, , “The constitution and legal system,” pp. 284–85Google Scholar. The Estatuto Orgdnico functions as the territory's constitution.

10. There are also municipal councils for the Macau peninsula (Leal Senado) and for the islands of Taipa and Coloane (Camera Municipal das Unas), each with a proportion of their representatives elected. Yee, Herbert S. and Lo, Sonny S.H. [Shiu-hing], “Macau in transition: the politics of decolonization,” Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 10 (10 1991), pp. 909–910CrossRefGoogle Scholar note that domination of the municipal councils by Macaense (persons of mixed ancestry) came to an end with the 1988 elections. Now all the elected members are Chinese with the majority pro-PRC.

11. According to Yee, and Lo, , “Macau in transition: the politics of decolonization,” p. 906Google Scholar the Macaense members as well as a small number of independent liberal Chinese deputies have been known to play key roles by breaking deadlocks. The Assembleia Legislativa does have some powers which its Hong Kong counterpart does not such as amending budgets and introducing spending measures.

12. In 1990 the pro-Beijing União Promotora do Progresso (Union for the Promotion of Progress) got slightly under 50% of the votes cast after losing with only 34% of total votes in 1988. “Corrente ‘tradicional’ conquista eleitorado,” Macau, No. 33 (Março 1991), pp. 4–5Google Scholar states that the two candidates for the União Promotora do Progresso won the intercalate elections in March 1991 obtaining 50% of the vote. In 1992, however, an increased number of voters turned out from a substantially reduced number of registered voters to elect four conservative Chinese from two parties (two of these deputies representing the União Promotora do Progresso and the other two the União para o Desenvolvimento (Union for Development)), two liberal Chinese from two parties, one Macaense and one pro-Macau government Chinese candidate while the traditionalist Macaense União Eleitoral did not elect a single candidate for the first time. The next elections will be in 1996.

13. In general, the appointment of the Governor and the adjunct secretaries are subject to changes in partisan politics in Portugal. The adjunct secretaries (secretários-adjuntos) have no statutory powers. Although the Governor suggests who will be the adjunct secretaries with the President of Portugal approving the Governor's suggestions, in reality these posts, along with the governorship, have often been given out by the Portuguese President as gifts for political support. In Macau it appears that some lower level division chiefs are also Portuguese political appointments.

14. The current seven adjunct secretaries are responsible for: judicial affairs; economic and financial affairs; public works and transport; education, administration and youth; health and social affairs; security; and communication, tourism and culture. Legally all the adjunct secretaries have equal power but in reality the strongest one emerges as number two in the Macau government. In contrast to Hong Kong, Macau only has Forças de Segurança or a local Security Force, since by agreement with China no Portuguese troops have been stationed in the territory since 1975. The Governor is also advised by a Conselho Consultivo or Consultative Council, half of whom are indirectly elected. The Conselho Consultivo must be consulted on bills to be introduced to the Assembleia Legislativa and on significant policy matters such as development plans.

15. Governors Joaquim Pinto Machado (1986–87) and Carlos Melancia (1987–90) were the first two civil governors in 46 years. Pinto Machado quit after one year due to political isolation and dissatisfaction with the local administration. Melancia was attacked for involvement in a scandal surrounding the transformation of state-owned Teledifusão de Macau into a limited public company in 1988 and in a bribe scandal related to the West German company Weidleplan's construction contract for the Macau airport in 1990. Lam, T. C., “Administration and public service system in Macau,” in Cremer, , Macau, pp. 325–26Google Scholar assumes that Governor Melancia was accused of these crimes to get control of the appointment of Macau's Governor out of the hands of President Mario Soares and the Socialist Party. In 1991 the post of Governor was returned to a military man, General Vasco Joaquim Rocha Vieira, in an attempt to reach a consensus over the appointment in Portugal and to achieve some stability in the run up to 1999.

16. According to Lam, , “Administration and public service system in Macau,” p. 330Google Scholar in recent years the Macau government has attempted to privatize many functions of government performed by departments as has occurred in Hong Kong.

17. Afonso, Rui António Craveiro and Pereira, Francisco Gonçalves, “The constitution and legal system,” in Cremer, , Macau, p. 292Google Scholar.

18. Yee, and Lo, , “Macau in transition,” p. 910Google Scholar refer to a South China Morning Post of 9 September 1990 report that the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office was given more powers to supervise matters relating to Macau and Hong Kong in order to ensure that the territories received consistent messages about Beijing's politics rather than cross signals from several organizations.

19. Shiu-hing, Lo, “Aspects of political development in Macao,” The China Quarterly, No. 120 (12 1989), p. 839CrossRefGoogle Scholar says the members of this committee were less liberal than those in the Hong Kong committee which explains why there has been less controversy over the establishment of Macau's post–1999 legal system.

