¹ Guthrie, W. C. K., A History of Greek Philosophy IV (Cambridge, 1975), p. 385Google Scholar .

² Throughout this paper by ‘Socrates’ is meant the speaker Socrates in Plato's dialogues i without any implication of an answer to the problem of the historical Socrates.

³ 202a 2–9; b1–5; d 10e–1. Cf. Kranz, W., ‘Diotima von Mantineia’, Hermes 61 (1926), 440Google Scholar ; he gives more cases which do not concern us here.

⁴ The lover being intermediate in these cases does not have wisdom (knowledge of the good and, therefore, also of the beautiful) and beauty and is not immortal. Hence he strives for them (cf. the general account of ⋯πιθυμεῖν 200a 5 ff.), and makes an effort to possess them (cf. 204e 2–4).

⁵ i.e., the possessor himself must be deathless; hence there is the striving for immortality.

⁶ The three forms are immortality in the form of prolongation of the life of the race, 207a6–208b6; in the form of leaving behind oneself everlasting fame, 208cl–209e4; in the highest form resulting from creating real virtue based upon the knowledge of beauty or good 210al–212a7.

⁷ 212a 3–5.

⁸ παντο⋯⋯ρετ⋯ created by statesmen (209d4–e3) is οὔτε ϕ⋯σει οὔτε διδακτ⋯ν, ⋯λλ⋯ θε⋯ᾳ μο⋯ρᾳ παραγιγνομ⋯νη ἄνευ νο⋯… (Men. 99e5–100a2).

⁹ Philosophic virtue is based upon wisdom, as is known from earlier dialogues; see especially the last argument for the inaccurately formulated thesis that virtue is knowledge in Prot. 359a2–360e5.

¹⁰ 210b3.ἔν τε κα⋯ ταὐτ⋯ν …τ⋯ ⋯π⋯ π⋯σιν τοῖς σώμασι κ⋯λλος is what the lover should know b2–3, but what he at present actually thinks is $$o$$τι τ⋯ κ⋯λλος τ⋯ ⋯π⋯ ⋯τῷουν σώματι τῷ⋯π⋯ ⋯τ⋯ρῳ σώματι ⋯δελϕ⋯ν ⋯στι 210a8–bl. I take το⋯το in 210b4 as referring to a8–bl not to b2–3, the latter being inserted as a parenthesis to explain what the pursuer of τ⋯ ⋯π' εἴδει καλ⋯ν should know, not what he at present does. If it refers to b2–3, it is in conflict with συγγεν⋯ς in c5 and τ⋯νδε in 211b5. ‘Akin’ is Jowett's translation of ⋯δελϕ⋯ν; more exact is Schleiermacher's ‘verschwistert’ in German; cf. also Robin's, translation into French: ‘soeur [de la beauté]’ (Le Banquet (Assoc. Budé), Paris, 1926, p. 68)Google Scholar.

¹¹ Moravcsik, J. M. E., ‘Reason and Eros in the “Ascent”-Passage of the Symposium’, in Anton, and Kustos, , Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy (Albany, N.Y., 1971), pp. 287–8Google Scholar, finds his pattern of R-steps in ‘first, reasoning recognizing common features of a plurality of instances, and isolating the common element and grasping its unity’. After quoting Bury, R. G., The Symposium of Plato (Cambridge, 2nd ed. 1932), p. xliiGoogle Scholar, he continues: ‘It is crucial to note, however, that… the relation between unities on any given plane and their instances is not the only “one and many”relation described in the passage. For in addition to seeing the unity within each level, the mind has to grasp that all the levels are “akin”; they are, one might say, species of beauty.’ Though Moravcsik emphasizes the second relation (to which we shall return; see n. 23), for the moment we shall concentrate on the first point – which he takes for granted. He finds a ‘unity within each level’. This supposed unity is questionable. In his R], 288, the lover recognizes only that the relation among the instances is ⋯δελϕ⋯ν. Even twin brothers are not a single person and their characteristics, though similar, are not a single characteristic; no matter how much they are like each other, their relation is not one of identity. There is no unity to replace ⋯δελϕ⋯ν εἶναι. The lover realizes no more than this ‘Verschwistertsein’ among beautiful bodies; he does not realize the beauty as such in all beautiful bodies. Otherwise he would love one and the same κ⋯λλος ⋯π⋯ π⋯σιν τοῖς σώμασι instead καταστ⋯ναι π⋯ντων τ⋯ν καλ⋯ν σωμ⋯των ⋯ραστ⋯ν (210b4–5). One may compare the Laches: when the general has been made to understand the nature of the question, he gives a definition of courage as such, not of its instances distributively (192b5–c 1). To return to our dialogue, when the lover advances to love beautiful institutions and laws, he still grasps only their συγγ⋯νεια (210c3–5) and not the γ⋯νος; being συγγεν⋯ς is not the same as being one and the same genus.

