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Perceptions of eastern frontier policy in Ammianus, Libanius, and Julian (337–363)*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

Robin Seager
Robin Seager*
Affiliation:
University of Liverpool
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Extract

It is the purpose of this paper to examine how Ammianus, Libanius, and Julian conceived of Roman policy on the eastern frontier from the death of Constantine to failure of Julian′s invasion of Persia. Any consideration of the actual facts is secondary. The predominant conclusion will be that all three saw Rome′s as essentially defensive, her objective as the containment of persistent aggression. This will be seen to hold good even for Julian′s invasion., when they are offered by the sources, are presented in terms of, whether national or that of individuals: Constantius, Julian, Jovian, and. It will become apparent, and is sometimes implied, that these attitudes derive the peace imposed by Rome in 299, with which Rome could well rest content, Persia clearly could not.

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Type
Research Article
Information
The Classical Quarterly , Volume 47 , Issue 1 , May 1997, pp. 253 - 268
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 1997

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Footnotes

*

I am grateful to Roger Blockley for commenting on a draft of this paper. He should not be assumed to agree with the views expressed and is not of course responsible for such faults and errors as may remain.

References

1 Cf. Barcelo, P.A., Roms auswdrtige Beziehungen unter der constantinischen Dynastie(Regensburg, 1981), pp. 74ff.; Blockley, R.C., East Roman Foreign Policy(Leeds, 1992), pp. 5ff. For the date of the treaty, cf. Barnes, T.D., Phoenix30 (1976), 182ff. For the terms, cf. Blockley, Worifegmm 6 (1984), 30ff.Google Scholar

2 On Constantine′s possible intentions, cf. Barcelo (n. 1), p. 81; B. H. Warmington in J. Fitz, Limes(Budapest, 1977), p. 512; Blockley in C. Deroux, Studies in Latin Literature and Roman HistoryK (Brussels, 1989), p. 469; ERFP,p. 12.Google Scholar

3 Cf. Wirth, G. in R. Klein, Julian Apostata(Darmstadt, 1978), pp. 459f; Barcelo (n.l), pp. 82ff.; Blockley, Phoenix42 (1988), 247f.; in Deroux (n. 2), pp. 467ff.; ERFP,p. 19.Google Scholar

4 On events before the initiative of Musonianus, cf. Blockley in Deroux (n. 2), pp. 470ff.; ERFP,p. 13.Google Scholar

5 On the chronology, cf. Blockley in Deroux (n. 2), p. 480.Google Scholar

6 On the basic reliability of this correspondence, cf. Blockley, ERFP,p. 19. On the meaning of composita fraude,cf. Blockley in Deroux (n. 2), p. 480 n. 84; ERFP,p. 179 n. 48.Google Scholar

7 Cf. Blockley in Deroux (n. 2), p. 481, with n. 87 on the text of 17.5.15.Google Scholar

8 For the possibility that Musonianus′ initiative actually encouraged Sapor to think of intervention in Mesopotamia, cf. Warmington (n. 2), p. 515; A. D. Lee in P. Freeman and D. Kennedy, The Defence of the Roman and Byzantine Eastii (Oxford, 1986), p. 459 (conceding that Sapor might have attacked anyway); contra: Barcelo (n. 1), pp. 90f.

9 The use of turbarehere, with its connotations of interference with what is right and proper, is extremely appropriate to the Roman point of view. Cf. Seager, R., Ammianus Marcellinus, Seven Studies in his Language and Thought(Columbia, 1986), pp. 92ff.Google Scholar

10 Warmington (n.2), p. 515, believes that the objective of the Blitzkriegwas merely to force Constantius to battle. Blockley, Phoenix42 (1988), 244, assumes that, even if Sapor had intended to invade Syria (which he denies; cf. next note), the object would have been merely plunder, not conquest.Google Scholar

11 Blockley, Phoenix42 (1988), 251f, argues (rejecting the story of the Euphrates flood) that Sapor never intended to invade Syria but was aiming at Amida from the first (thus also briefly ERFP,p. 22), though in Deroux (n. 2), pp. 483ff., he appears to accept Sapor′s change of plan as genuine.Google Scholar

12 For the message, cf. Blockley, Phoenix42 (1988), 256; in Deroux (n. 2), p. 484. As remarked by J. F. Matthews in Freeman and Kennedy (n. 8), p. 558, the message gave no details of the planned invasion route. 13 Blockley, Phoenix42 (1988), 256fT., seems to neglect this factor.Google Scholar

