1. These varied criticisms may be found in many analyses, including: Geremie Barmé, “Travelling heavy: the intellectual baggage of the Chinese diaspora,” Problems of Communism (January–April 1991), pp. 94–112;Google ScholarCalhoun, Craig, Neither Gods nor Emperors (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994);Google ScholarCalhoun, Craig and Calhoun, Craig, “Workers in the Tiananmen protests: the politics of the Beijing Workers' Autonomous Federation,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs (January 1993), pp. 1–29;Google ScholarCalhoun, Craig (ed.), Cries for Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990);Google ScholarCalhoun, Craig and Calhoun, Craig, “Acting out democracy: political theater in modern China,” Calhoun, Craig, “Casting a Chinese ‘democracy’ movement: the roles of students, workers, and entrepreneurs,” and Calhoun, Craig, “That holy word, ‘revolution,’” all in Calhoun, Craig and Calhoun, Craig (eds.), Popular Protest and Political Culture in Modern China: Learning from 1989, 2nd edition (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994). Criticisms of student behaviour also are voiced in the 1995 Long Bow Group film, The Gate of Heavenly Peace.Google Scholar

2. All interviewees were living in the United States at the time. Interviews were conducted in person and typically took between two and four hours.Google Scholar

3. Transcripts of this meeting are recorded in German Rhine Writers' Association 1989 Student Research Group, Huigu yu fansi (Review and Reflect) (1993). Meeting participants included: Bai Meng, Cai Chongguo, Chai Ling, Chang Jin, Feng Congde, Lao Mu, Li Lanju, Li Lu, Liang Er, Liu Wei, Liu Yan, Shen Tong, Wang Chaohua, Xin Ku, Yang Tao, Zhang Boli and Zhang Lun.Google Scholar

4. It should be emphasized that this project focuses solely on the situation in Beijing. In the conclusion, available accounts of protest activities in other cities are referenced in an attempt to assess the wider applicability of this project's findings.Google Scholar

5. The majority of these documents (in their original form) may be found in the Robin Munro Collection, copies of which are located in many university archives, including the University of California, Berkeley's Center for Chinese Studies Library. The “Tiananmen Archive” at Columbia University also includes other documents not found in this collection. Another useful compilation of movement documents may be found in Bajiu Zhongguo minyun ziliao ca (Data from the Chinese People's Movement of 1989) (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Student Union, 1991).Google Scholar

6. This movement is also known as the “White Lily” (Yebaihe) movement.Google Scholar

7. Information on the movement in Taiwan was derived from approximately 20 interviews with prominent student leaders, as well as all available primary and secondary written sources. Interviews were conducted in Taiwan in the autumn of 1994. The most comprehensive compilation of primary documents may be found in: Calhoun, Craig (ed.), Fennu de yebaihe (Indignant White Lily) (Taipei: Jianwang chubanshe, 1990).Google Scholar The most useful secondary sources are: Calhoun, Craig (ed.), Xin sheng dai de ziwo zhuixun (Self-Reflections on the New Era) (Taipei: Taiwan yanjiu jijinhui, 1991);Google ScholarCalhoun, Craig, Calhoun, Craig, Calhoun, Craig and Calhoun, Craig, Taipei xueyun (Taipei Student Movement) (Taipei: Zhongguo shibao chubanshe, 1990);Google Scholar and Calhoun, Craig, Bashi niandai (The Eighties) (Taipei: Taiwan yanjiu jijinhui, 1990).Google Scholar

8. See, for example, Calhoun, , Neither Gods nor Emperors; Walder and Gong Xiaoxia, “Workers in the Tiananmen protests”; and Perry, “Casting a Chinese ‘democracy’ movement.”Google Scholar

9. See, for example, Liu, “That holy word, ‘revolution.’”Google Scholar

10. See, for example, Calhoun, , Neither Gods nor Emperors, p. 19.Google Scholar Timothy Brook reaches a similar conclusion regarding government behaviour during the movement: see Calhoun, Craig, Quelling the People (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).Google Scholar

11. It is also likely that the 1989 movement in China influenced student protest strategy in Taiwan. Certainly, all residents of Taiwan had closely followed the events of the spring of 1989 in China and were distraught about the brutal end of the movement. Indeed, many prominent student leaders in Taiwan stressed that they consciously sought to avoid making the same mistakes as the protesters at Tiananmen. Given this, it is all the more interesting that students in Taiwan ultimately engaged in behaviour that was remarkably similar to that of their mainland counterparts.Google Scholar

