¹ On the cruelty of the Athenians' ultimate decision (3.50), see Connor, W. R., Thucydides (Princeton, 1984), pp. 86–7.Google Scholar

² Lewis, D. M., Cambridge Ancient History, v² (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 405–6.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³ Wassermann, F. M., TAPA 87 (1956), p. 34.Google Scholar

⁴ 2.65.4, 4.28.3, 6.24. See Hornblower, S., Thucydides (Baltimore, 1987), p. 166Google Scholar. On Athenian gullibility, see below, n. 9.

⁵ 3.36.6: τῳ … δμῳ παρ πολὺ ν τῳ τóτε πιθανώτατος. Cf. 4.21.3.

⁶ Hornblower, , A Commentary on Thucydides (Oxford, 1991), p. 420Google Scholar, translates βιαιóτατος ‘forceful,’ suggesting that ‘“violent” … is perhaps too unfavourable.’ It is better to allow the word to embrace both senses, in the way indicated in the text.

⁷ 5.16.1. Cf. 3.42.2 (Diodotus speaking), 4.27.4.

⁸ Andrewes, A., Phoenix 16 (1962), p. 72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁹ Ethos, as used by Aristotle in connection with the three modes of persuasion, designates ‘the trustworthy character of a speaker as artistically created in a speech’ (Kennedy, G., Aristotle on Rhetoric (Oxford, 1991), p. 163Google Scholar). This is what Dionysius of Halicarnassus has in mind when he speaks of ethopoiia in Lysias (Lysias 8), and it is to be distinguished from Lysianic ‘dramatic’ or ‘individual characterization’ (characters realistically flawed): see Carey, C., Lysias: Select Speeches (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 10–11Google Scholar; Kennedy, G., The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton, 1963), p. 136Google Scholar. (I will not discuss Cleon's ethos in stylistic terms. For a study of stylistic characterization in Thucydidean speeches, see Tompkins, D. P., YCS 22 (1972), pp. 181–214.)Google Scholar

If the Athenians do indeed find Cleon's ethos trustworthy, shall we then pronounce them foolish or gullible? Perhaps. But since the present paper focuses on the speaker rather than the audience, I shall defer discussion of the Athenians' gullibility until a later time.

¹⁰ Aristotle (Rhet. 2, 1378a 8–19) identifies πετ and φρóνησις as the two aspects of character which are essential to effective ethos-appeal. (εὔνοια pertains to πáθος).

¹¹ 3.37.2 ~ 2.63.2; 3.38.1 ~ 2.61.2 and 1.140.1; 3.40.4 ~ 2.63.2.

¹² Westlake, H. D., Individuals in Thucydides (Cambridge, 1968), p. 65Google Scholar. Pericles' imperial policy, as we know it from Thucydides, is that the Athenians ‘keep a tight hold on the allies’ (2.13.2: τà των ξυμμáχων διà χειρòς ἔχειν). For the Periclean tenor of Cleon's policy, see, besides Westlake, Gomme, A. W., More Essays in Greek History and Literature (Oxford, 1962), pp. 107–8Google Scholar; Woodhead, G., Mnemosyne 13 (1960), 297CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Saar, H.-G., Die Reden des Kleons und Diodotos im Gesamtwerk des Thukydides (Diss. Hamburg, 1953), pp. 99–100Google Scholar; Connor, W. R., The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens (Princeton, 1971), p. 134.Google Scholar

¹³ Kagan, D., The Archidamian War (Ithaca, 1974), p. 158Google Scholar and YCS 24 (1975), 82–4Google Scholar. Gomme, A. W., More Essays (op. cit.), pp. 107–8 minimalizes the contrast.Google Scholar

¹⁴ We again see Cleon advocating a policy of destruction in the case of Scione, this time with complete success (4.122.6). Cleon's ruthlessness is also apparent in his treatment of Torone (5.3.4).