20. While the legal system is still Portuguese dominated, laws are now being translated into Chinese, and from the end of 1993, Macau's courts will offer simultaneous translation. Asia Yearbook 1988, p. 175 noted that all 11 judges and prosecutors in Macau, were Portuguese and Asia Yearbook 1989, p. 164Google Scholar that not one of the 30 lawyers in Macau is Chinese. Cantonese became an official language for legal translation in May 1988. Yee, and Lo, , “Macau in transition,” p. 916–17Google Scholar note some of the difficulties the government faces in translating Portuguese laws into Chinese. Portuguese higher courts used to hear appeals against decisions made by high ranking members of the Macau government. However, an independent local High Court (Tribunal Superior de Justiça) composed of seven judges to judge prosecution appeals, a Court of Audit (Tribunal de Contas) with three judges to deal with financial control of government departments and an Administrative Court (Tribunal Administrativo) were established in Macau in April 1993.

21. Yee, and Lo, , “Macau in transition,” p. 913Google Scholar cite the beginning of the localization policy to Governor Melancia's visit to Beijing in May 1990.

22. Ibid. p. 906 points out that the Portuguese expatriate percentage went up from 11.3 to 12.4% but note that the numbers of Portuguese passport holders went down from 73.6 to 71.4% over the same period. Although Macau government officials indicate there are about 8,500 civil servants, Yee, and Lo, give a figure of 14,664 for 1988, the Asia Yearbook 1992 (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, 1992), p. 147Google Scholar gives a figure of 12,000, Afonso, and Pereira, , “The constitution and legal system,” p. 289Google Scholar indicate 11,500 based on 1988 data, and Lam, , “Administration and public service system in Macau,” pp. 338–39Google Scholar gives a 1988 figure of 9,765. These discrepancies may be due to the large number of non-established short-term workers in the civil service. Some say the recent upsurge in the recruitment of Portuguese civil servants is due to a lack of skilled locals to handle the increasingly complex administration whereas others say it is a last ditch attempt to imprint the Portuguese presence on Macau in the post–1999 era.

23. Afonso, and Pereira, , “The constitution and legal system,” pp. 289–290Google Scholar state that 45% of the highest positions in Macau's administrative hierarchy are held by administrators from Portugal. A considerable number of short-term non-established posts are filled by Portuguese from Portugal. Only about one-third of the Portuguese professionals in the Macau government remain in the territory for longer than five years. Lam, , “Administration and public service system in Macau,” p. 340Google Scholar notes that an article in the Si Man Yat Pou (Shimm ribao) from 14 May 1989 stated that only one-sixth of the directors of departments were local-born Macau residents.

24. “91 As linhas de accao governativa,” Macau, No. 31 (Janeiro 1991), p. 45Google ScholarPubMed. This is known as the Programa de Estudos em Portugal or PEP programme. A small number of Macaense and Portuguese have also been sent to Beijing Normal University for Chinese language training. Lawyers are also being trained in Beijing and school teachers at Huanan University in Guangzhou.

25. Macau Travel Talk, Series 2, No. 187 (March 1992), p. 8.

26. Keong, Wong Hon [Hanqiang, Huang], “Aomen guoduqi fazhan jingji miandui de maodun ji chulu de xuanze” (“Economic development of Macau during the transitional period - its difficulties and choices”), Aomen YanjiulJoumal of Macau Studies, Vol. 1 (1988), p. 6Google Scholar points out a Chinese phrase for describing Macau as a place of “Three nos” (san wu): no resources, no capital, and no domestic market.

27. Fu, Cheong Cheok [Zhuofu, Zhang], “Lun Hengqin de kaifa yu Aomen nongye, zhonggongye de zhuanyi” (“On the opening of Hengqin and its effect on trends in Macau's agriculture and industry”), Hou Keng [Haojing], No. 9–10 (1992), pp. 93Google Scholar, 96–97 notes from paper clippings that between November 1989 and the end of May 1991 infrastructural and construction investments in Taipa and Coloane totaled 8,300 million patacas with another 13,800 million patacas committed to or being raised for planned investment. This represents a tremendous growth over past investment. Daokuang, Yang [To-Kwong, Yeong], “Luelun Aomen de jingji fazhan yu chengshi jianshe wenti” (“A design for the municipal construction and economic development of Macau”), Aomen YanjiulJounal of Macau Studies, Vol. 1 (1988), p. 17Google Scholar notes housing for 120,000 people will shortly be completed on Taipa.

28. “Quatrocentos hectares de aterro vão ligar as duas ilhas,” Comércio de Macau (29 de Fevereiro 1992), p. 7. According to Macau, Sér. 2, No. 14 (Junho 1993), p. 86Google ScholarPubMed Macau and Chinese investors signed an agreement in May 1993 to develop newly reclaimed lands between Coloane and Taipa near the future airport. About one-fifth of the land is to be devoted to housing and almost two-fifths to industry.

