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ΕΦΟΔΟΣ and Insinuatio In Greek and Latin Rhetoric

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

E. W. Bower
Affiliation:
The Queen's University of Belfast

Extract

The rhetorical treatises of Aristotle and Anaximenes, in discussing the introduction of a speech, recognize that a speaker may encounter prejudice on the part of his audience for some reason or other; perhaps because of his own character or reputation, or because of the nature of the case he is pleading, or because his opponent has already won their approval. Anaximenes describes a speaker in this situation as and he and Aristotle give advice on countering such if they have arisen (Arist. Rhet. 3. 15; Anax. Rhet. ad Alex. 29 fin., 35 init., 36 init.). Rather more than two centuries later we find the early Latin rhetoricians expounding the doctrine of insinuatio for dealing with such a situation; they distinguish between principium, the ordinary direct introduction, and insinuatio, the ‘subtle approach’ (Caplan, in his Loeb translation of the ad Herennium, p. 13).

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 1958

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