12. Yen Chia-kan briefly held this post prior to the younger Chiang's ascension.Google Scholar

13. This also widely was expected. For example, on 2 January, the China Times Express (Zhongguo shibao) and Capital Morning Post (Shoudu tongxun) both featured front-page articles stating that Lee Teng-hui intended to choose non-mainstream member Lee Huan to be his vice-president.Google Scholar

14. At the time, Lin was President of the Judicial Yuan.Google Scholar

15. Chiang is the half-brother of Chiang Ching-kuo, and was at the time Secretary-General of the National Security Council.Google Scholar

16. Shao-chuan, Leng and Cheng-yi, Lin, “Political change on Taiwan: transition to democracy?” The China Quarterly, No. 136 (1993), pp. 810, 813;Google ScholarCalhoun, Craig and Calhoun, Craig, “The first Chinese democracy,” Asian Survey (March 1994), p. 223.Google Scholar

17. Most notably, non-KMT newspapers and journals were allowed to exist and had begun to increase their circulation.Google Scholar

18. At the same time, co-operation with, and loyalty to, the Party were often rewarded with desirable employment contracts and, in the case of Taiwan, scholarships.Google Scholar

19. Although in Taiwan it was technically illegal to expel a student for such activities, campus authorities had been able to skirt this rule. According to regulations, a student could be expelled only if he or she received three “large” demerits (three “small” demerits amounted to one “large”). In 1985, National Taiwan University student activist Lee Wen-chung was given two “large” demerits and two “small” demerits for participating in a campus protest demonstration. Shortly thereafter, Lee was accused of violating a registration technicality and punished with a third “small” demerit. He was subsequently expelled.Google Scholar

20. See, for example, Chong, Woei Lien, “Petitioners, Popperians, and hunger strikers: the unco-ordinated efforts of the 1989 Chinese democratic movement,” in Calhoun, Craig (ed.), The Chinese People's Movement: Perspectives on Spring 1989 (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1990);Google ScholarKhu, Josephine M. T., “Student organization in the movement,” in Forges, Roger Des, Calhoun, Craig and Calhoun, Craig (eds.), Chinese Democracy and the Crisis of 1989 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993);Google Scholar and Calhoun, Craig, China Rising: the Meaning of Tiananmen (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1990), pp. 134–13.Google ScholarA unique counter-assessment of this salon-centred approach can be found in Calhoun, Craig and Calhoun, Craig, “Student associations and mass movements,” in Calhoun, Craig, Calhoun, Craig, Calhoun, Craig and Calhoun, Craig (eds.), Urban Spaces in Contemporary China (New York: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, 1995).Google Scholar

21. Calhoun, Craig and Calhoun, Craig, Review and Reflect, p. 3.Google Scholar

22. They were Wang Dan, Chang Jin, Feng Congde, Ding Xiaoping, Zhang Boli, Guo Haifeng, Yang Tao, Xiong Yan and Zhang Zhiyong.Google Scholar

23. Calhoun, Craig, Review and Reflect, p. 4.Google Scholar

24. Calhoun, Craig, Review and Reflect, p. 21.Google Scholar

25. Ibid. p. 22.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid. p. 26.

28. Both had been key participants in Beida's “Wednesday Forum” (which existed for a few months during the 1987–88 institution year) and “Democracy Salon” (which formed in the autumn of 1988, and remained in existence during the early spring of 1989).Google Scholar

29. Calhoun, Craig, Review and Reflect, p. 57.Google Scholar

30. There had been no elections for union offices; the three leaders had appointed themselves to these positions. The “union office” was Wu'er Kaixi's dormitory room. No department had yet registered with the union because no Shida students had heard of the union until they read the poster.Google Scholar

31. Calhoun, Craig, Review and Reflect, p. 31.Google Scholar

32. For example, Wang Dan attended the first meeting, but at the time his connection with the BAU was tenuous.Google Scholar

33. See Calhoun, Craig, Review and Reflect, p. 25Google Scholar; and Calhoun, Craig, ibid. p. 37.Google Scholar

34. “It is necessary to take a clear-cut stand against turmoil,” People's Daily, 26 April 1989,Google Scholar reprinted in Calhoun, Craig, Calhoun, Craig and Calhoun, Craig (eds.), Beijing Spring, 1989: Confrontation and Conflict: The Basic Documents (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1990), pp. 207–208.Google Scholar