29. The Praia Grande reclamation is financed jointly by Chinese, Macau and Portuguese interests as are most current major projects. Since the mid–1980s, all major infrastructural projects have had a Chinese organization as one consortium partner. Santos, Luís, “Ambiente e tráfego justificam o fecho da Baía de Praia Grande,” Tribuna de Macau (25 de Maio 1991), p. 11Google Scholar points out that the enclosure will have two positive benefits: creation of a clean fresh water lake and provision of a six-lane by-pass alleviating congestion in the city centre.

30. Macau Travel Talk, Series 2, No. 193 (09 1992), p. 9Google Scholar. Twelve high-rise buildings, a hotel and an underground car park are due to be completed in phase one which will end in 1996. The lease for the phase one land reclamation can be extended to a convenient expiration date of 20 December 2049.

31. Edmonds, , Macau, p. xlviiGoogle Scholar. Now about six million people arrive by sea annually with jetfoils carrying over two-thirds of the passengers. The increase of service has led to the construction of a new ferry terminal with a heliport on the roof to be opened in October 1993 at an estimated cost of 800 million patacas which should be able to handle a peak of 7,200 Hong Kong passengers an hour or about 13 million passengers per annum. With the link to former Portuguese Timor severed, all the current passenger sea links are with Hong Kong and China. The Hong Kong-Macau link has been useful for overseas Chinese many of whose ancestors came from the western side of the Pearl River delta and who have increasingly gone to visit this area via the territory since the early 1980s.

32. Macau Travel Talk, Series 2, No. 187 (03 1992), p. 9Google Scholar gave 1991 loading figures for the Macmosa of 27% capacity.

33. According to Harrison, Godfrey J., “English in Macau,” in Cremer, , Macau, p. 150Google Scholar, Hong Kong's dominance led one Macau tourist poster to refer to the British colony as “Macau's airport.” Marriage, Paul and Chu, Kennis, “Wu plans to transform Pearl delta,” South China Morning Post, 29 06 1992Google Scholar notes one of the most spectacular plans put forward for linking Hong Kong and Macau – a scheme proposed as early as 1988 by Hong Kong developer Gordon Wu Ying-sheung's Hopewell Holdings to build a 38-kilometre bridge and tunnel toll link between the two territories via Shekou and Zhuhai that would cut travel time to half an hour.

34. Roughly 5 to 7 tonnes of sand are deposited annually in the Lingdingyang waters near Macau adding a layer of about 1 to 2.5 centimetres of silt on the bed each year. The Ká-Hó port cost roughly MOP$120 million. It is being linked to Zhuhai and Hong Kong by a 200 TEU vessel feeder service.

35. Coutinho, Paulo, “Um Porto-mar no Delta,” Macau, Sér. 2, No. 13 (Maio 1993), p. 7Google Scholar. In 1992 Macau handled 72,000 TEUs. Approximately 20,000 TEUs were handled by Ká-Hó port.

36. This 350 million pataca terminal is being built by China's Nan Guang (Nam Kwong) Petroleum and Chemicals (95%) and the Ká-Hó port franchise holder, Macauport (5%) of which Nan Guang is a partner holding 12% of the shares. It should be completed in July 1994.

37. Gomes, Clara, “Nova ponte emerge do Rio das Pérolas,” Macau, No. 41 (11 1991), pp. 46–53Google Scholar, “Administração e consórcio chegam a acordo,” Tribuna de Macau (30 de Abril 1992) and Coutinho, Paulo, “A ponte do entendimento,” Macau, Ser. 2, No. 13 (Maio 1993), pp. 10–12Google Scholar. The bridge is being built by a Portuguese-Chinese consortium and is estimated to cost 640 million patacas. There have been problems as the silt bed in the river cannot support the bridge without the insertion of deep concrete piles and also problems with granite boulders which required special drilling equipment, and damage caused by a typhoon during September 1993.

38. Silva, Jorge, “Aeroporto: ordem para descolar,” Macau, Ser. 2, No. 13 (Maio 1993), pp. 5–7Google Scholar. The Macau government's decision to start on the airport dates from a 1983 study. There have been problems which have slowed construction of the 136 hectare artificial island by about two years. This was apparently due to the slow supply and overcharging for sand and building materials from China. According to “Aeroporto em boa rota,” Macau, No. 42 (Dezembro 1991/ Janeiro 1992), p. 72Google Scholar the airport reclamation requires 22.5 million cu.m. of sand. At first it was decided to build part of the airport on reclaimed land and part on piles as a compromise since the sand and soil will be bought from China and the piling work would probably be done by a consortium including Portuguese interests. In 1992 a decision was taken to build the whole project on reclaimed land. While there are several different consulting firms and companies involved in the project the reclamation work for the runway is being undertaken by a Chinese and Macau consortium, China Harbour Engineering. Management of the runway project has been given to a Hong Kong-Portuguese consortium known as SPP (Scott Wilson Kirkpatrick, Pengest Internacional, and Partex CPS). The terminal construction and aviation equipment was contracted to Siemans and Soares da Costa. However, over two-thirds of the construction tenders have gone to mainland Chinese interests. In December 1992 the Macau government announced its intention to become the majority shareholder in the airport by buying out other company shares. This was probably from Beijing's desire to have the airport largely under government control prior to 1999.

