¹ The texts of Galen are cited in general by way of C. G. Kühn's monumental, if inadequate, Leipzig edition of 1821–33 (20 vols. in 22); where later and better editions exist, either in the Teubner or the Corpus Medicorum Graecorum (CMG) I have sometimes (though not invariably) added those references as well. This is unwieldy, and unsatisfactory in many ways, but until a proper edition of the Galenic æuvre; becomes available (if it ever does), there is no better method. ‘CIAG’ refers to the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca; the other references are self-explanatory.

² See Pritchet, C. D. (ed.), Johannis Alexandrini Commentaria in Librum de Sectis Galeni (Leiden, 1982), Praefatio, p. viiGoogle Scholar.

³ ibid., p. vii.

⁴ Also edited by Pritchet, : Commentaria Iohannis Alexandrini in sextum librum Hippocratis Epidemiarum (Leiden, 1975)Google Scholar.

⁵ See Pritchet, , op. cit. n. 2, Praef. p. viiGoogle Scholar.

⁶ By Braeutigam, in his De Hippocratis Epidemiarum libri sexti Commentatoribus (Diss., Königsberg, 1908), p. 46Google Scholar.

⁷ De Sectis Ingredientibus: i 64–105 Kühn, = Scripta Minora (Scr. Min.) 31–32 (Leipzig, 1893), edited by Helmreich, Google Scholar.

⁸ Pritchet, op. cit. (n. 2).

⁹ See Pritchet, , op. cit. (n. 2), p. viiGoogle Scholar.

¹⁰ Extensive at least by comparison with some comparable texts that survive only in medieval Latin versions.

¹¹ The work contains some scholarly irritations however: in particular, Pritchet's references to the rest of the Galenic corpus are unsatisfactory, in two distinct ways, (a) The references are sometimes confusing: he refers to Galen's short treatise Ad Glauconem de Medendi Methodo (xi 1–146Kühn, )Google Scholar as ‘De medendi methodo’ (e.g. at Pritchet, 1982, pp. 24, 33)Google Scholar: but he also uses the same designation (at p. 37) to refer to Galen's masterpiece of therapeutics De Methodo Medendi (Meth. Med.), x 1–1021Kühn, Google Scholar. (b) More importantly, he does not distinguish between the authentic texts of Galen and those that are either (i) clearly spurious, or (ii) of doubtful provenance. As examples of (i), he refers throughout to Introductio, sive Medicus (Int.) xiv 674–797Kühn, Google Scholar, and the Definitions Medicae (Def. Med.) xix 346–462Kühn, Google Scholar as if they were genuine, when they are universally acknowledged not to be. In class (ii) fallDe Optima Secta (i 106–223Kühn, Google Scholar, which is almost certainly at least in part a forgery) andDe Theriaca ad Pisonem (xiv 210–310Kühn, Google Scholar, which is doubtful). All these texts are included, apparently as genuine, in the list of citations appended to the work (pp. 98–9), and in the preface Pritchet refers to the Introductio as if it contained Galen's, ipsissima verba (Praef. pp. viii–ix)Google Scholar.

¹² Pritchet refers these divisions principally to [Gal.] Int. xiv 689–90 Kühn, Google Scholar, although pseudoGalen's division there is substantially different from that to be found in John (even allowing for the obscurities generated by textual difficulty). The most important divergence is that pseudo-Galen does not distinguish between theoretical and practical, although that distinction is to be found in the genuinely Galenic On the Constitution of the Art of Medicine (Const. Art. Med.) I 227–33 Küuhn, Google Scholar; the division of τ⋯χναι into theoretical and practical, with the latter divided further into the acquisitive and the conservative which we find both there and in John, 1 va 27–39 (see n. 13 for the system of references to John), albeit rather badly handled by the latter, goes back to Plato: Soph. 219a–d. See further Galen's, De Partibus Artis Medicativae, translated from the Arabic by Lyons, M. (CMG Supp. Or. II, 1969)Google Scholar; and cf. Galen's Subfiguratio Empirica (Subf. Emp.), ch. 5, for the account of the Empiricist doctors; the proper division of the art of medicine was a matter of deep and abiding importance to the Greek doctors.Subf. Emp. is printed as fragment 10b of Deichgraber's, K.Die Griechische Empirikerschule (Berlin, 1930)Google Scholar, and translated by Frede, Michael, in Galen: Three Treatises on the Nature of Science (Indiana, 1985)Google Scholar. Note also Aristotle's, division of τέχναι into theoretical, practical, and productive: Met. 6 1, 1025b25Google Scholar.

