¹ F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy: Greece and Rome, Volume 1: Part 1 (Garden City, 1962), p. 286;Google ScholarW. J.Prior, Unity and Development in Plato's Metaphysics (London, 1985), pp. 163–4.Google Scholar

² By ‘doctrines’ I mean beliefs which are part of a system of ideas that is taught to others, consciously. Doctrines are typically elements of theories and typically seek to distinguish one's own way of thinking from competing world views. At the very least, theories set forth, in a systematic way, statements about the nature, function and purpose of a concept, practice, etc.

³ By ‘belief’ and its cognates I mean, as Saul Kripke does, a statement to which one sincerely assents without ambiguity (S.Kripke, ‘A Puzzle About Belief’, in A., Margalit [ed.], Meaning arid Use [Dordrecht, 1979], pp. 239–83;Google ScholarJ.Angelo Corlett, ‘Is Kripke's Puzzle Really a Puzzle?’, Theoria, 55 [1989], 95–113). Beliefs are constituent elements of doctrines and theories.Google Scholar

⁴ Throughout this paper, I shall refer to the ‘beliefs’ of Plato as a shorthand way of meaning to refer to his theories, doctrines or beliefs.

⁵ R. Kraut, ‘Introduction to the Study of Plato’, in R, Kraut, (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plato (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 26–7Google Scholar. A still weaker version seems to be represented in M.Frede's ‘The Literary Form of the Sophist’;, in C., Gill and M., McCabe (edd.), Form and Argument in Late Plato (Oxford, 1996), pp. 135–51 (herein cited as FALP), where he argues that the Sophist gives us more than mere Socratic dialectic. It presents a certain view or ‘dogma’ of Plato's on truth and falsity.Google Scholar

⁶ R. Robinson, Plato's Earlier Dialectic (Oxford, 1953).Google Scholar

⁷ K. Hermann, Geschichte und System der Platonischen Philosophie (Heidelberg, 1839).Google Scholar

⁸ F. Susemihl, Die genetische entwickelungder Platonischen Philosophie (Leipzig, 1855–60).Google Scholar

⁹ S. Ribbing,Genetische darstellung der Platonishen Ideenlehre (Leipzig, 1863–4).Google Scholar

¹⁰ P. Friedlander, Platon (Berlin, 1954–60).Google Scholar

¹¹ E. Zeller, Die philosophic der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung (Tubingen, 1844–52)Google Scholar;P. Shorey, The Unity of Plato's Thought (Chicago, 1904)Google Scholar; L. Robin, Platon (Paris, 1935).Google Scholar

¹² H. Gomperz, ‘Platons philosophisches System’, Proceedings of the Seventh International Congress of Philosophy (Oxford, 1930).Google Scholar

¹³ H. J.Kramer, Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles (Stuttgart, 1963).Google Scholar

¹⁴ For an incisive discussion of the problem of interpreting Plato's dialogues, see E. N. Tigerstedt, Interpreting Plato (Uppsala, 1977); R. B. Rutherford The Art of Plato (Cambridge, 1995), ch. 1.Google Scholar

¹⁵ See, for instance:H. Cherniss, The Riddle of the Early Academy (Berkeley, 1945);Google ScholarJ.Angelo Corlett, ‘A Dialectical Interpretation of the Concept of Art as Mimesis in the Republic’, Idealistic Studies, 21 (1991), 155–69;CrossRefGoogle ScholarM.Frede, ‘Plato's Arguments and the Dialogue Form’, in J., Klagge and Smith, N. D. (edd.), Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy: Methods of Interpreting Plato and His Dialogues (Oxford, 1992), pp. 201–19;Google ScholarH.-G.Gadamer, Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato (New Haven, 1980);Google ScholarF., Gonzalez, (ed.), The Third Way (Lanham, 1995);Google ScholarGriswold, C. L., Jr (ed.), Platonic Writings: Platonic Readings (New York, 1988), see especially chh. 3, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, and 15;Google ScholarL. A.Kosman, ‘Silence and Imitation in the Platonic Dialogues’, in Klagge and Smith, pp. 73–92Google Scholar; Press, G. (ed.), Platos Dialogues: New Studies and Interpretations (Lanham, 1993)Google Scholar, hereafter cited as PD; and J. H.Randall, Plato: Dramatist of the Life of Reason (New York, 1970).Google Scholar

¹⁶ I say ‘recent’ because, as Julia Annas insightfully points out, certain historical figures have taken views of Plato's writings which are remarkably similar to the SI. See Julia Annas, ‘Plato the Sceptic’, in Klagge and Smith.

¹⁷ Also see the distinction between these two competing interpretations of Plato's writings made in Klagge and Smith, p. 3. To the description found there I would point out that there seems to be nothing about the analytical philosophical method which precludes the adoption of the SI.

¹⁸ For an incisive discussion of the complexities of the dialectic found in Plato's later dialogues, see C. Gill, ‘Afterward: Dialectic and the Dialogue Form in Late Plato’, in FALP, ch. 10. Gill construes Plato's later dialogues (in particular, the Philebus and Sophist) as containing a ‘shared search’ for truth about various issues and problems, a search which includes the author and the readers of the dialogues.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Frede, ‘Plato's Arguments and the Dialogue Form’, 203. He goes on to state in the same passage that ‘the form of a Platonic dialogue is such that the mere fact that an argument is advanced in the dialogue does not yet mean that it is endorsed by Plato’.