39. According to “Aomen guoji jichang 1995 nian wangong hou” (“After completion of the Macau International Airport in 1995”), Zhongyang ribao (International Edition), No. 23388 (24 10 1992), p. 7Google Scholar a delegation from Macau in Taiwan during October 1992 stated that once there is direct air travel between the two territories, Nationalist Chinese citizens will be able to obtain on-the-spot visas upon arrival in Macau which will make travel between Taiwan and Guangdong faster than going through Hong Kong. Stanley Ho is supposedly interested in establishing the rights for flights between Macau and Taiwan through an airline company that he plans. According to Macau, Sér. 2, No. 14 (Junho 1993), p. 86 both the Chinese (CAAC) and Portuguese (TAP) national airline companies have expressed an interest in investing in a new airline called Air Macau which will initially make flights to selected Chinese destinations. Silva, , “Aeroporto,” p. 5Google Scholar notes that airlines putting in applications to land in Macau include Lufthansa, Singapore Airlines, CAAC, TAP and KLM. Grindrod, Barry, “Marketing of Macau,” South China Morning Post (16 03 1991)Google Scholar, stated that several East European airlines are also putting in such applications.

40. According to Asia Yearbook 1991, p. 156, CAM is made up of investors from Macau including Stanley Ho and the STDM (630 million patacas), the Macau government (500 million patacas), banker Edmundo Ho and real estate developer Ng Fok (120 million patacas each) as well as the Chinese consortium Chung Luen (Thong Lian, 130 million patacas) and according to Macau Travel Talk, Ser. 2, No. 189 (05 1992), p. 1Google Scholar, the Portuguese investment corporation, Interfina. The Zhongyang ribao (International Edition), 24 October 1992, p. 7 says the Portuguese government holds 30% of the stocks in the airport and that the group building it has a 30-year management concession. Chung Luen originally had a 500 million pataca share but was forced to reduce its investment due to foreign exchange shortages in 1990 with the STDM, E. Ho, and Ng picking up the slack.

41. Cunha, Luís, “Guang Da: o jogador de póquer,” Comércio de Macau (17 de Abril 1993), p. 4Google Scholar.

42. Silva, , “Aeroporto,” p. 7Google Scholar says that Macau now has a guarantee of autonomy from China with regard to its own air space. “Aeroporto em boa rota,” p. 73 notes that the Macau airport will have a very important role to fulfil by 1996 as its ability to handle 2.2 million passengers and 79,000 metric tonnes of cargo will take some of the strain off Hong Kong's Kai Tak Airport. Huifen, Situ, “Zhuhai tun Aomen?” (“Will Zhuhai swallow Macau?”), Guangjiaojing, No. 238 (07 1992), pp. 42–43Google Scholar gives 75,000 to 1,000,000 passengers and 11,354 tonnes of freight while Asia Yearbook 1992, p. 149 gives 2,000,000 passengers and 150,000 tonnes of cargo and mentions the possibility of a 6 million passenger-600,000 tonne freight capacity by 1999. Apart from these obvious functions the airport will serve as a wave blocking jetty for the Ká-Hó port. In view of this and the problems of flight traffic congestion, there will be no need for another airport at Sanzao. However, as of mid–1993, it appears that a domestic airport will be built at Sanzao.

43. According to Bruce Taylor (personal correspondence) Zhuhai has announced plans to have Formula One Grand Prix racing by 1996 which would become competition for the Macau Formula Three Grand Prix. Macau is now in the process of upgrading its own Grand Prix facilities. Zhuhai has also proposed a causeway link to Tuen Men in Hong Kong's New Territories thereby circumventing Macau's new airport and port.

44. Huifen, Situ, “Zhuhai tun Aomen?” p. 43Google Scholar. Cheong, Cheang Tin, “A coordenação das infraestruturas entre Macau e Zhuhai,” Tribuna de Macau (27 de Abril 1991), p. 21Google Scholar. Gaolan Harbour should be able to handle 30 million tonnes of cargo by 1998.

45. Daokuāng, Yang, “Luelun Aomen de jingji fazhan yu chengshi jianshe wenti,” p. 21Google Scholar. This opinion was seconded by another member of the Academy: Peng, Chao Wai, “O papel de Macau nas relações de cooperação económica entre Guangdong, Hong Kong e Macau,” Tribuna de Macau (12 de Outubro 1991), p. A–6Google Scholar who felt that these islands along with Wanzai should at the least be interlinked with Macau by bridges. According to Fu, Cheong Cheok, “Lun Hengqin de kaifa yu Aomen nongye, zhonggongye de zhuanyi,” p. 92Google Scholar the rush to develop Xiaohengqin and Dahengqin (together known as Hengqin) began in 1990 with plans put forward to develop an export industrial processing zone. The islands' total area is 2.73 times that of Macau. Cheong feels that the economic climate is not right for developing Hengqin since Macau and foreign capital is lacking, there is little infrastructure on the islands, the population is only about 5,000 and the zone would compete with Macau for markets. Instead Cheong argues for development of agriculture as this activity has virtually disappeared in Macau.