¹⁵ Finley, J. H., Three Essays on Thucydides (Cambridge, MA, 1967), p. 26CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On the purpose of the echoes, see Cairns, F., JHS 102 (1982), pp. 203–4CrossRefGoogle Scholar (bibliography: p. 203 n. 4); Rengakos, A., Form und Wandel des Machtdenkens der Athener bei Thukydides (Hermes Einzelschriften 48 [1984]), pp. 58–65Google Scholar (bibliography: p. 59 n. 144). Of the authorities, only de Romilly, J., Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism (Oxford 1963), pp. 163–7Google Scholar, is inclined to discount the significance of the ‘echoes.’ On Pericles as Cleon's predecessor in a ‘new polities’, see Connor, W. R., New Politicians (op. cit.), especially pp. 91–4, 119–22.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Cf. 5.14.3, 7.28.3.

¹⁷ 2.13.2. For the diverse meanings of the word, see Huart, P., ΓNΩMH chez Thucydide et ses contemporains (Paris, 1973)Google Scholar. See also Edmunds, L., Chance and Intelligence in Thucydides (Cambridge, MA 1975), pp. 11–12, n. 11 (bibliography).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁸ See de Romilly's, J. discussion of ‘la lutte entre la γνώμη de Périclès et les πγαí du peuple’ in Thucydide: La Guerre du Péloponnèse Livre II (Paris, 1962), pp. xvi–xxv (cf. 101)Google Scholar. Cf. also Huart, P., Le Vocabulaire de l'Analyse Psychologique dans l'Oeuvre de Thucydide (Paris, 1968), pp. 160–2Google Scholar; Zahn, R., Die Erste Periklesrede (Borna-Leipzig, 1934), pp. 59–61Google Scholar; Edmunds, L., Chance and Intelligence (op. cit.), pp. 13–15.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Cf. 1.140.1: της μν γνώμης αἰε της αὐτης ἔχομαι.

²⁰ R. Zahn, op. cit., p. 57.

²¹ Hornblower's, S. ‘wayward’ nicely captures the active sense of μαθως applied to events (Commentary (op. cit.), p. 227).Google Scholar

²² Cf. 2.40.3.

²³ For -μα/-σις synonymity, compare ξíωμα–ξíωσις (2.37.1). See Gomme, A. W., A Historical Commentary on Thucydides 2 (Oxford, 1956), p. 172Google Scholar; Rusten, J. S., Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War Book II (Cambridge, 1989), p. 138.Google Scholar

²⁴ 2.62.4: καταϕρνησις δ ὃς ἂν κα γνώμῃ πιστεῃ των ναντων προχειν, ὃ μîν ὑπρχει. See Zahn, R., Die Erste Periklesrede (op. cit.), p. 58Google Scholar; Edmunds, L., Chance and Intelligence (op. cit.), p. 73.Google Scholar

²⁵ 1.141.2–144.1, 2.13.3–9.

²⁶ 2.40.2–3, 43.1. See Macleod, C. W., Collected Essays (Oxford, 1983), pp. 127–8Google Scholar; Edmunds, L., Chance and Intelligence (op. cit.), p. 100Google Scholar. Elsewhere καταϕρνησις is dangerous and foolish, e.g. 1.122.4, 2.11.4. See Gomme, A. W., A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, vol. 3 (Oxford, 1956), p. 642.Google Scholar

²⁷ ‘A formula…endlessly repeated in the epitaphioi’, says Loraux, N., The Invention of Athens (Cambridge, MA, 1986), p. 99Google Scholar. Cf. Rusten, J. S., HSCP 90 (1986), pp. 71–4.Google Scholar

²⁸ J. S. Rusten, ibid., pp. 75–6. Cf. Parry, A. M., Logos and Ergon in Thucydides (Salem, NH, 1988), pp. 167–71.Google Scholar

²⁹ νδραγαθα differs from ρετ only in its specification of manliness (cf. 2.45.2: γυναικεα ρετ). So too when Socrates asks Meno to give his own version of arete, the young Thessalian responds (71e2): πρωτον μν, εἰ βολει νδρς ρετν … εἰ δ βολει γυναικς ρετν …

³⁰ Cf. 1.144.4, where Pericles says that the Athenians' fathers repelled the Medes γνώμῃ πλονι ἢ τχῃ κα τλμῃ μεζονι ἢ δυνμει.

