^{page 213 note 2} Thus Rex Warner in the Penguin translation (p. 526). Cf. the comments of Grene, D., Greek Political Theory (originally issued as Man in his Pride) (Chicago, 1950), 80–4.Google Scholar

^{page 213 note 3} Thus E. Lange, ‘Die Bedeutung von bei Thukydides’, Jahrbuch fūr Klassischi Philologie cxlv (1892), 827 ff. (I am indebted to Professor K. J. Dover for drawing my attention to this invaluable article.)

^{page 213 note 4} See, for instance, Schwartz, E., Die Ethik der Griechen, 18 ff.,Google ScholarWundt, M., Geschichte der griechischen Ethik, 1–4,Google ScholarSnell, B., The Discovery of the Mind, 153–90,Google ScholarGulley, N., The Philosophy of Socrates, 75–83.Google Scholar

^{page 213 note 5} Henceforth referred to as MR. For further development of Adkins's views see especially ‘Aristotle and the Best Kind of Tragedy’, C.Q. xvi (1966), 78–502,Google Scholar‘Basic Greek Values in Euripides’ Hecuba and Hercules Furens', C.Q. xvi (1966), 193–219. Cf. also below, p. 220 n. 4.Google Scholar

^{page 214 note 1} Adkins's arguments (MR 44–5) for denying that, is a powerful word of commendation in Homer are at least in part circular, depending on the fact that is not used to commend actions which he thinks Homeric usage commends most powerfully.

^{page 214 note 2} The point has in fact been put in various forms before. The eighth (though not the ninth) edition of Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon speaks of the sense of in Attic as remaining ‘more of active excellence than of the strictly moral virtues’, and W. K. C. Guthrie, The Greek Philosophers, p. 9; talks of it (in my view somewhat mislead. ingly) as meaning ‘skill or efficiency at a particular job’. This is certainly an elemerr in but scarcely the whole of the meaning of the word as it is used in Plato's dialogues.

^{page 214 note 3} Much of the force of Adkins's arguments for the fifth century derives of course from his claim that his theses apply to the Homeric poems, and that Homeric uses are traditional for the fifth century. For a criticism of Adkins's conclusions on Homer see the admirable article of Long, A. A., ‘Moral Values in Homer’, J.H.S. xc (1970), 121 f.,Google Scholar to which Adkins has replied in his ‘Homeric Values and Homeric Society’, J.H.S. xci (1971), 1 f.Google Scholar

^{page 214 note 4} Adkins admits (MR 7) that the distinction is very much simplified but scarcely seems fully to perceive the distorting effect of the simplification. For a criticism of the distinction see A. A. Long, op. cit. 122 ff. and cf. Adkins's reply, op. cit. 3–4.

^{page 21 note 1} As exemplified par excellence in Euripides' Hippolytus, see for instance 413, 431, 995, 1100, 1365. Cf. Aeschylus, , Choephoroe 140, Euripides, Andromache 594, 596, 601, 741, Troades 1027, Electra 261, Helen 47.Google Scholar

^{page 21 note 2} Adkins admits (MR 80 n. 2) that means basically ‘prudent in one's own interests’, but again the implications of this for his dichotomy are inadequately brought out. For the ‘prudential’ aspect of and cognate terms see for instance Sophocles, Ajax 1264, Philoctetes 304, Euripides, Medea 311, 549, 884, Herodotus 3. 71. 3, Thucydides 1. 32. 4, 42. 2, 80. 2, 3. 43. 5, 4. 18. 4, 6.6. 2 (end). On in Thucydides see Gomme, A. W., A Historical Commentary on Thucydides (henceforth referred to as Commentary) i. 166–7,Google ScholarNorth, Helen, Sophrosyne (Cornell, 1966), 100–15 and cf. below, p. 228 n. 5.Google Scholar

^{page 21 note 3} See especially Plato, Republic 2. 357–67 and cf. 1. 343 c where justice is declared by Thrasymachus to be

^{page 21 note 4} Republic 1. 332d. Adkins (MR 229–30) lays some stress on this being part of Meno's first definition of (Meno 71 e); yet it is also surely of interest that conventional definitions of should coincide.