¹² 210b 4–5.1 take the word ‘deindividualize’ from Robin, op. cit., xciii, although he uses the word differently. For deindividualization, cf . Gould, T., Platonic Love (London, 1963), p. 55Google Scholar, who, without having this concept in mind, yet rightly says about this fact: ‘and actually [we] quite forget the individual who first quickened our awareness.’

¹³ 210b 6–c3. Since this passage comes between the passage on beautiful bodies and the passage on beautiful institutions and laws, τ⋯⋯ν ταῖς Ψυϰαῖς κ⋯λλος is to be understood as parallel to ⋯δελϕ⋯ν and συλλεν⋯ς in the other two passages. It is not the supposed unity within ‘level’ of beautiful souls.

¹⁴ For Robin's interpretation see below, n. 26.

¹⁵ 210c5 συλλεν⋯ς cf. above, n. 11.

¹⁶ 210c6–7. Moravcsik, op. cit., 294–5, stresses this ‘level’, the group of beautiful sciences or τ⋯ καλ⋯ μαθ⋯ματα, and distinguishes correctly between sciences and bodies: ‘The instances of Science are themselves already on the plane of the abstract and general’, whereas instances of bodies are not. However, he misses the point in the discussion. The topic is the striving for beauty through the love of beautiful instances. Socrates' speech in this section starts from τ⋯ καλ⋯ σώματα 210a6. They are relevant instances only when our attention is focused on their being καλ⋯ not on their being σώματα. Beautiful bodies without regard for their being beautiful are not instances of beauty, but of body; as instances of body, they are irrelevant to the topic. It is similar with beautiful souls, beautiful institutions and laws, and beautiful sciences. Though beautiful sciences qua sciences have a different ontic status from beautiful bodies qua bodies, in regard to their being beautiful they are particular instances of beauty and thus strictly parallel to beautiful bodies, which, qua being beautiful, are also particular instances of beauty. The section deals with beauty and its instances, not body and its instances, and equally not science and its instances. Beautiful bodies qua bodies and beautiful sciences qua sciences are equally irrelevant here. So far as they are relevant, they are regarded as particular instances of beauty. This is why all of them are designated τ⋯δε τ⋯ καλ⋯. (See the passage given below in n. 18.)

¹⁷ 210d4. This can refer to nothing else but the great quantity of instances in which beauty itself is instanced, as is clear from the recapitulation. See the next note.

¹⁸ All of these objects of knowledge are designated in the recapitulation 211 b 5–d 1 equally τ⋯δε, τ⋯δε τ⋯ καλ⋯ in contrast to ⋯κεīνο τ⋯ καλ⋯ν (cf. 210e 3–6; the same contrast is there) which the lover has not come to behold yet.

¹⁹ 210d6–e1, e1–5. ωσθε⋯ς κα⋯ αὐξηθε⋯ς is a biological metaphor, which can be best understood from the passages on nourishing in the Phaedo (84b 1) and the Phaedrus (247d 1–4 and 248 b4–c2). We may paraphrase the same metaphor in the three dialogues in the following way: when the soul cognizes, it is in the state of cognition. The more it cognizes, the richer becomes its cognitive content. In this sense the soul is nourished and grows in cognition by the object it cognizes. We may neglect the differences in these passages for the present.