46. de Macau, Govêrno da Província & Marques, José Luis, Breve Memória Documentada acêrca da Soberania e Jurisdiçāo de Portugal na llha de D. Joāo, Macarira ou Sio-Vong-Cam (Macau: Imprensa Nacional, 1923)Google Scholar.

47. For example according to Tribuna de Macau, 2 de Junho de 1990, p. 19 the government had to impose fines on anyone fishing for any species or collecting shellfish or seaweed in most of the waters adjacent to the territory.

48. According to Portela, Severe, “A Central dos fumos brancos,” Macau, Sér. 2, No. 13 (Maio 1993), pp. 14–15Google Scholar, the need to build a 550 million pataca waste incineration centre dates from Zhuhai's refusal to give the go ahead for a sanitary landfill of Macau rubbish in 1982. It is thought the Solid Waste Incineration Centre will provide enough capacity for Macau up to 2010.

49. “Aomen shengtai zaoshou pohuai jidai fa ‘zhi’ heshan,” (“The destruction of Macau's environment”), Zhongguo huanjing bao, No. 888 (25 12 1990), p. 4Google Scholar.

50. Batalha, Carlos, “Semana Verde de Macau,” Macau, No. 34 (Abril 1991), pp. 56–63Google Scholar. In 1991 this event attracted over 22,300 participants.

51. Santos, Luís, “25 edificios e dois templos vāo receber obras de restauro,” Tribuna de Macau (19 de Outubro 1991), p. 9Google Scholar notes that 18.3% of the total area of the Macau peninsula now has protected status. The functions of the Comissāo de Defesa passed to the lnstituto Cultural de Macau (Macau Cultural Institute) when it was formed in 1982.

52. Duncan, Craig, “Development of Macau's city landscape,” in Cremer, , Macau, p. 182Google Scholar. For the stronger opinions of Francisco Figueira, a Portuguese architect who has been involved in preservation in Macau since the mid–1970s, see Gomes, Clara, “Patrimdóio indefeso,” Comércio de Macau (12 de Dezembro 1992)Google Scholar. For comments by Carlos Batalha see Santos, Luis, “Ambiente e cimento,” Tribuna de Macau (21 de Março 1992), p. 15Google Scholar. As the head of the Department of Traffic points out, Macau has already reached capacity for automobiles with ten new vehicles still entering the territory each day – Lopes, Gilberto, “Carlos Nunes: ‘Sem tiscalização. código da estrada nao resolve nada’,” Tribuna de Macau (19 de Dezembro 1992), pp. 16–17Google Scholar. Chun, Ho Wa, “Melhorar o planeamento urbano,” Tribuna de Macau (8 de Junho 1991), p. A–3Google Scholar notes how serious noise pollution problems are, especially in low income areas, and suggests that the government must begin to think more about long-term environmental control.

53. Feitor, Renato and Cremer, Rolf Dieter, “Macau's modern economy,” in Cremer, , Macau, p. 189Google Scholar add geographical location, access to foreign markets and the existence of a nucleus of dynamic entrepreneurs as favourable economic growth factors.

54. Keong, Wong Hon, “Aomen guoduqi fazhan jingji miandui de maodun ji chulu de xuanze,” p. 5Google Scholar gives a 8.6% annual growth rate for Macau from 1980 to 1985 compared with 6.9% for Hong Kong, 6.8% for Singapore, and 6.3% for Taiwan. According the the adjunct-secretary for Economics and Finance, Vftor Pessoa (Comfircio de Macau (5 de Dezember 1992), p. 5), textiles in Macau still have labour costs on the order of 50% of those in Hong Kong but the levels of productivity are said to be lower than 50% of Hong Kong.

55. Feitor, and Cremer, , “Macau's modern economy,” p. 190Google Scholar. Cremer, Rolf Dieter, “Chinese entrepreneurs and enterprises,” in Cremer, , Macau, pp. 207–208Google Scholar.