^{page 21 note 1} The comment is slightly less applicable to the passage from the Orestes in that it i: Apollo's command which is characterized in this way, not the killing itself.

^{page 216 note 2} Aristotle after all seems to assume that the identification of was regularly and conventionally accepted; see the Delian epigram quoted at the end of the article.

^{page 216 note 3} He does in fact allow that there is some flexibility over the use of, as noticed above, p. 214 and n. 1.

^{page 217 note 1} Cf. the judicious comments of Lloyd-Jones, , The justice of Zeus (Univ. of California, 1971, henceforth referred to as JZ), 158, especially his remark that ‘Much of the work done in our language by the term “good” was done in Greek by words other than agathos, particularly by the word dikaios, “just” or “righteous”…’Google Scholar

^{page 217 note 2} Although there are cases where and are linked with other moral terms without this implying that they refer to what we should regard as a specific part of goodness as a whole. See below, p. 221 and n. 1. In the cases there cited, however, or is linked with only one other moral term. Adkins discusses the Septem passage briefly (MR 192 n. 13).

^{page 217 note 3} See G. Italie, Lexicon Aeschyleum s.v. It occurs once in a fragment—Nauck 340, which may only be a paraphrase by Libanius, although it seems to me likely that the word did appear in the original version. occurs six times in the extant plays of Sophocles, and once in a fragment, see Dindorf, Lexicon Sophocleum s.v.

^{page 217 note 4} See especially Agamemnon 699 if., 761–2, 773–5; Septem 407 (where is depicted as a force driving a man to fulfil what Adkins would call traditional.), 597 f. The same concern is evident in Sophocles' Antigone 332–75, esp. 370 where must denote the negation of the just and lawful behaviour described in the previous two lines. It is no doubt true that a motive for the avoidance of injustice was often the fear of divine retribution, but to infer from this that it was the only reason why justice was valued begs the question. Rather an appreciation of the value of justice might lead to the view that the gods reward it.

^{page 217 note 5} See particularly Ol. 13. 6 f., Py. 8. r f., and note the striking phrase at Paean 6. 130–1. Cf. Ol. 7. 18, Py 5. 14, 6. 48, 8. 21–4, Nem. 8. 40 f., 11. 8, Isth. 7. 47–8, and Bacchylides 4. 3, 5. 6, 14. 53–5.

^{page 218 note 1} It is never entirely clear whether Adkins regards the ‘infiltration’ of ‘quiet’ uses as something that is gradually becoming acceptable in normal discourse in the fifth century, or whether he thinks that such uses would have always startled the listener or reader.

^{page 218 note 2} See the admirable remarks of Bruno Snell at the beginning of his essay ‘The Call to Virtue’ in The Discovery of the Mind, 153.

^{page 218 note 3} This is particularly true of MR chapters 8 and 9.

^{page 219 note 1} I need only cite the literary tradition of hostility to the so-called Athenian demagogues, and the suspicion at Rome of a novus homo.

^{page 219 note 2} See Pindar ol. 9. 100 f., 10. 20 f., 11. 10, Pyth. 41 f., Nem. 3. 40–3, Euripides H.F. 663 f., Ion 237–40, Electra 38, 253 f. (a passage on which Adkins lays justified distorted emphasis, MR 176–8), 369 f., Helen 728 f., 1641, Nauck frs. 22, 53, 232. 336, 413, 495. II. 40 f., 527.

^{page 219 note 3} Cf. Lloyd-Jones, JZ 26 and 47. Adkin. seems partially to concede this point in hi: reply to Long, J.H.S. xci (1971), 4–5.Google Scholar

^{page 219 note 4} Cf. below, p. 230 and ibid. n. 4.