³¹ Pericles' πργμων may allude to more or less specific political figures opposed to empire. But even if this is so, Pericles' concern is with the effect such people have on the ργ or disposition of the Athenians at large. See Wade-Gery, H. T., JHS 52 (1932), pp. 205–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Andrewes, A., JHS 98 (1978), pp. 1–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Groϐmann, G., Politische Schlagwörter aus der Zeit des Peloponnesischen Krieges (Zurich, 1950), pp. 133–6Google Scholar; Gomme, A. W.HCT 2 (op. cit.), pp. 177–8Google Scholar; Carter, L. B., The Quiet Athenian (Oxford, 1986), pp. 39–51Google Scholar. For the idea that 2.63 4 is directed against the ‘triumphant πργμονες’ of 404 B.c., see de Romilly, J., Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism (op. cit.), pp. 149–51Google Scholar. On πολυ- and πραγμοσνη in general, see Edmunds, L., Cleon, the Knights, and Aristophanes' Politics (Lanham, MD, 1987), pp. 17–20 and n. 10 (bibliography).Google Scholar

³² Cf. MacDowell, D., Mn 16 (1963), pp. 127–8.Google Scholar

³³ 2.40.5. For the correct interpretation of Pericles' words, see Rusten, J. S., Thucydides: Book II (op. cit.), p. 156.Google Scholar

³⁴ 3.37.2: λγῳ πεισθηναι, οἴκτῳ νδουναι. Cf. 40.2–3. On generosity and compassion in the orators' eulogies of the Athenian democracy, see N. Loraux, op. cit., p. 67; C. W. Macleod, op. cit., p. 119.

³⁵ 37.1: ἔγνων δημοκραταν ὅτι δνατν στιν τρων ἄρχειν. The accusative δημοκραταν results from prolepsis, and its predicate, δνατν, is neuter because Cleon here is interested in τ δημοκρατικν, the spirit of generosity which is the essence of democracy. See Steup, J. (Thukydides, Band 3 (Berlin, 1892 ³), p. 64.Google Scholar

³⁶ See the remarks of the Syracusan generals at 7.68.1.

³⁷ Xen. Mem. 2.6.35. See Rusten, J. S., Thucydides Book II (op. cit.), p. 156Google Scholar and the thorough survey in Blundell, M. W., Helping Friends and Harming Enemies (Cambridge, 1989), Ch. 2CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Winnington-Ingram, R. P., BICS 12 (1965), pp. 73, 76Google Scholar and Hornblower, S., Commentary (op. cit.), p. 438 comment on Cleon's adherence to this ethic.Google Scholar

³⁸ Cf. Adkins, A. W. H., Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece (New York, 1972), p. 134Google Scholar: ‘it is on the requirements of traditional arete that Pericles and Cleon take their stand.’ But this statement holds true not only for 3.40.4 (the passage Adkins had under discussion) but for virtually all that Pericles and Cleon have to say on the subject of arete.

³⁹ Compare the words of Cleon's Sicilian counterpart Athenagoras at 6.38.2.

⁴⁰ Rhet. 2, 1395b11–17. Cf. 3, 1418a17–19.

⁴¹ Kennedy, G., The Art of Persuasion (op. cit.), p. 115Google Scholar; Martin, J., Antike Rhetorik. Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft II.3 (Munich, 1974), p. 9Google Scholar; Moraux, P., ÉC 22 (1954), 6–7.Google Scholar

⁴² 11 (Fuhrmann): Γνώμη δ στι μν ὡς ν κεϕαλαῳ καθ᾽ ὅλων των πραγμτων δγματος ἰδον δλωσις. Cf. Arist. Rhet. 2, 1394a21–5.