56. Sit, Victor F.S., Cremer, Rolf Dieter and Wong, Siu Lun, Entrepreneurs and Enterprises in Macau: A Study in Industrial Development (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, API Press, 1991), pp. 204–207Google Scholar. Cremer, Rolf Dieter, “Economic development under conditions of inter-national dependency of the manufacturing industry,” in Cremer, R. D. (ed.), Industrial Economy of Macau in the 1990s (Hong Kong: API Press, 1990), pp. 23–24Google Scholar. Yuhuang, Bao, “Guanyu Zhu Ao liangdi jingji guanxi de sikao” (“Economic relations between Macau and Zhuhai”), Aomen YanjiulJournal of Macau Studies, Vol. 1 (1988), p. 45Google Scholar. Shiming, Lin, “Guoduqi Aomen jingji fazhan xuyao zhuyi de wenti de tantao” (“Economic development of Macau during the transitional period”), Aomen YanjiulJournal of Macau Studies, Vol. 1 (1988), p. 12Google Scholar points out that as of the mid-1980s only one-quarter to one-third of Macau's workforce was literate or semi-literate in Chinese. Virtually the whole workforce is illiterate in Portuguese. One exception to the lack of training facilities is the government Hotel and Tourism Training Centre which saw its enrolment climb by 40% in 1990. In addition the University of Macau and the new Macau Polytechnic Institute are increasing their abilities to train people in various skills.

57. Kamm, , “Macau's economic role in the West River Delta,” p. 239Google Scholar.

58. For a start the data for Guangdong will include Hainan for 1986 and 1987.

59. Pinho, António Duarte de Almeida, “Gambling in Macau,” in Cremer, , Macau, pp. 255–56Google Scholar states that the State of Nevada in the USA is the only place with a comparable amount of public expenditure financed from gambling. According to O Jogo em Macau (Macau: Inspecçāo dos Contratos de Jogos, 1985), p. 69Google Scholar public revenue in Macau was 58% derived from gambling in 1984. The dominance of Hong Kong gamblers is implied by the fact that the average length of stay for a visitor to Macau is 1.35 days.

60. Friedland, Jonathan, “A winning streak,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 6 09 1990, pp. 56–59Google Scholar.

61. Business Profile Series: Macau (Hong Kong: The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, 1989), p. 22Google Scholar.

62. During 1990 the races were televised in Taiwan, but telebets were blocked by the Nationalist government and, according to some, the Hong Kong Jockey Club. The track fell into deep financial trouble and had to be rescued by a consortium led by Stanley Ho's STDM in January 1991. Off-track uncrontrolled betting is increasing and it is said that the remaining Taiwan interests are dissatisfied with their investment.

63. Wigan, Richard, “A ‘bit on the side’ helps boost Macau,” South China Morning Post, 14 08 1991Google Scholar notes that it is even speculated that Hong Kong businessmen have fuelled the property boom by purchasing weekend hideaway flats for their mistresses.

64. Feitor, and Cremer, , “Macau's modern economy,” p. 192Google Scholar. Keong, Wong Hon, “Aomen guoduqi fazhan jingji miandui de maodun ji chulu de xuanze,” p. 9Google Scholar advocated further concentration of Macau's industry in certain specializations such as high quality textile products. However, he also noted that such a policy is dangerous in an era of growing protectionism.

65. Feitor, and Cremer, , “Macau's modem economy,” p. 194Google Scholar.

66. Cremer, , “Chinese entrepreneurs and enterprises,” p. 218Google Scholar. Yeung, Eric, “Uma questāo de sovrevivência,” Comércio de Macau (31 de Outubro 1992), pp. 9–10Google Scholar feels that for Macau's industry to survive after 1999 it will be necessary that the current multi-fibre quotas continue, that Macau is viewed as a useful entry point to China, and that the government and industry introduce structural alterations to create a more flexible business environment.

67. Edmonds, Richard Louis, “Land use in Macau: changes between 1972 and 1983,” Land Use Policy (01 1986), pp. 58–60Google Scholar.

68. In 1988 Macau negotiated with Zhuhai to supply water up to 1999 to make up for shortages in the local supply. According to Macau, Sér. 2, No. 1 (Maio 1992), p. 97Google ScholarPubMed the Companhia de Electricidade de Macau has invested enough funds in new electric generators on Coloane to ensure adequate electric supplies until 1995. Recent discoveries of natural gas on Hainan are more likely to be directed via pipeline towards Hong Kong than Macau.

69. Cheong, Cheang Tin, “A coordenaçāo das infraestruturas,” p. 21Google Scholar states that in 1987 the price of electricity in Macau was 71.6% higher than in Hong Kong and 112.5% higher than in Taiwan. There has been talk of laying a cable to channel Hong Kong electric power to Macau.

70. Keong, Wong Hon, “Aomen guoduqi fazhan jingji miandui de maodun ji chulu de xuanze,” p. 5Google Scholar.

71. For more on the Macaense dialect see Lume, José Miguel Riveiro, “Centre of Portuguese language and culture,” in Cremer, , Macau, pp. 133–34Google Scholar and Batalha, Graciete Agostinho Noguiera, Língua de Macau: O que foi e o que é (Macau: Imprensa Nacional, 1974)Google Scholar. According to Zepp, Raymond A., “Interface of Chinese and Portuguese cultures,” in Cremer, , Macau, p. 155Google Scholar there are less than 20 people alive in Macau who can speak the Macaense dialect. For information on Macaense cuisine see Gomes, Maria Margarida, A Cozinha Macaense (Macau: Imprensa Nacional, 1984)Google Scholar and Senna, Maria Celestina de Mello e, Bons Petiscos (Macau: Direcçāo dos Serviços de Turismo, 1983)Google Scholar.