¹³ Pritchet keys his text to some earlier version (either a manuscript of a very early printed edition: thus ‘1 va 12’ would refer to line twelve of column ‘a ‘ of the verso of the first folio), hence the somewhat peculiar references in this article; but he nowhere seems to say which earlier version it is. Accordingly, I follow his system, but cite page numbers of his edition as well.

¹⁴ As Pritchet prints it, John's text is unnecessarily clumsy: ‘habet igitur medicina speculativum (ӨεωρητικΌν) et activum (πρακτικΌν), sed speculativum dividitur in phisiologion (ӨυσιολοκΌν) et ethiologion (αῚτιολογικΌν)… tertium sumoticon (σημειωτικΌν) quidem est significativum,’ etc. (1 vb 13–16, p. 11 Pritchet). It would be much clearer if'et sumoticon’ were read after ‘ethiologion’ in 1 vb 14 (this would further involve excision of the ‘et’ before ‘ethiologion’); these words might very easily have fallen out of the text. Even easier palaeographically would be the insertion of ‘sumoticon’ between ‘phisiologion’ and ‘et'; but the order of treatment in the succeeding lines makes this unlikely.

¹⁵ For references to the canonical triad, see [Gal.] Def Med. xix 392Kühn, Google Scholar; Caus. Puts. IX 1–2Kühn, Google Scholar; De Causis Contentivis (Caus. Cont.) 2, = CMG Supp. Or. II, p. 134.8–13; and see further my article ‘Evidence, externality, and antecedence: inquiries into later Greek causal concepts’, Phronesis 32 (1987), 80–100CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁶ For a full discussion of these issues, see my art. cit. (n. 15); and my Galen on Antecedent Causes (Cambridge, forthcoming). Further texts relating to the distinction include San. Tu. 236Kühn, Google Scholar= CMG v 42, 104.9–16; Meth. Med. x 65–6, 242–4 Kühn, Google Scholar; Praes. Puls. ix 269, 349–51, 386 Kühn, Google Scholar; Hipp. Epid. XVIIB 63Kühn, Google Scholar, =CMG v 10 2 2, 157.20–1; Hipp. Nat. Horn, xv 111–13 Kühn, Google Scholar= CMG v 9 1, 58.16–59.12; [Gal.] Int. xiv 691–2 Kühn, Google Scholar; [Gal.] Def. Med. XIX 392–3 Kühn, Google Scholar; and [Gal.] Hipp. Alim. xv 302Kühn, Google Scholar, although the latter is a very late forgery, and follows Def. Med. so closely at this point that it does not count as a separate source.

¹⁷ Cf. Sextus Empiricus.PH 3 15; [Gal.] Def. Med. xix 393Kühn, Google Scholar; Clement, , Stromateis 8 (9) 25, 33Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Cam. Symp. VII 93, 132 Kühn, Google Scholar; Adv. Jul. XVIIIA 280Kühn, Google Scholar=CMG v 10 3, 58.1–1; however, he notes that earlier theorists (the Stoics) used the term αἲτιον συνεκτικΌν for causes of being, to explain the persistence of material objects, something which he himself generally considers to be superfluous: Plen. VII 524–8 Kühn, Google Scholar. I discuss these issues in my art. cit. (n. 15), esp. pp. 80–6.

¹⁹ Lampe gives ‘hold out’ and ‘offer’ as possible meanings for the term, although given the paucity of the attestations it is not clear on what basis he does so.

²⁰ Although given the second occurrence of ‘proepticon’ at 1 vb 23 in all but one of the MSS. (which omits the crucial part of the sentence altogether), this would involve two stages of textual corruption - first 1 vb 20 is corrupted involuntarily by assimilation of prefixes; then at a later stage 1 vb 23 is ‘corrected’ to coincide with the corrupt reading. I am grateful to the Editors for pointing this out.

