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The “Second Wang Mine Line” (1935–38)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

Shum Kui Kwong
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Extract

Gregor Benton's article “The ‘Second Wang Ming Line’ (1935–38)” is the first major attempt to explore the internal ideological debates in the CCP during the Second United Front Period, the complexities of which have long been overlooked by other historians. In line with the prevailing tendency among historians to look upon Wang Ming as a young, inexperienced and dogmatic theoretician, Benton elaborates and confirms the official Chinese Communist interpretation of Wang's “rightist opportunism” or “capitulationism” in relation to the Kuomintang (KMT). He further asserts that Wang was simply a spokes-man for the Comintern, who framed his policies with “one eye on Moscow's foreign policy needs.” Proceeding on the assumption that Mao's internal statements do not provide conclusive evidence against Wang since the latter's secret reports are not available, he draws comparison between the public statements of Mao and Wang to support his view that fundamental and far-reaching conflicts existed between the two over various policy issues of the united front from 1935 onwards.

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Comment
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The China Quarterly , Volume 69 , March 1977 , pp. 136 - 145
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1977

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References

1. The China Quarterly, No. 61 (03 1975), pp. 61–94CrossRefGoogle Scholar;

2. See Wang Ming hsüan-chi (Tokyo: Kyoko shoin, 1970–1974, 4 vols., hereafter cited as WMHC), Vol. 4, pp. 179–304Google Scholar; Wang, had drastically revised his script in the Chiu-kuo yen-lun hsüan-chi (Hankow: Chung-Kuo ch'u-pan she, 1938)Google Scholar to accommodate the CCP in the then established alliance with the KMT.

3. Ibid. pp. 330–31.

4. Ibid. pp. 391–94.

5. For details of the concessions, see Mao Tse-Tung hsüan-chi, Vol. 1 (Peking: Jen-min ch'u-pan she, 1969, p. 247Google Scholar;

6. WMHC, Vol. 4, pp. 433–41.

7. See WMHC, Vol 1, pp. 142–44 for his detailed description of the structural composition of the democratic republic.

8. See Mō Takutõ shū, (Tokyo: Hokubo sha, 1970–1972, 10 vols.Google Scholar; hereafter cited as MTTS), Vol. 5, p. 72.

9. Ibid. pp. 70–71.

10. WMHC, Vol. 4, pp. 271–76.

11. WMHC, Vol. 1, pp. 129–30 and 137–38.

12. Bisson, T. A., Yenan in June 1937: Talks with the Communist Leaders (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), p. 47Google Scholar;

13. WMHC, Vol. 1, p. 205.

14. For a personal account, see Chang Kuo-t'ao's autobiography, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, 1928–1938, (Kansas University Press, 1972), Vol. 2, pp. 480–84Google Scholar;

15. The text of the telegram is in Hua-lun, Kuo, Chung-kung shih-lun, (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, 1969), Vol. 3, p. 201Google Scholar; According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, p. 488, Chou En-lai in his interview with Chiang Kai-shek re-affirmed the CCP's willingness to support Chiang as the national leader in resisting Japan. Benton further mentions Otto Braun's memoir which recalls the rumour that Chou had made a last-minute attempt at the airport to prevent Chiang from taking off (p. 72, note 64). According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, however, Chou was trying to dissuade Chang Hsüeh-liang from flying to Nanking together with Chiang (p. 489).

16. WMHC, Vol. 1, pp. 185–231.

17. Ibid. p. 286.

18. Ibid. pp. 285–86. See also pp. 181–83 and 217–18 for similar views.

19. MTTS, Vol. 5, p. 325.

20. See Chang Kuo-t'ao, pp. 564–68.

21. According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, p. 569, Mao expressed complete approval for Wang's views along with others. In 1945, Mao acknowledged that up to October 1938, the KMT had made satisfactory progress towards resistance and the Communists all placed “high expectations” upon the KMT, see MTTS, Vol. 9, p. 195. This seems to reflect the overall sentiment in the Party in favour of a more conciliatory attitude towards the KMT.

22. Wang advocated mobile warfare as the main form of combat, to be co-ordinated with positional warfare, and guerrilla warfare was to be subsidiary. See WMHC, Vol. 1, pp. 327–34, esp. p. 335.

23. See Slyke, Van, Enemies and Friends, The United Front in Chinese Communist History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), pp. 162–63Google Scholar;

24. See WMHC, Vol. 1, pp. 340–41.

25. Ibid. p. 177.

26. Ibid. p. 338.

27. See Kai–shek, Chiang, Su-o tsai Chung-kuo (Taipei: Chung-yang wen-wu kung-ying-she, n.d.), pp. 88–9Google Scholar; and the text of the letter in Kuo, pp. 386–87.

28. MTTS, Vol. 6, pp. 221–48.

29. WMHC, Vol. 1, p. 246.

30. MTTS, Vol 6, p. 222.

31. See, for example, the debate at the Loch'uan Conference, Kuo Hua-lun, pp. 229–34; and Mao's, concluding speech at the Sixth Plenum, Mao Tse-tung hsüan-chi, Vol. 2, pp. 502–504Google Scholar;