²⁰ The most eloquent philosophical expression, endorsement, and defence of the SI, in this author's opinion, is found in Frede, ‘Plato's Arguments and the Dialogue Form’. Also see I Mittelstrass, ‘On Socratic Dialogue’, in Griswold, pp. 126–42; M. Schofield, ‘Likeness and Likenesses in the Parmenides’, in FALP, p. 51.Google Scholar

²¹ Assuming, of course, that the SI is itself theoretically adequate.

²² Griswold, Platonic Writings, p. 3.

²³ Kraut, ‘Introduction to the Study of Plato’, p. 25.

²⁴ Gilbert Ryle points to a different construal of Plato and the dramatists when he writes: 'The dialogues were dramatic in form because they were composed for semi-dramatic recitation to lay and drama-loving audiences' (Gilbert Ryle, ‘Plato’, in P., Edwards [ed.], Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 6, p. 319).Google Scholar

²⁵ Kraut's use of ‘merely’ here is disingenuous to the extent that it minimizes the Si's commitment to (3), above.

²⁶ Kraut, ‘Introduction to the Study of Plato’, pp. 25–6.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 26.

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 29–30.

²⁹ For it might turn out that even if there are no such reasons to the contrary, Kraut's method of interpreting the Platonic corpus is still inadequate. After all, the best interpretative strategy is not always adequate.25 Kraut's use of ‘merely’ here is disingenuous to the extent that it minimizes the Si's commitment to (3), above.

³⁰ Kraut, ‘Introduction to the Study of Plato’, p. 29.

³¹ This is not an argument in favour of the ‘innocent until proven guilty’ status of the SI. Rather, it is a point about the superior plausibility status of the SI over that of the TI.

³² T. Irwin, ‘Plato: The Intellectual Background’, in Kraut, The Cambridge Companion to Plato, p. 77.Google Scholar

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.; ‘Reply to David L. Roochnik’, in Kraut, The Cambridge Companion to Plato, p. 199.Google Scholar

³⁵ For example, in his discussion of substance in De Generatione, Aristotle asserts that it is unclear what is meant in the Timaeus by an ‘omnlrecipient’. This is queer because Aristotle is a student of Plato's during the time in which the Timaeus is in circulation. And, as Harold Cherniss queries of Aristotle, ‘If he was uncertain about Plato's meaning, did it ever occur to him to ask the master for an explanation? Or did he ask and receive no answer? And, if so, why did Plato keep silent when he must have known that he was inviting misinterpretation of his opinions and misinterpretation of his theories?’ (See Harold Cherniss, The Riddle of the Early Academy, pp. 71–2).

³⁶ W. K. C.Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy V: The Later Plato and the Academy (Cambridge, 1978), p. 421.Google Scholar

³⁷ Irwin, ‘Reply to David L. Roochnik’, in Kraut, The Cambridge Companion to Plato, p. 199Google Scholar

³⁸ Irwin, ‘Plato: The Intellectual Background’, in Kraut, The Cambridge Companion to Plato, p. 77.Google Scholar

³⁹ Ibid., p. 78.

⁴⁰ Annas, ‘Plato the Sceptic’, p. 64.

⁴¹ For instance, Frede argues the following in regards to Plato and his primary dialogical interlocutors: ‘it is by no means clear, so clear as not to require an argument, that he fully identifies himself with them’ (Frede, ‘Plato's Arguments and the Dialogue Form’, p. 204).

⁴² Annas seems to ignore or is unaware of arguments which are aimed at showing that the interpretation of Plato as a sceptic or a dogmatist is problematic. See Alan Bowen, ‘On Interpreting Plato’, in Griswold, Platonic Writings, pp.49–65.

⁴³ Annas, ‘Plato the Sceptic’, p. 70.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 71.

⁴⁸ Frede, ‘The Literary Form of the Sophist’, pp. 135–51.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 150.

⁵⁰ G. Press, ‘Principles of Dramatic and Non-dogmatic Plato Interpretation‘, in PD, p. 111.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 117.

⁵² Ibid., pp. 109–110.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 113

⁵⁴ Gill, in FALP, pp. 292f.

⁵⁵ That Plato's later dialogues contain a certain level of philosophical sophistication might be explained, at least in part, by the possibility that Plato uses his dialogues, perhaps among other things, as a way of engaging philosophically his contemporaries. The assumption here is that conversing with others enhances the ‘shared search’ for answers to problems.

⁵⁶ Irwin, ‘Reply to David L. Roochnik’, in Kraut, The Cambridge Companion to Plato, p. 199.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Irwin's use of ‘all’ here is disingenuous in that the SI does not hold that one ought to spend all one's time doing metaphilosophy in relation to the Platonic corpus.

⁵⁸ P. Woodruff, ‘Reply to Ronald Polansky’, in Griswold, Platonic Writings, p. 214.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ I wish to thank Michael Frede, Jill Gordon, Gerald Press, Nicholas D. Smith, Al Spangler, and Charles Young for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.