^{page 208 note 1} Cf. 199c 10; and see C. 137 and H.

^{page 209 note 1} ‘The misleading statement that “we judge 12 in our waxen block to be 11” is a consequence of the too narrow use of “know” in terms of that image.’ C. 130.

^{page 209 note 2} A. wavers between two views, and fuses them in the phrase at 16^b10 κα⋯ ⋯ε⋯ τ⋯ν καθ' ⋯τ⋯ρоν λεγоμ⋯νων σημεῖ⋯ν ⋯оτι <sc. τ⋯ ῥ⋯μα>.

^{page 210 note 1} If it was not already a commonplace in Plato's day; he introduces it in the Cratylus 421e, 425a, without explanation.

^{page 210 note 2} Cf. Cratylus 425a, where P. speaks of putting together (σνντιθ⋯ναι) a sentence ⋯κ τ⋯ν ⋯νоμ⋯των κα⋯ ῥημ⋯των.

^{page 210 note 3} It is perhaps worth noting that in the wax-block simile, which is similar to the aviary in many ways, the only examples of impressions that are given (memory-image of Socrates, etc., 193b; concepts or notions of man and number 195d–196a) may fairly be called νо⋯ματα in the sense defined.

^{page 210 note 4} Plato is in fact probably thinking of ‘some classification of the objects of knowledge’ (C. 132). But his words suggest that he would not have regarded such a linking or grouping of νо⋯ματα (birds) as impossible.

^{page 211 note 1} The change would have to occur between 199d and 199e.

^{page 211 note 2} Note how careful P. is at 199e to keep ψενδ⋯δоζ⋯ξειν separate from ⋯νεπιστημоσ⋯νη C. (138) considers that these words practically state that by ⋯νεπιστημоσ⋯νη P. simply means false belief. It seems to me that P. keeps the two distinct, and says that false belief is the result of but not the same thing as ⋯νεπιστημоσ⋯νη.

^{page 211 note 3} ⋯π⋯ τ⋯ν πρώτην π⋯ρεσμεν ⋯πоρ⋯αν 200a 11–12, referring, I take it, to 190b ff., and to 196b 5 ff., the starting-point of the simile.