35. Calhoun, Craig, Review and Reflect, p. 44.Google Scholar

36. Wu'er Kaixi was elected in his stead. Zhou was allowed to remain on the Standing Committee.Google Scholar

37. Suggestions that the students begin a hunger strike had been raised prior to 10 May, but these suggestions had not received widespread support, as many felt that such an action should be undertaken only as a “last-ditch” strategy. Apparently, the idea was previously put forth in many different arenas. For example, it is reported that on 9 May some graduate students in Building #46 at Beida displayed a poster calling for a hunger strike (Feng Congde, Review and Reflect, p. 124). In addition, Zhang Boli had earlier suggested an on-campus hunger strike, noting that this way protesters could actually “sneak” some food in campus bathrooms (Chai Ling, ibid. p. 89). Further, on 8 May, Wu'er Kaixi made a speech to the chemistry department at Shida in which he expressed his desire to begin a hunger strike (Liang Er, ibid. p. 127).Google Scholar

38. Liu Yan, ibid. p. 123. The six students were Wu'er Kaixi, Wang Dan, Wang Wen, Cheng Zhen, Ma Shaofang and Yang Zhaohui.Google Scholar

39. The others were Wang Wen and Yang Zhaohui.Google Scholar

40. Wu'er, Kaixi and Calhoun, Craig. See Calhoun, Craig, Review and Reflect, p. 89.Google Scholar

41. At a meeting a few days earlier, the group had discussed the possibility of a hunger strike, but decided that it should be used only as a “last moment” strategy.Google Scholar

42. Calhoun, Craig, Review and Reflect, p. 93.Google Scholar

43. Yang Zhaohui.Google Scholar

44. Calhoun, Craig, as quoted in Review and Reflect, pp. 94–95.Google Scholar

45. Wang Chaohua, ibid. p. 95.Google Scholar

46. Chai Ling, ibid. p. 90.Google Scholar

47. Liang Er, ibid. p. 97.Google Scholar

48. The group had a nucleus of about 800, although there were many onlookers standing nearby (Feng Congde, ibid. p. 130).Google Scholar

49. Ibid. p. 131.

50. Approximately 40 schools sent representatives, and each representative was required to show student identification prior to entry (ibid. p. 136).Google Scholar

51. Ibid. p. 136.

52. Ibid. p. 137.

53. Upon hearing this news, the Hunger Strike Command announced that the hunger strike would end that evening, although Feng Congde and others argued for its continuation. In the end, some students continued their hunger strikes, but most students ceased.Google Scholar

54. Calhoun, Craig, Review and Reflect, p. 223.Google Scholar

55. Participants included Wu'er Kaixi, Wang Dan, Liang Er, Feng Congde, Chai Ling, Lao Mu, Zhang Lun, Wang Juntao, Liu Gang, Chen Ziming, Liu Xiaobo and many others (Feng Congde, in Review and Reflect, p. 271).

56. This date was chosen because it was ten days after the start of martial law, and thus would symbolically show that the movement had “broken” martial law. Further, it was agreed that it would be best to “self-end” the movement before the authorities arrived to crush it (Feng Congde, ibid. p. 271).Google Scholar

57. Ibid. pp. 238–39.

58. Unaware of this change of plan, on 29 May, Wu'er Kaixi and Wang Dan arrived at the Square to announce the withdrawal. Chai Ling then informed them of the hunger strikers' veto of the proposal. In consequence, when Wang and Wu'er took the microphone, they could only “suggest” that the students withdraw. Immediately following this statement, Zhang Boli announced that the Hunger Strike Command had decided to remain at the Square. Ibid.Google Scholar

59. The others were He Zhongxian and Yang Hongren.Google Scholar

60. Calhoun, Craiget al., Taipei Student Movement, p. 36.Google Scholar

61. Calhoun, Craig (ed.), Self-Reflections on the New Era, p. 404.Google Scholar

62. Calhoun, Craig, The Eighties, p. 304.Google Scholar

63. Calhoun, Craig (ed.), Self-Reflections on the New Era, p. 410.Google Scholar

64. “President faces students, presidential house becomes site of negotiations” (transcription of dialogue), Xin xinwen (The Reporter), 26 March–1 April 1990, p. 72.Google Scholar

65. The final tally was 32–1, with four abstentions (Calhoun, Craig (ed.), Self-Reflections on the New Era, p. 426).Google Scholar

66. Ibid. p. 426.

67. Ibid. p. 428.

68. Calhoun, Craig, The Eighties, p. 336.Google Scholar

69. Calhoun, Craiget al., Taipei Student Movement, p. 37.Google Scholar

70. Of course, interviewees had an interest in down-playing any clitist reasoning which may also have supported this strategy. In addition, they may have been simply unaware of their elitism. Yet, had this sort of attitude been the primary reason for this strategy choice, one might expect at least some indication of disdain toward workers during lengthy interviews. Further, given the current bitterness that exists among many prominent leaders of the 1989 movement, as well as widespread accusations of student elitism in many analyses of the movement, one might expect interviewees to accuse their antagonists of such attitudes. However, none of those interviewed made any such claims. Neither did interviewees from Taiwan make any statements of this nature. Thus, although elitism certainly may have influenced the students' decision-making process, student statements and student-produced documents provide no clear evidence that this was the primary cause of their strategy choice.Google Scholar