^{page 219 note 3} The use and significance of in Thucydides were exhaustively considered by E. Lange, op. cit. (above, p. 213 n. 3.)

^{page 219 note 6} See for 2. 35. 5, 36. 1, 42. 2, 43. 1, 46. 1, 87. 9, 92. 7, 126. 2, 6. II. 6, and probably 4. 63. 2; for (including) 2.11, 35.1, 46. 1, 87. 9 (cf. use of at 87. 3), 3. 98. 4, 4. 40. 2, 80. 3, 95. 1, 5. 9. 9, 60. 5, 69. 1, 2, 7. 77. 7. seems in these cases to include the notion of capacity as well as that of courage, since, when Thucydides wishes to isolate courage from skill in analysing military success, the words used for courage are See 1. 121. 4; 2. 87. 1–5 and 89. 1–7 (the fullest treatment of this theme); 5. 72.2; 6. 68. 2; 7. 64. 2.

^{page 219 note 7} See Lloyd-Jones, JZ. 15: ‘Even in a heroic society… the so-called quieter virtues are essential, above all loyalty, without which not even a gang of thieves, let alone an army, can hope to operate successfully.’ Cf. the argument of Plato, Republic 1. 351.

^{page 219 note 8} Thucydides 2. 43, and for the notion that times of danger and war call for cooperative activity cf. Pericles' last speech, 2. 60. 2–4.

^{page 220 note 1} See 2. 71. 3, 3. 56. 7, 58. 1, and cf. the Theban remarks at 67. 2.

^{page 220 note 2} See Pearson, L., ‘Popular Ethics in the World of Thucydides’, C.P. lii (1957), 228–44, esp. 229–30 and 242 n. 7. Gomme in his note on this passage (Commentary ii. 123) introduces an unnecessary and misleading contrast between ‘courage’ and ‘goodness’.Google Scholar

^{page 220 note 3} D. MacDowell, and Generosity’, Mnem. 4th ser. xvi (1963), 127–9.

^{page 220 note 4} This whole issue has been illuminated by Adkins's, admirable article ‘Friendship and Self-sufficiency in Homer and Aristotle’, C.Q. N.S. xiii (1963), 30–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 220 note 5} Commentary ii. 157.

^{page 221 note 1} It might be argued that there is here a disjunction between and that this supports Adkins's view of the normal meaning of In fact, however, some notion like is clearly present in the second use of (in the phrase earlier in the sentence merely seems to signpost the particular aspect of which is here under discussion. It is difficult, and perhaps wrong, to try to establish a rule as to whether the combination of or with another moral term implies conjunction or disjunction. It seems wisest to be guided by the context. See p. 222 below where I assume along with other scholars that there is a disjunction between and at 4. 81. 2 and 6. 54. 5. For a usage rather like the present one see Herodotus 8. 79. 1 where Aristides is said, and the surely amplifies and explains the (is there any evidence that Aristides was in military valour, or more successful, than Themistocles?—it must be remembered that the words here have the meaning ‘best and justest’, not ‘very good and very just’), and cf. 8. 95 where the notion is more briefly expressed by describing Aristides as

^{page 221 note 2} Dover has commented on this passage that it makes clear that a ‘good’ man is one who ‘sacrifices his own pleasure and advantage’, in his edition of Book 6 (OUP), p. 63 on 54. 5. To the passages cited in the text can be added two (6. 80. 2, 86. 3) in which the Athenians are described as in so far as they are aggressive, and two in the general account of in Book 3 which will be dealt with below, pp. 229–30.

^{page 221 note 3} Cf. the discussion of these by Lange, op. cit. (above, p. 213 n. 3) 829–33.

^{page 222 note 1} See above, p. 213 n. 2.

^{page 222 note 2} By Grene, op. cit. (above, p. 213 n. 2) 81.

^{page 222 note 3} See for Themistocles 1. 138. 3 and for Pericles 2. 65. 5–9.