⁴³ Cf. Ebener, D., Kleon und Diodotos. Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift, Halle v, 1955/1956, p. 1091Google Scholar: the ἔγωγε of 37.1 alerts us to the vehemence of the speaker. On the ‘egoism’ pervading Cleon's speech see Gomme, , HCT 2 (op. cit.), pp. 299, 307Google Scholar and Connor, W. R., Thucydides (op. cit.), pp. 50 n. 61, 65 and n. 36Google Scholar. Alcibiades displays a similar penchant for the first-person pronoun at 6.16.1 and 89.1–2 (D. Ebener, loc. cit., p. 1151 n. 10). Gomme (ibid., pp. 307, 308, 312, 313) notes Cleon's maxims in passing and observes that they frequently are not well-suited to their context.

⁴⁴ Speakers often remark on the value of such stability and praise laws of great antiquity. So Antiphon 5.14–15, 6.2, Isocrates 15.82, Aeschines 1.6. In Thucydides we have the remarks of the Corinthians at 1.71.3 and Alcibiades at 6.18.7. See further Edwards, M. and Usher, S., Greek Orators I (Warminster and Chicago, 1985), p. 77.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ The notion is usually that excessive prosperity breeds hubris (e.g. Solon 6W: πολὺς λβος). The element of suddenness or unexpectedness in Cleon's account (προσδκητος, παρ δξαν) clearly betrays the influence of Thucydides' own thinking: see de Romilly's, J. discussion of the ‘law of hubris’ (Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism (op. cit.), pp. 322–9).Google Scholar

⁴⁶ On the appearance in maxims of words like εἴωθε (39.4) and πϕνκε (39.5), see Meister, C., Die Gnomik im Geschichtswerk des Thukydides (Winterthur, 1955), p. 19.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Cf. P. Moraux, op. cit., 12.

⁴⁸ For the division of Cleon's speech into discrete sections, see P. Moraux, op. cit., pp. 7–15.

⁴⁹ C. Meister, op. cit., p. 14.

⁵⁰ C. Meister, op. cit., p. 15.

⁵¹ Rhet. ad Alex. 11; Arist. Rhet. 1394b7–10.

⁵² Finley, J. H., Three Essays (op. cit.), p. 31Google Scholar aptly notes Cleon's ‘forceful outpouring of familiar judgments.’

⁵³ That is not to say that Cleon does not strike the pose of the outspoken critic. But as we have seen in our analysis of Cleon's opening pronouncement (37.1: δημοκρατα δνατον ἄρχειν: above, pp. 8–9), the controversy is more apparent than real: everyone knows that the spirit of generosity characteristic of democracy is an impediment to ruling others. On 37.2 (empire is tyranny) see de Romilly, J., Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism (op. cit.), p. 125Google Scholar. On 37.3 (ordinary people better manage the affairs of state than do intellectuals), see below p. 36 and n. 55.

⁵⁴ Cleon seems to be using the κνητοι νμοι maxim (above, n. 44) in order to suggest that repeal of the Mytilene decree is tantamount to undermining the laws themselves. Gomme objects (HCT 2 (op. cit.), p. 300): Cleon is ‘confusing ψηϕσματα with νμοι; the laws of Athens would not be affected by the rescinding of an executive decree.’ But it is doubtful whether the fifth century made so clear a distinction between laws and decrees: see Hornblower, S., Commentary (op. cit.), pp. 423–4Google Scholar. And in any event it is not at all certain that the ββαιον καθεστηκς which the Athenians disturb is the decree per se. I reserve for the study alluded to in n. 9 my own view of the matter.