71. Most notably, in interviews with Andrew Walder and Gong Xiaoxia, two individuals involved in the Beijing Workers' Autonomous Federation claim that student leaders wanted no ties with city workers (Walder and Gong Xiaoxia, “Workers in the Tiananmen protests”). Similarly, in interviews with Anita Chan and Jonathan Unger, a junior faculty member from Chongqing reports that students there were greatly embarrassed when it was discovered that the two persons they had elected as their leaders were not students but private entrepreneurs (getihu) (see Calhoun, Craig and Calhoun, Craig, “Voices from the protest movement in Chongqing: class accents and class tensions,” in Calhoun, Craig (ed.), The Pro-Democracy Protests in China: Reports from the Provinces (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1991)).Google Scholar

72. See, for example, Calhoun, Craig, Almost a Revolution (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1990), p. 277;Google Scholar and Calhoun, Craig, Review and Reflect, p. 298.Google Scholar

73. For a similar account of these activities, see Calhoun, Craig, Review and Reflect, p. 33.Google Scholar

74. “Xinwen kuaixun” (“News bulletin”), 31 May 1989, p. 5. From Robin Munro Collection, UC Berkeley Center for Chinese Studies Library, Section XXIII, Document 1.Google Scholar

75. Beijing University pamphlet (undated). From Robin Munro Collection, Section II, Document 4.Google Scholar

76. “Courageously stand up, working brothers,” Beijing University leaflet (undated). From Robin Munro Collection, Section II, Document 29.Google Scholar

77. All-Beijing City Students' Autonomous Federation flyer, 31 May 1989. From Robin Munro Collection, Section XIII, Document 1.Google Scholar

78. See also Walder and Gong Xiaoxia, “Workers in the Tiananmen protests,” p. 7.Google Scholar

79. Ibid. p. 6.

80. Perhaps most notably, founders of the DPP had been involved in the Chung-li incident of 1977 and Kao-hsiung incident of 1979. More recently, in August 1988 police attempting to arrest DPP legislator Hung Chi-chang (for his alleged involvement in violent demonstrations in May and June) were met by approximately 80 protesters wielding clubs. In the three-hour confrontation which followed, three officers sustained head injuries and were hospitalized (see “Dissidents clash with police in Taipei,” South China Morning Post, 30 August 1988).Google Scholar Similarly, in October 1989 a riot erupted as DDP members protested against the arrest of DPP leader Hsu Hsin-liang. Fifteen officers and at least ten demonstrators were injured; 15 protesters were detained (see “Double Tenth marked with street clashes and prison protest,” Hong Kong Standard, 11 October 1989Google Scholar; “Kuomintang faces challenge over detention of dissident,” South China Morning Post, 11 October 1989).Google Scholar Further, in January 1990, seven DPP members were charged with instigating a riot following a disputed election (see “Democrat candidate charged over riot,” Hong Kong Standard, 7 January 1990).Google Scholar And in February a DPP rally turned into a 15-hour street battle that resulted in the destruction of 19 cars, the injury of over 100 persons and the arrest of five (see “Police ordered to take tough stand on riots,” South China Morning Post, 22 February 1990Google Scholar; “Taiwan's age war,” Asiaweek, 9 March 1990).Google Scholar

81. Zhonghua ribao, 14 March 1990, p. 1.Google Scholar

82. Zhongguo shibao, 17 March 1990, p. 1 and 18 March 1990, pp. 2–3.Google Scholar

83. Zhongguo shibao, 19 March 1990, pp. 1–2.Google Scholar

84. “Taipei municipal police announce principle: don't interfere with the student action, but continue to protect student safety,” Zhongguo shibao, 20 March 1990, p. 4.Google Scholar

85. Chan and Unger, “Voices from the protest movement in Chongqing: class accents and class tensions.”Google Scholar

86. Calhoun, Craig, “Letter from Shanghai,” and Calhoun, Craig, “Shanghai's response to the deluge,” both in Unger, (ed.), The Pro-Democracy Protests in China.Google Scholar

87. Calhoun, Craig, Anthems of Defeat: Crackdown in Hunan Province 1989–1992 (New York: Asia Watch, 1992), pp. 7–8.Google Scholar