^{page 222 note 4} See Dover's comments ad loc. (Commentary iv. 329) and Lange, loc. cit.

^{page 222 note 5} This may seem a surprising description of a passage whose text is disputed (some manuscripts omit) and whose translation has caused difficulty (with what does agree?). It would seem that Dover is right (Commentary iv. 461) to make it agree with, as against Grene (op. cit. [above, p. 213 n. 2] 81) who makes it agree with is retained in the text, and however the sentence is construed, the content of the is surely as I have described it. The passage, although unaccountably ignored by Adkins, has been extensively discussed; in addition to Dover and Grene see Murray, , B.I.C.S. viii (1961), 33 f.,Google ScholarWestlake, , C.Q. xxxv (1941), 59 f.,Google Scholar and for the contrast between this judgement and that on Antipho see Grene, loc. cit. and Jebb, R. C., ‘The Speeches of Thucydides’ in Essays and Addresses (Cambridge, 1907), 403 n. 3.Google Scholar

^{page 223 note 1} For and cognate terms see below, pp. 227–8 and p. 228 n. 2.

^{page 223 note 2} See MR 178, 193 nn. 16 and 17, 218 n. 18. Adkins does not claim that his list of ‘quiet’ uses is exhaustive, but the only instances he cites are 1. 37. 5, 38. 5, 86, 3. 58. 1 and 3. 82. 7.

^{page 223 note 3} Rhetorical, that is, in the slightly forced neatness and logic of its rebuttal of the Corcyraeans' claims.

^{page 224 note 1} I am not meaning here to imply that means ‘conventional’ and agrees with See above, p. 222 n. 5.

^{page 224 note 2} On this see now the illuminating account by Croix, G. E. M. de Ste, Origins of the Peloponnesian War, 11–25. I fully agree with de Ste Croix's view (16 ff.) that Thucydides in practice drew a fundamental distinction between the relations between states and those between individuals within the state; but whatever his intentions I feel that Thucydides must have expected his readers to be shocked by the view of inter-state relations expounded by the Athenians in the Melian dialogue.Google Scholar

^{page 224 note 3} See particularly the Corinthian speech at Athens, I. 37–43 (esp. 43. 4), and the debate on the Plataean prisoners (3. 53–67).

^{page 224 note 4} At. 1. 36. I the Corcyraeans seem prepared to let arguments of expediency override those of morality, but have already devoted some time to justifying themselves. On 4. 61. 5 see below.

^{page 224 note 5} As at 1. 82. 1, 32. 5, 4. 114. 5. Cf. (where the speakers are Athenian) 1. 75. 5, 6. 83. 2, 8. 50. 2.

^{page 224 note 6} Here the Thebans clearly regard the Plataeans as owing a loyalty to Boeotia as a whole—just as the Corinthians claim (1. 37–8) that colonies have a duty to their Such claims, however, are not regarded as absolute—the Corcyraeans can plausibly claim that they need no longer be obedient to a which wrongs them (1. 34), and the Mytilenaeans feel justified in deserting an alliance which is infringing their autonomy. The claim that loyalty should be shown to Greece as a whole is much nearer to being absolute, although it is a serious over-simplification to say, as Grene does (op. cit. [above, p. 213 n. 2] 50), that ‘the practical question of justice or injustice in international procedure in his [viz. Thucydides'] day always falls back to claims as to what this country or that did against the Persians in the wars of 490 and 480’. It is admittedly a plea that the Athenians are fond of using (see esp. 1. 73–4, 6. 82–3), and is prominent in the Plataean speeches. But in neither case is the argument decisive, and in other debates, like that between the Corinthian and Corcyraean ambassadors, it is irrelevant, although issues of international justice are prominent.

^{page 225 note 1} Closely linked to the respect for treaties is the belief that it is wrong to have recourse to violence except as a last resort. See the Corinthian and Corcyraean accusations of each other over arbitration (1. 34. 2, 39. 1–2), and the Plataean and Theban arguments over truce-violation (3. 56. 1–2, 66. 2).