²⁰ Scholars usually speak of the ascent in terms like ‘the “Ascent” - Passage in Symposium’. Exactly where the ascent is should be determined by a careful examination of the text. From 209e5–212a7 ⋯π⋯ is used with a verb of motion or as a prefix for a compound verb of motion a total of twelve times. (We disregard it when used neither with a verb nor as a prefix of a compound. Such passages are found twice [210b2, and 3] and are irrelevant to the ascent.) The twelve cases are: (1)210a5, (2)210a6, (3) 210c6, (4) 210d3, (5)211b6, (6)211b7, (7)211c2, (8) 211c3, (9)211c4, (10)211c5, (11)211c6(em), (12) 211c6 (⋯π⋯).

Of these twelve cases case (1) is taken up in case (6). (For ⋯π⋯ in these two cases, another preposition πρ⋯ς is also used at 210e2.) They concern pursuit of Eros, but not directly the ascent. Of the rest, ⋯π⋯ in cases (2), (3) and (4) is used in the same way. Case (2) is expressed more fully in (8) and (9). This leaves the following cases: (5), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11) and (12). Cases (10), (11) and (12) seem to form a series of ascending steps

⋯π⋯ τ⋯ν καλ⋯ν σωμ⋯των ⋯π⋯ τ⋯ καλ⋯ ⋯πιτηδε⋯ματα,

⋯π⋯ τ⋯ν ⋯πιτηδευμ⋯των, ⋯π⋯ τ⋯ καλ⋯ μαθ⋯ματα,

⋯π⋯ τ⋯ν μαθημ⋯των ⋯π' ⋯κεῖνο τ⋯ μ⋯θημα…ἤ αὐτο⋯ ⋯κε⋯νου το⋯ καλοῡ μ⋯θημα 211c4–8.

But in comparison with cases (8) and (9) ⋯⋯ ⋯ν⋯ς ⋯π⋯ δ⋯ο κα⋯ ⋯π⋯ δυοῖν ⋯π⋯ π⋯ντα τ⋯ καλ⋯ σώματα the ⋯π⋯ (10) and (11) cannot indicate the ascent; it refers rather to the same horizontal expansion as in (8) and (9). The ⋯π⋯ in case (12) should be understood from cases (5) and (7) because the three ἄπ⋯'s 211 c4 (10), c5 (11) and c6 (12) are the enumeration of ἄπ⋯ τ⋯νδε and ἄπ⋯ τ⋯νδε τ⋯ν καλ⋯ν which are summarily stated in 211b5 (5) and c2 (7), respectively. To sum up, in the context in question only the ⋯π⋯'s (as preposition or as prefix) in cases (5), (7), and (12) indicate the upward direction, the same upward movement to the Idea of beauty. This is the only ascent in the passage under discussion. The ascent has only one step and no more, i.e., the step from beautiful instances to the Idea of beauty; there is no ascent until the final step in the whole movement is taken. All the other steps in the process are steps of horizontal expansion preparing for the ascent. If this theory (which forms the ontic ground of the methodology for apprehending the Idea of beauty – or rather Ideas in general) is called a tier-metaphysics, then there are only two tiers, the level of Ideas and the level of particulars; there is no generic hierarchy yet.

²¹ e.g. Lutoslawski, W., The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic(London, 1879), p. 236Google Scholar, Bury, op. cit., p. xliii, Leisegang, H., article ‘Platon’ in RE, 2. xi (1941), Col. 2449Google Scholar.

²² ⋯ξα⋯ϕνης κατ⋯Ψετα⋯ τι θαυμαστ⋯ν τ⋯ν ϕ⋯σιν καλ⋯ν 210e4–5, which is variously expressed 211b6, c8–dl, 2–3, el, 3–4; all of them refer to the Idea of beauty.

²³ See n. 11. Moravcsik takes π⋯ν in 210c4 as referring not only to all ⋯πιτηδε⋯ματα and ν⋯μοι but to ‘all of the levels’, because only in this sense πᾱν αὐτ⋯ αὑτῷ συγγεν⋯ς ⋯στιν (210c4–5). If by ‘levels’ he means (a) groups of instances, then there are no species or kinds of beauty because these groups are not species or kinds. If he means (b) his ‘unities’ because they are akin, then they are species or kinds of beauty. But there are no such ‘unities’ (see above n. 11). Moreover, he must take 210c4–5 as a summary of his ‘unities’ on the preceding levels. But such a summary should wait until after the ⋯πιστημ⋯ν κ⋯λλος 210C7 and include this as well.