²¹ Similar claims are mad e at [Gal.] Int. xiv 688Kühn, Google Scholar, and [Gal.] Def. Med. xix 349Kühn, Google Scholar.

²² Cf. Caus. Proc. vi 57 =CMG Supp. n 15.3–8: ‘unu m utique est hoc genus, quod sive id quod propter quo d [i.e. οὗ χ⋯ριν] fit volueris nominare, sive utilitatem [i.e. χρεíα] generationis eius quo d fit, sive finem [i.e. τ⋯λοσ], sive intentionem [i.e. σκοπΌσ] nichil differt’ (see my op. cit. n. 16 above, ad loc.) an d cf. Us. Part, III 464–71 Kühn, Google Scholar, where σκοπΌσ and τέλοσ are used interchangeably, as they are (apparently) at Symp. Diff. VII 47Kühn, Google Scholar(cf. the remarks of Stobaeus, n. 23 below).

²³ Fo r an excellent discussion of this apparently paradoxical belief, and a convincing defence of its coherence, see Striker's, Gisela ‘Antipater, or the art of living’ in Striker, G. and Schofield, M. (edd.) The Norms of Nature (Cambridge, 1986), 185–204Google Scholar. Stobaeus ascribes three definitions of τέλοσ to the Stoics, according to the second of which it is equivalent to σκοπΌσ (the third is the definition appropriate to the sort of distinction just mentioned): Eel. 2 76, = SVF3 3; cf. ibid. 2 77, =ibid. 3 16). Inwood, B., in Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism (Oxford, 1985), p. 58Google Scholar, writes of ‘the distinction between σκοπΌσ, a material object, and τέλοσ, a λ⋯κτον closely related to it’ ; but that characterisation does not seem to do justice to the distinction as we find it in Galen.

²⁴ For earlier versions of this stock Stoic illustration, see SVF3 18 (= Cicero, , Fin. 3 22)Google Scholar, and 3 10 (= Philo, , de Moyse, 2 3)Google Scholar; and cf. Aristotle, , Eth. Nic. 1 2, 1094a23–4Google Scholar.

²⁵ Pritchet prints ‘considerate’, which makes no sense; I do not know whether this is a misprint, or represents something in the MSS.

²⁶ What can this mean? Does it translate αἷρεσισ though not in its sense of ‘medical sect’ but rather in its general sense of ‘grasping’? This seems unlikely. Michael Frede suggested, in a private letter, that we should read ‘intentio’ for ‘secta’, which at least gives a clear sense, and would restore a balance to the sentence - but the emendation is palaeographically unsatisfactory. It may be, as David Sedley suggests, that the text is correct as it stands, and that ‘secta’ does have its technical sense, the idea being that the overall goal of medicine is the completion of medical science.

²⁷ Michael Frede suggests reading ‘perficeretur’ for ‘finit’ (which is certainly harsh), which gives an excellent sense, although such a corruption is difficult to account for. David Sedley suggests ‘ut direxerit finis, est intentio’, which is easy palaeographically, and gives the sense ‘when the goal directs it, it is an aim’ (presumably distinguishing genuine aims from mere happenstance successes); it also allows the possibility that John's conception of the relation between ακοπΌσ and τ⋯λοσ is broadly speaking that of the Stoics (although it does not entail it: see n. 23 above). None of this is, however, central to our current concerns.

²⁸ Phys. 2 3, 194bl6–195a21; Met. 5 2, 1013a24–1014a25; cf. Met. 2 2, 994alff.; 3 2, 996a 18ff.; 12 4, 1070a31ff; etc.

²⁹ For this later addition to the Peripatetic causal categories, see my op. cit., n. 16 above. The Neoplatonists of the fourth century and later adopt a six-fold taxonomy of Efficient, Material, Formal, Final, Paradigmatic, and Instrumental Causes (see Philoponus, , In Phys. II, CIAG xvi 5.7ff.Google Scholar; Simplicius. In Phys. II, CIAG ix 10.35–11.4)Google Scholar; the first five causes are to be found in Seneca, Ep. 658. See also Frede, M., ‘The Original Notion of Cause’, in Barnes, J., Burnyeat, M. F., Schofield, M. (edd.), Doubt and Dogmatism (Oxford, 1980), 217–49, p. 222Google Scholar. Aristotle himself mentions tools, ⋯ργανα, in his discussion of causes: Phys. 2 3, 195al–3, Met. 5 2, 1013bl–4; but they do not figure as a separate causal category either in Aristotle or in later Peripatetics such as Galen's contemporary Alexander of Aphrodisias: see Alexander, , de Fato 3, vol. 2, p. 116.15 26Google ScholarBruns, , = Sharpies, R. W., Alexander of Aphrodisias on Fate (London, 1983), p. 180Google Scholar.