^{page 225 note 2} See Andrewes, A., ‘The Melian Dialogue and Pericles’ last speech', P.C.P.S. clxxxvi (1960) 1–10.Google Scholar

^{page 225 note 3} The principle of non-aggression is expounded most succinctly by Pagondas the Boeotarch in his speech before Delium (4. 92) when he refers to those for whom it is various attacks on Athenian imperialism, 1. 68. 2–3, 69. 1–2, 71. 1–2, 121. 1, 124. 3, 2. 8. 4, 3. 13–14, 4. 85. 2.

^{page 225 note 4} On this theory see Andrewes op. cit. (above, n. 2) and Commentary iv. 159 if., also Croix, G. E. M. de Ste, ‘The Character of the Athenian Empire’, Historia iii (1954–1955), 36–7, and Origins of the Peloponnesian War, loc. cit.Google Scholar

^{page 226 note 1} For further discussion of this passage see below, pp. 227–9.

^{page 226 note 2} This and other echoes of Pericles' last speech serve powerfully to heighten the contrast with Pericles on the question whether rational argument or sustained emotion shall be the mainspring of policy—a point wel brought out by Wassermann, F. M., ‘Post-Periclean democracy in Action: the Myti. lenaean Debate’, T.A.P.A. lxxxvii (1956) 27–41,Google Scholar esp. 33–4. See also Andrewes, , ‘The Mytilene Debate: Thucydides 3. 36–49’ Phoenix xvi (1962), 64–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 226 note 3} The contrast is both in the intellectua character of the arguments and in the final judgement. Thucydides is not saying, however, that the Athenians were unaffectec by moral considerations, rather that the arguments put forward by Diodotus ignored them. He makes it clear that the debate was reopened because of a feeling that the sentence was savage (36. 4), and ever Diodotus allows himself to remark that the Athenians would do wrong to kill their benefactors (47. 3). See de Sainte Croix, op. cit. (above, p. 225 n. 4), Andrewes, op. cit. (above, p. 225 n. 2.)

^{page 226 note 4} A decision on this point depends on one's view of the speeches. I incline to believe that Thucydides does wish us to think that the theory was propounded by some Athenians. I can, however, see no grounds for accepting the view of Strasburger, H., ‘Thukydides and die politische Selbstdarstellung der Athener’, Hermes lxxxvi (1958), p. 36 that the Spartans are being presented as in practice more humane than the Athenians. Strasburger underestimates the significance of the execution of the Plataeans, and in his text ignores the massacre of the Ionian prisoners in 427 (3. 32. 1), although he cites the passage in a note. Cf. de Ste Croix, op. cit. (above, p. 225 n. 4) 21.Google Scholar

^{page 226 note 5} This may both appear and be a contradiction in terms. It seems to me none the less implicit in the presentation of the theory that the immoral is being made out to be permissible.

^{page 227 note 1} Thucydides may have regarded the theory as embodying a correct view of actual motivations; it does not seem to me likely that he would have regarded it as sanctioning the practical conclusions drawn from it by the Athenians.

^{page 227 note 2} This is obviously not to deny that more unsophisticated assertions of the role of force in politics were made earlier. See Themistocles' threats to the Andrians, Herodotus 8. 111.

^{page 227 note 3} Adkins appropriately compares Euripides, Phoenissae 549 (MR 234 and 242 R. 19), but his view that the disparagement which the phrase implies is ‘ineffective’ depends precisely on the thesis which he should be trying to prove.

^{page 228 note 1} Gomme, however, Commentary ii. 175 disagrees. He insists that is complimentary term (always) and in his rendering the bite of the phrase derives from the contrast between Cf. de Romilly, Thucydide et l'impérialisme athénien, 72 n. 1 and Ehrenberg, V., ‘Polypragmosyne, a study in Greel politics’, J.H.S. lxvii (1947), 48 n. 9.Google Scholar

^{page 228 note 2} And the word would certainly be associated with the phrase Thucydides bear out the association with courage—see 2. 42. 3, 3. 64. 4, 5. 101, although at 3. 57. r a reputation for justice as well ar military valour seems to be in mind.