⁵⁵ C. Meister, op. cit., p. 41 says that 37.4 is the explanatory epilogue which rhetorical theory requires for paradoxic maxims. 37.4 certainly does serve an explanatory function. But what it explains is not a paradox but a debatable view—an μϕισβητομενον, to use Aristotle's term. Cleon is taking issue with the view, common among critics of democracy (e.g. [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 1.8–9), that it is the δξιοι and συνετο who best govern. On the oligarchic overtones of such terms, see H.-G. Saar, op. cit., p. 31 n. 2; G. Groϐmann, op. cit., pp. 146–53.

⁵⁶ 1.84.2. I say ‘pointedly,’ because there is so much in this discussion of μαθα and σωϕροσνη which recalls Archidamus' defence of Spartan ways. See Gomme, A. W., HCT 2 (op. cit.), pp. 300–1Google Scholar; Finley, J. H., Three Essays on Thucydides (Cambridge, MA, 1967), p. 30CrossRefGoogle Scholar. (‘a harsh travesty of the Spartan ideal’). In a detailed discussion of the matter, H.-G. Saar, op. cit., pp. 28–31 argues that, just as the Corinthians at Sparta recited Athenian strengths in order to expose to the Spartans the obsolescence of their ways, so too Cleon rehearses Spartan virtues in order to goad the Athenians to recognize and correct their own weaknesses. I reserve for the study alluded to in n. 9 my own view of Cleon's apparent echoing of Archidamus.

⁵⁷ Gomme, A. W., HCT 2 (op. cit.), p. 302.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Stahl, I. M., Thucydidis de bello peloponnesiaco libri octo, II.1 (Leipzig, 1875), p. 59Google Scholar; H.-G. Saar, op. cit., p. 26 (the emendation was first proposed by Reiske).

⁵⁹ Many render παρ δξαν ‘contrary to their true opinion.’ C. W. Macleod, for example, has ‘insincerely’ (op. cit., p. 98). Gomme expresses reservations (HCT 2 [op. cit.], p. 302).

⁶⁰ HCT 2 (op. cit.), p. 303. H.-G. Saar, op. cit., p. 34 n. 2 compares 1.140.1: τοις κοινῃ δξασιν.

⁶¹ Marchant, E. C., Thucydides Book III (London, 1909), p. 147Google Scholar. Cf. I. M. Stahl, op. cit., p. 61 (id quod omnino videtur), Steup, J., Thukydides 3 (op. cit.), p. 69 (was allgemein angenommen wird).Google Scholar

⁶² Gomme, , HCT 2 (op. cit.), p. 309 places a pause after διαμχομαι and treats μ μεταγνωναι as an imperative. This certainly solves the problem of understanding a sentence which otherwise appears to be saying that Cleon has defended the Mytilene decree (τ προδεδογμνα) not just now but from the very first (or—reading ττε in place of τ τε—‘at that time as well as now’). But rather than strain the syntax in this way, we should (with Cleon) strain the semantic range of τ προδεδογμνα.Google Scholar

⁶³ C. W. Macleod, op. cit., pp. 93–4 (he has all of 38.2–7 in view).

⁶⁴ Contrast Pericles at 2.40.2.

⁶⁵ Parry, A. M., Logos and Ergon (op. cit.), p. 48.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ δεδοκιμασμνου at 38.5 is neuter and not masculine (sc. λγου). It amounts to a synonym for γνώμη ‘maxim’. And since Cleon's maxims regularly conform to δξα (they are ‘endoxic’), is tempting to see in δεδοκιμασμνου a play on δξα (C. W. Macleod, op. cit., p. 94 detects play on τ δοκουν at 38.2).

⁶⁷ Edmunds, L., Chance and Intelligence (op. cit.), p. 8, commenting on 1.140.1.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ C. W. Macleod, op. cit., p. 92: ‘His opening … impl(ies) that the speaker is a wise man and that the substance of his reflections has repeatedly been confirmed by experience’.

⁶⁹ Isoc. 13.7–8.