³⁰ Caus. Proc. VII 71, =CMG Supp. n, 18.18–22.

³¹ At De Usu Partium (UP) III 464–71 Kühn, Google Scholar; UP is also edited by Helmreich, G. in the Teubner series (Leipzig, 1907–1909)Google Scholar; and it is translated into English with an introduction in May, M. T., Galen on the Usefulness of the Parts of the Body (Baltimore, 1967)Google Scholar.

³² UP III 465–6, 470–1 Kühn, Google Scholar; Symp. Diff. VII 47–8 Kühn, Google Scholar; Caus. Proc. vi 60, 63–7 = CMG Supp. ii, pp. 15.31–6, 16.18–17.22. Cf. Seneca, , Ep. 65 8Google Scholar.

³³ In his ‘Ancient Skepticism and Causation’, in Burnyeat, M. F. (ed.), The Skeptical Tradition, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1983), 149–203, p.191 n. 21Google Scholar.

³⁴ Galen sometimes contrasts αἴτια ποιητικ⋯ with αἴτια φυλακτικ⋯, or conservative causes, things responsible for things staying the way they are: Ars Med. I 307, 365–6 Kühn, Google Scholar; cf. San. Tu. vi 437–8 Kühn, , =CMG v 4 2, p. 192.2–10Google Scholar; Meth. Med. x 551–2 Kuuml;hn, Google Scholar; Hipp. Aph. XVIIB 503–4 Kühn, Google Scholar: in medical contexts the distinction is generally between cure and prophylaxis.

³⁵ Which figures in late antiquity as a synonym for the Final cause: see Proclus, in Parm., p. 612 SGoogle Scholar; in Tim. 3.126 D; and in particular Alexander of Aphrodisias Febr. 23.

³⁶ UP III 465, 471–2 K̈hn, Google Scholar; cf.Caus. Proc. vi 57–67, VII 69–72, =CMG Supp. n pp.15.3–17.22, 18.6–34, 19.11–17; Seneca, , Ep. 65 8Google Scholar; cf. Diogenes Laertius 1 21, for the curious variant of the eclectic Potamo (who included τῸ ⋯ν ὡ, ‘that in which’, a ‘Locational cause’); and cf. Dillon, , op. cit., p. 138, on what he calls, somewhat infelicitously, ‘the metaphysic of prepositions’.Google Scholar.

³⁷ See the references at n. 36 above; and cf. Proclus. Elem. Theol. 75, and Sextus Empiricus, , PH 2 14 (albeit in the different context of the criterion of truth)Google Scholar. The use of prepositional phrases to characterise causes goes back to Aristotle, , Phys. 2 3, 194b24–195a3, but he did not employ the method systematically: cf. n. 40 below.Google Scholar.

³⁸ Art. cit. (n. 33), pp. 170–1.

³⁹ PH 3 14.

⁴⁰ One might cite Phys. 2 1, 193bl3ff. as a case in which εῚσ ὃ occurs in a more or less parallel context: but the similarity is only superficial (Aristotle is not concerned with the rigorous classification of causes, only with the preliminaries of the investigation into the nature of nature); and in any case, εῚσ ὃ clearly picks out the Final cause (or the fully-actualized form) if it picks out anything.

⁴¹ See n. 35 above: YπΌ is of course ubiquitous as a preposition denoting agency.

⁴² The fact that ‘esu.’ occurs twice in the same line is to be explained in the same way as the second occurrence of προεκτικΌν see n. 20 above.

⁴³ In my art. cit., n. 15 above.

⁴⁴ Art. cit., n. 29.

⁴⁵ An early version of this note was read by Jonathan Barnes, and by Myles Burnyeat. As always, I profited from their helpful and penetrative comments. The penultimate draft benefited enormously from the detailed and incisive commentary of the Editors.