^{page 228 note 3} Gomme, (‘Four Passages in Thucydides’ J.H.S. lxxi [1951], 78–9) sees Nicias and his associates as being Pericles' targets here rather than strictly oligarchical opponents but from the point of view of politica. propaganda the difference is not very important. I see no ground for accepting the suggestion of NestlePhilologus lxxx [1925], 129–40), that are philosophers, even Socrates. If Thucydides had meant to refer to philosophers he would have made it much clearer.Google Scholar

^{page 228 note 4} On the nature of this traditional attitude see Wade-Gery, H., ‘Thucydides, son of Melesias’, Appendix D, J.H.S. lxi (1932), 234–5, Ehrenberg, op. cit. (n. 1) 62, and Lloyd-Jones, JZ 205–6. For the opposite characteristics of the Athenians see Thuc. 1. 68–71.Google Scholar

^{page 228 note 5} Note particularly 3. 82. 8, 8. 53. 3, 64. 5, and the overtones of 4. 28. 5. Cf. Helen North, op. cit. (above, p. 215 n. 2) 111 ff. It is surely no accident either that in Plato's Charmides Socrates discusses with two well-known oligarchs, Charmides himself and Critias.

^{page 228 note 6} Op. cit. (above, n. 1) esp. 53–6.

^{page 228 note 7} See the passages cited by Ehrenberg, esp. Plutus 913 ff.

^{page 229 note 1} Indeed the word itself indicates that some active qualities were regularly decried, and generally implies a contrast with the peaceful and law-abiding citizen. Cf. the use of at 82. 2, where, however, the connotation may be intellectual rather than moral.

^{page 229 note 2} The contemptuous use is already present in Herodotus, see 1. 60. 3, 2. 45. 1, and cf. the only other use of a word from this root in Thucydides, 3.45. 7; it is perhaps this that has tempted at least one scholar to translate here as ‘silliness’ (Shorey, P., ‘The Implicit Ethics and Psychology of Thucydides’, T.A.P.A. xxiv (1893), 75 f.). Shorey's translation is well criticized by Grene op. cit. [above, p. 213 n. 2] 27.) For a use which like the one here shows an awareness of both meanings of the word see Plato, Republic 1. 348 c–d, where the term is again coupled with. See also Republic 3. 400 e (cited by Gomme ad. loc.) and 409 a.Google Scholar

^{page 229 note 3} See Philoctetes 475, 799, 801, 1068, 1402. That the term could also plausibly commend a person's resource is implied at 50–3. Adkins's discussion of this play (MR 183, 189) once again shows him greeting ‘quiet’ uses of value-terms as novelties when in fact they are surely traditional, and being challenged by the wily Odysseus. Adkins's own somewhat ambiguous attitude over values at this period is well illustrated by his remark (MR 183): ‘The new usage (sc. of to describe an unjust action) is sufficiently understood without explanation but only a minor assault might be needed to overset it’.

^{page 230 note 1} Philoctetes, 409 B.C.; Phoenissae between 411 and 409.

^{page 230 note 2} Alcestis 624, 742, 993.

^{page 230 note 3} Ajax 524.

^{page 230 note 4} Leading instances are obviously the widening of Greek horizons to take account of non-Greeks (Alexander, the Stoics), and the progressive extensions of the Roman citizenship up to the time of Caracalla.

^{page 231 note 1} See D. C. Earl, The Political Thought of Sallust, ch. 2, and Lloyd-Jones, JZ 32 and 136–7.

^{page 231 note 2} See especially Plato, Republic 2. init. and Aristotle, E.N. init.

^{page 231 note 3} Cf. E.N. 1. 1099^a27–8.