88. For example, workers reportedly joined students in a hunger strike on 16 May, and on 24 May the Changsha Students' Autonomous Federation organized a mass demonstration in conjunction with the Changsha Workers' Autonomous Federation (Tang Boqiao, Anthems of Defeat, pp. 10–15).Google Scholar

89. See, for example, Calhoun, Craig, Student Protests in Twentieth-Century China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 137.Google Scholar

90. See Calhoun, Craig, Civil War in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 42–90.Google Scholar

91. Ibid. p. 43.

92. See Wasserstrom, Student Protests in Twentieth-Century China, and Pepper, Civil War in China.Google Scholar

93. Calhoun, Craig, Calhoun, Craig and Calhoun, Craig, “A comparative synthesis on social movements and revolution: towards an integrated perspective,” paper prepared for The Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (San Francisco: 29 August–1 September 1996), p. 1.Google Scholar

94. See, for example, Calhoun, Craig, “The structure of political opportunities and peasant mobilization in Central America,” Comparative Politics (1991), pp. 253–274;Google ScholarCalhoun, Craiget al., “New social movements and political opportunities in Western Europe,” European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 22 (1992), pp. 219–244;Google ScholarCalhoun, Craig, “The impact of national contexts on social movement structures: a cross-movement and cross-national comparison,” in Calhoun, Craig, Calhoun, Craig and Calhoun, Craig (eds.), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996);Google Scholar and Calhoun, Craig, Power in Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). A synthesis of these arguments may be found in Doug McAdam, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, “Introduction: opportunities, mobilization structures, and framing processes – toward a synthetic, comparative perspective on social movements,” and Doug McAdam, “Conceptual origins, problems, future directions,” both in McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (eds.), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements.Google Scholar

95. See especially Porta, Donatella della, Social Movements, Political Violence and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995)CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Porta, Donatella della, “Social movements and the state: thoughts on the policing of protest,” in McAdam, , McCarthy, and Zald, (eds.), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements; and Brockett, , “The structure of political opportunities and peasant mobilization in Central America.”Google Scholar

96. See Calhoun, Craig and Calhoun, Craig, “Framing political opportunity,” in McAdam, , McCarthy, and Zald, (eds.), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements.Google Scholar

97. Calhoun, Craig, “Feminist politics in the U.S. and West Germany,” in Calhoun, Craig and Calhoun, Craig (eds.), The Women's Movement of the United States and Western Europe (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987);Google ScholarCalhoun, Craig, “Social movements during cycles of issue attention: the decline of the anti-nuclear energy movements in West Germany and the USA,” British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 42 (1991), pp. 43–60;Google ScholarCalhoun, Craig, “Political opportunity structures and political protest: anti-nuclear movements in four democracies,” British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 16 (1986), pp. 57–85;Google ScholarKriesi, et al., “New social movements and political opportunities in Western Europe,” and Calhoun, Craiget al., The Politics of New Social Movements in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis (Minneapolis and St. Paul: University of Minnesota Press, 1995)Google Scholar; Rucht, , “The impact of national contexts on social movement structures: a cross-movement and cross-national comparison”; Calhoun, Craig, Social Movements, Political Violence and the State and “Social movements and the state: thoughts on the policing of protest.”Google Scholar

98. See Rucht, “The impact of national contexts on social movement structures: a cross-movement and cross-national comparison,” pp. 191–92.Google Scholar

99. Della Porta, “Social movements and the state: thoughts on the policing of protest,” p. 64.Google Scholar

100. See, for example, Calhoun, Craig, LouisZurcher, Jr. Zurcher, Jr. and Sheldon, Eklund-Olson, “Social networks and social movements: a microstructural approach to differential recruitment,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 45 (1980), pp. 787–801;Google ScholarCalhoun, Craig, “Social movements and resource mobilization,” Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters: Special Issue on Collective Behaviour and Social Movements in Comparative Perspective (1986);Google ScholarCalhoun, Craig, “Recruitment to high-risk activism: the case of Freedom Summer,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 91 (1986), pp. 64–90;Google ScholarWilson, K. and Calhoun, Craig, “Mobilizing people for collective political action,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Vol. 4 (1976), pp. 187–202Google Scholar; and Calhoun, Craig and Calhoun, Craig, “Understanding rapid social movement growth: the role of organizational form, consensus support, and elements of the American state” (paper presented at Social Movements Conference, Ann Arbor, Michigan: 1988).Google Scholar

101. An intriguing study of the budding women's movement in post-Communist Russia also finds a substantial correlation between organizational growth and friendship ties. See Calhoun, Craig, Engendering Transition: The Women's Movement in Contemporary Russia (University of California Berkeley: PhD dissertation, 1997).Google Scholar