²⁴ 210d6–e 1, e2–5. ‘Turning towards the vast sea of the beautiful’, which Moravcsik, op. cit., 294–5, stresses, is only a way to sum up what has been achieved and to prepare for the final step. It points to the subsequent transition. But there is no indication of the transition from the instances to the supposed ‘unity within each level’, neither indicated by a literary device nor implicit in the text.

²⁵ 210b7 and c5. σμικρ⋯ν τι here is a value predicate, ‘of little importance’.

²⁶ The scholar in question may try to avoid the first of his two difficulties by following Robin's interpretation of the ascent as comprising ‘en tout quatre degres: 1° la beauté physique; 2° la beaute morale; 3° celle des connaissances; 4° la connaissance de Beau absolu, Voir p. 68, n. 2’, op. cit., 70–71. However, the second difficulty still remains.

Robin's ‘ascension’ is not an ascent in value. It is rather an ascent from emotions for different groups of beautiful instances to ‘l'amour du savoir en général’ (op. cit., xciii), though he distinguishes the movements before the final leap into movements from ‘la beaute physique’ to ‘la beauté morale’ and from ‘la beauté morale’ to ‘celle des connaissances’. He does not explain how they are steps in an ascent, and in the text there is nothing which jutifies his interpretation. See n. 24.

²⁷ 210e6–211 b2. The four positive predicates are αὐτ⋯ καὑτ⋯ μεθ' αὑτο⋯ μονοειδ⋯ς ⋯ε⋯ ⋯ν. ⋯ε⋯ ⋯ν is mentioned twice, the first time at the beginnning of this passage. Contrasted with it is change in various forms 211a1–2, and also b3–5. In contrast to αὐτ⋯ καθ' αὑτ⋯ is the relativity of different kinds 211 a2–5. For ὡς… αἰσχρ⋯ν , Solmsen, F., ‘Parmenides and the Description of Perfect Beauty’, AJP 92 (1971), 66, n. 14Google Scholar , is in favour of Vogelin's reading, αὐτ⋯ καθ' αὑτ⋯ seems easier to understand from the phrasing in a later dialogue, Soph. 250c 6 κατ⋯ τ⋯ν αὑτο⋯ ϕ⋯σις of τ⋯ καλ⋯ In contrast to μεθ' αὑτο⋯ is a number of τ⋯ καλ⋯, particular beautiful things, in which beauty manifests itself (211a5–bl). Finally, for the meaning of μονοειδ⋯ς, considering the passage by itself without connecting it with Parmenides, I accept R. Hackforth's interpretation of Phaed. 81 b2 (see his Plato's Phaedo, Cambridge, 1955Google Scholar, reprint New York, p. 81, n. 2); the word ‘uniform’ is borrowed from his translation. μονοειδ⋯ς is repeated in 211e4, which explains ἄμεικτον in el from the other side; ἄμεικτον itself is the same as μ⋯⋯ν⋯πλεων σαρκ⋯ν etc., e2–3.

²⁸ 75c 10–d3.

²⁹ λογ⋯ξεσθαι 65c2; διανοεῖσθαι 65e8; θε⋯σθαι see 66e 1; θεωρεῖν 65e2, 84a7–b 1; καθορ⋯ν 66d7.

³⁰ See Adam, J., The Republic of Plato, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1926 and 1929)Google Scholar, ad Rep. 511d5: ‘δι⋯νοια is the general word for a state (ἔξις) of mind or mode of thought in Greek.’

³¹ And from Rep. 7, 517c 1 we know that the intellectual ‘seeing’ is also the basis of reasoning. That it is the basis of defining hardly needs to be said, because definition is the formulation of the essential nature of what is intellectually seen.

³² 73 c I ff.

³³ 100a 3 ff.

³⁴ 63e8–69e5.

³⁵ 67a6–b3; the translation is Jowett's.

³⁸ 66b5–7, d8–67a2 and 64c4–9.

³⁷ 64a4–8, 67a3–bl, c5–dl.

³⁸ 75clO–d5.

³⁹ Namely, first in respect of direct vision and then in respect of intellectual running-through (δι⋯νοια).