72. Básica, Conselho Consultivo da LeiRegião, da Administrativa Especial Macau, deda, República Popular China, da (ed.), Lei Básica da Região Administrativa Especial de Macau da Repiiblica Popular da China (Macau: Tipografia San Ngai, 1993), p. 19Google Scholar. On page 1, the preamble refers to the Portuguese gradual occupation of Macau since the mid–16th century. Bruce Taylor (personal communication) points out that this has caused considerable concern amongst the Macaense and Portuguese communities.

73. In 1991 9.2% of the population spoke Chinese languages other than Cantonese and Standard Chinese (Mandarin). For more discussion of issues related to the status of ethnic Chinese women, mainland Chinese migrant workers, and ethnic Chinese secondary school students in Macau see Xinxin, Chen, Aomen shehui chūtan (A Preliminary Discussion of Macau's Society) (Hong Kong: Wanshiwei, 1992)Google Scholar.

74. Lun, Wong Siu, “Chinese entrepreneurship in Macau,” in Cremer, , Industrial Economy of Macau in the 1990s, pp. 27–36Google Scholar. Sit, , Cremer, and Wong, Siu Lun, Entrepreneurs and Enterprises in Macau, p. 55Google Scholar.

75. Business Profile Series: Macau, p. 22.

76. The 1991 census gave Macau an official preliminary population figure of 354,537 although most agree that something closer to 450,000 or 500,000 is probably more accurate. Shiming, Lin, “Guoduqi Aomen jingji fazhan xuyao zhuyi de wenti de tantao,” p. 15Google Scholar and Keong, Wong Hon, “Aomen guoduqi fazhan jingji miandui de maodun ji chulu de xuanze,” pp. 6–9Google Scholar have even advocated allowing Macau's population to rise to one million by 2010, through immigration of selected Chinese labour and to a lesser extent natural increase in order to solve labour shortages and increase the size of the territory's domestic market. A Macau government planning report of 1987 estimates a population of 710,000 in 2010.

77. Lam, , “Administration and public service system in Macau,” pp. 326–27Google Scholar, notes that the Governor at that time, Carlos Melancia and the Chief of the Security Forces, Col. Proença de Almeida, who was responsible to military authorities in Portugal, used this incident as a political football. Putting the security forces under an adjunct secretary directly responsible to the Governor increases the power of the Governor and reduces the chance that this sort of incident could occur again.

78. Asia Yearbook 1992, p. 149.

79. Underlying tension between the small Macaense and Portuguese communities and the Chinese majority surfaced over the future of the statue to Joāo Maria Ferreira do Amaral, a Governor of Macau assassinated by a group of Chinese on 22 August 1849. The statue had been standing in Macau since 24 June 1940. In 1990 the director of the Chinese State Council's Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, Lu Ping, stated that the statue should be removed prior to 1999 as it was a symbol of colonialism - a view echoed in the Beijing-controlled Macau newspapers and also held by many of Macau's ethnic Chinese. On Overseas Portuguese Day (10 June 1990) Governor Melancia deleted a passage referring to Ferreira do Amaral from a speech to be given by Portuguese Minister for Parliamentary Affairs, Dias Loureiro, in order not to offend the Chinese. Loureiro was delayed and the speech was read with this section and another passage deleted. This angered Portuguese politicians who saw the gesture as giving in to the Chinese. Melancia was called to Lisbon to answer questions about the affair. In August a project to build a car park was taken as the pretext to announce plans to remove Ferreira do Amaral's statue. In September 1990 it was said that the project would begin in December and be completed in ten months. However, Melancia fell from power. At roughly the same time the Bank of China building was completed to become the biggest symbol of growing Chinese influence while the statue stayed where it was as opinions about what to do with it multiplied. In September 1991 Governor Vasco Joaquim Rocha Vieira announced that the statue would be transferred to a proper place in Lisbon. However, it still aroused sensitivities prior to its removal in 1992. Some Macau Chinese stated that it should not have been removed as it was property of Macau not Portugal, many Macaense worried that removal was a sign of their further disenfranchisement, while the Portuguese rejoiced that movement of the five tonne statue was completed with no major incident. For a recent Portuguese reflection on the matter see also Fernandes, João, “Ferreira do Amaral tornou a ser polémico,” Macau, Sér. 2, No. 14 (Junho 1993), pp. 92–93Google Scholar. According to José, Carlos Morais, “Polémica à porta,” Ponto Final (29 de Janeiro 1993), pp. 4–5Google Scholar and Clarke, Rachel, “Row over financing of public projects in Macau,” South China Morning Post (12 04 1993)Google Scholar, a plan to erect seven monuments to Sino-Portuguese friendship has been criticized locally as a waste of money. Presumably the purpose of these monuments is in part to replace the Ferreira do Amaral statue.

