^{page 16 note 1} The clearest statement of the charge is byGreene, W. C. in his valuable study, ‘Plato's View of Poetry’ (Harvard Studies in Class. Phil. XXIX.), p. 54Google Scholar.

^{page 16 note 2} See e.g. Adam on 607a 4.

^{page 16 note 3} SeeGreene, (op. cit.), pp. 67–68Google Scholar, especially p. 68, n. 2; and cf. p. 34.

^{page 17 note 1} See Adam on 595a 3, followed by Greene, pp. 50 and 54.

^{page 17 note 2} Cf. 377e, where the comparison of such poets with bad painters makes its first appearance.

^{page 18 note 1} 306c (ούκ αίσΧυνεȋσθαι έπì τῇ τοιαύτῃ μιμήσει) and 395c (οὐδ μιμεȋσθαι έν δ μιμνται) certainly give the impression that μίμησις is used in a good sense with reserve as a kind of metaphor.

^{page 19 note 1} On 401–402 cf. Greene, pp. 37–38. The imitation here mentioned is ‘clearly something more than the literal kind of imitation that is implied in the tenth book.’ Cf. also Laws 816–817. The ideal state is an imitation (817b μίμησις) of the best and noblest life, and the truest tragedy is essentially the same thing. Imitation as practised by the ideal poet will not produce something unlike the original (cf. 388c), but something as like the truth as possible (cf. 382d, ad init.).

^{page 19 note 2} It should be observed that what is formally simple narrative may really be imitation in this sense; for the poet may speak as though he knew the truth about subjects like philosophy—i.e. he will be putting on the character of a philosopher. If he is not really a philosopher, this is imitation in the bad sense

^{page 21 note 1} 5976 runs thus: ‘Do you call the third from reality an imitator?’ ‘Certainly.’ ‘Then the tragedian, being an imitator, will be third from reality.’ Formally this is:

All who are third from reality are imitators;

All tragedians are imitators;

Therefore, all tragedians are third from reality. That is to say, if the passage be an argument (which I deny), the ‘argument’ is formally an illicit syllogism, the middle term being undistributed. It is strange that the commentators who are anxious to discover discrepancies have not seen this one! However, we must take the first premiss as stating a characteristic of imitation, so that the predicate is really distributed. This would save the ‘syllogism,’ but still leaves us with the formidable charge of ‘begging the question’ in the second premiss.

^{page 21 note 2} On the artistic expression of the ideal in sensible form (which Plato sometimes calls ‘imitation’ in a good sense of the word) see furtherGreene, , op. cit., pp. 66Google Scholar sqq. On p. 41 Greene rightly says that the theory of ideas ‘does not make art impossible; it actually explains that which is valuable in art.’ I cannot therefore understand why Greene thinks that all poetry is condemned in the tenth book, and that the reason for this ‘change of spirit’ is the discussion of the theory of ideas which comes between the earlier and later discussions of poetry in the Republic.

^{page 22 note 1} This is the point of the additional arguments to prove Homer's ignorance in 598c–600e—a passage which commentators (e.g. Adam on 599b) take as meaning that Plato would rather be Achilles, the man of action, than Homer, the man of words. Certainly Plato would rather be Achilles if Achilles possessed the true heroic character—virtue, wisdom, self-control, etc.—and were not as Homer represents him. But if Homer had been really wise, he too would have been no mere man of words, but an excellent artificer of all virtue (cf. 500d). It may be worth observing, in support of my interpretation, thatProclus, (In Platonis Remp. 405)Google Scholar sees clearly that if Homer contemplated the truth, he was not imitative in this sense. For imitation, as the word is used in Book X., is the companion of ignorance (e.g. 598d νεπιστημοσύνη and μίμησις are coupled together).

^{page 23 note 1} The fact that the imitative poets are here placed one class higher than the artisans, to whom they are inferior inRep. X. (cf. Adam, on 601eGoogle Scholar), seems due to a more lenient view of the value of inspiration. I have no space here to deal fully with Plato's treatment of inspiration; but its highest gift is not knowledge, but only right opinion, which enables Plato indeed to approve of many passages inHomer, (Rep. 383aGoogle Scholar), but which is a poor thing when compared with knowledge (Meno 98–99).Adam, (on Rep. 598eGoogle Scholar) is right in asking us to remember that Plato, while denying knowledge to Homer and kindred poets, allowed them ‘genius and inspiration’; but we should also remember the low estimate which Plato placed on inspiration without knowledge.

^{page 23 note 2} One might quote in support even the early Charmides (173): there are pretenders, deceiving and self-deceived, in every art and craft; only if wisdom rules shall we have the true physician, etc.

^{page 23 note 3} Rep. 599c μιμητς μόνον ίατρικν λόγων.

^{page 23 note 4} Cf. Rep. 387b öσψ ποιητικώτερα, τοσοûτῳ ἧττονάκουστέον.

^{page 23 note 5} μέθεξις, παροσία, etc., see Greene, p. 66.