80. Bray, Mark, “Colonialism, scale and politics: divergence and convergence of educational development in Hong Kong and Macau,” Comparative Education Review, Vol. 36, No. 3 (1992), p. 322Google Scholar, has noted the differences in Macau's and Hong Kong's education systems. However, colonial heritage and proximity have led these two territories to share more educational features than either does with Taiwan or the People's Republic.

81. Brock, Colin, “The educational context,” in Bacchus, Kazim and Brock, Colin (eds.), The Challenge of Scale: Educational Development in the Small States of the Commonwealth (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1987), p. 8Google Scholar.

82. Pinto, M. Conceição Alves, Ensino em Macau: Uma Abordagem Sistémica da Realidade Educativa (Macau: Gabinete do Secretário-Adjunto para a Educação e Cultura, 1987), pp. 20–21Google Scholar. Rosa, Alexandre, “Educação em mudança,” Macau, Sér. 2, No. 2 (Junho 1992), p. 63Google Scholar. For more detail on Macau's education system see Keong, Wong Hon [Hanqiang, Huang] (ed.), Aomen jiaoyu gaigelReforma da Educação de MacaulEducation Reform in Macau (Macau: Centra de Estudos de Macau, University of East Asia, 1991)Google Scholar.

83. Bray, , “Colonialism, scale, and politics,” p. 329Google Scholar.

84. As of the 1991–92 academic year over 83% of the students in Macau were in Chinese schools and 9% were in Anglo-Chinese schools. Only 0.6% of the territory's population are native speakers of English.

85. “91 As linhas de acção goveraativa,” p. 42.

86. According to Bray, , “Colonialism, scale, and politics,” p. 336Google Scholar, financial inducements for the study of Portuguese were introduced in 1987. In 1988 the government even tried to make Portuguese a compulsory subject in all private schools, but was forced by local opposition to retract this policy.

87. According to “91 As linhas de accao governativa,” p. 43 nearly 700 Macau students were already studying with government scholarships at what is now the University of Macau in 1991. Between 1987 and 1992 close to 300 local pupils were trained at the University to take on responsibilities in the Macau government.

88. Yee, and Lo, , “Macau in transition,” p. 916Google Scholar.

89. Lam, , “Administration and public service system in Macau,” p. 323Google Scholar. Harrison, , “English in Macau,” p. 150Google Scholar.

90. Asia Yearbook 1992, p. 149. Wan, Mariana, “Macau in for bumpy landing,” South China Morning Post-Spectrum (4 08 1991), p. 3Google Scholar.

91. While the Portuguese have often stressed the role that Macau can play in increasing contacts between China and the Latin world, it is interesting to see a Cuban, , Rivero, Enrique Bryon, “Macao,” Páginas (Havana) No. 6 (1991), p. 47Google Scholar reiterate this point. For a Macau Chinese voicing the economic potential of the Luso connection see Keong, Wong Hon, “Aomen guoduqi fazhan jingji miandui de maodun ji chulu de xuanze,” p. 8Google Scholar. For mainland Chinese see Qiang, Lei and Tianxiang, Zheng, “Aomen yu Zhu Jiang sanjiaozhou jingji guanxi fazhan de xinshiqi” (“A new era in the relation between Macau and the Pearl River delta”), Aomen Yanjiw'Journal of Macau Studies, Vol. 1 (1988), p. 38Google Scholar and Shouqian, Zhang, “Aomen jingji de fazhan jiqi zai YaTai diqu de diwei he zuoyong” (“Economic development of Macau and its position in the Asia-Pacific region”), Aomen YanjiulJournal of Macau Studies, Vol. 1 (1988), p. 50Google Scholar.

92. Economic links between Zhuhai and Macau are already substantial. According to Nogueira, Paulo, “Zhuhai e Cantāo: o delta do futuro,” Macau, Sér. 2, No. 7 (Novembro 1992), p. 9Google Scholar, Macau investments made up 38% of the total external investments in Zhuhai during 1991. Only the volume from Hong Kong was larger. Macau received 61.7% of Zhuhai's exports in 1990. This amounted to about 44% Macau's imports from China. Over 76% of Macau's exports to China in U.S. dollar terms went to China via Zhuhai. Miranda, Leonel, “Aproveitar as complementaridades,” Comércio de Macau (31 de Outubro 1992), p. 8Google Scholar notes that as of 1991, 580 firms in Zhuhai were financed with Macau capital. Feitor, and Cremer, , “Macau's modern economy,” p. 197Google Scholar make the point that Macau and Zhuhai's products do not compete for local markets but for international markets which they suggest implies that Macau manufacturers are not likely to close their Macau operations if they open another plant in Zhuhai but rather may only shift labour intensive parts of their operation or some of their product lines out of the territory. Differing export quotas and tax preferences also encourage Macau investors in Zhuhai to continue to maintain their Macau operations.