14 On the geography, cf. Blockley, Phoenix42 (1988), 253ff.Google Scholar

15 Cf. P. De Jonge on 19.1.6. The suggestion that Sapor was forced to besiege Amida to appease his allies (Matthews (n. 12), p. 557; The Roman Empire of Ammianus[London, 1989], p. 58) may underestimate the king′s own fit of pique.Google Scholar

16 On which, cf. Blockley in Deroux (n. 2), p. 485 at n. 103.

17 I Szidat, ad loc., observes that Constantius clearly knew better.

18 On the justification of the request, cf. Warmington (n. 2), p. 516.

19 Cf. Blockley, Florilegium6 (1984), 35f. with n. 44.

20 Cf. Blockley in Deioux (n. 2), pp. 484ff.

21 Cf. Blockley in Deroux (n. 2), p. 486.

22 Contrast the order at 21.13.3 with the generals′ request for reinforcements at 21.13.5.

23 Cf. Blockley, Latomus31 (1972), 441ff.Google Scholar

24 On the Syrian bias of criticism of Constantius, cf. Blockley in Deroux (n. 2), p. 487.

25 Cf. Blockley in Deroux (n. 2), p. 473.

26 The idea that Julian intended to conquer Persia is widely dismissed, usually on the inadequate ground that such a goal was unrealistic. Thus e.g. P. Petit in R. Braun and J. Richer, L′empereur Mien. De I′histoire a la legends(Paris, 1978), p. 80; Barcelo (n. 1), pp. 98f.; Blockley in Deroux (n. 2), p. 468; Matthews (n. 15), p. 139. But cf. Wirth (n. 3), pp. 460fF., 483ff.; A. Marcone, Athen.57 (1979), 343ff.; F. Paschoud, REL58 (1980), 122. On the Alexander motif and its possible value as a disguise for the fact that Julian was to some extent reviving the policies of Constantine, cf. Marcone, 342f.; W. E. Kaegi Jr, Athen.59 (1981), 209ff.; Barceld (n. 1), p. 100; and especially Blockley, ERFP,p. 25. That Julian′s admiration for Alexander was not unqualified is rightly stressed by R. Scholl, Historische Beitrdge zu den julianischen Reden des Libanios(Stuttgart, 1994), p. 138.Google Scholar

27 On the doom-laden atmosphere of Ammianus′ narrative, cf. D. Conduche, Latomus24 (1965), 364ff.; Rike, R.L., Apex Omnium(Berkeley, 1987), p. 61; Matthews (n.15), pp. 132,176ff.Google Scholar

28 Stressed e.g. by Barcelo (n. 1), pp. 98f, but cf. Wirth (n. 3), p. 483.

29 On the conflict between haruspicesand ‘philosophers’, cf. Conduche (n. 27), 368ff.; Rike (n. 27), p. 63; Scholl (n. 26), p. 141.Google Scholar

30 Cf. Marcone (n. 26), 334ff. The parallel between what Julian is made to say here by; Ammianus and his own words at Or.2.86B is striking.

31 The embassy at least is probably historical. Cf. Barcelo (n. 1), p. 99; Blockley, Florilegium6 (1984), 34.

32 Scholl (n. 26), pp. 134fF. argues that the consular oration reveals veiled disapproval of the planned expedition and indirectly attempts to put pressure on Julian to negotiate. This seems to me inconsistent with the second half of Or.12.74.

33 Cf. Hor. C. 1.2.45ff.

34 Cf. above, n. 26.

35 For various estimates of the situation, cf. Turcan, R., Melanges Piganiol II(Paris, 1966), pp. 876ff. (exaggeratedly positive); N. Austin, J.E., Athen.50 (1972), 301ff.; Ridley, R.T., Historia22 (1973), 326 (also extremely positive); Wirth (n.. 3), pp. 461ff. (violently negative); Paschoud, Zosime, Histoire Nouvelle III(Paris, 1979), pp. xixff. (cogently negative, and with an excellent appreciation of Sapor′s strategy); Barcelo (n. 1), pp. 97, lOlf. (negative, and again with a just valuation of the quality of the Persian defence and its similarity to the strategy of Constantius); Matthews (n. 15), pp. 158f.; Scholl (n. 26), p. 139.Google Scholar

36 On the terms of the treaty, cf. Blockley, Florilegium6 (1984), 35ff.; ERFP,pp. 27ff. His earlier view (art. cit. 35 with n. 44) that Rome had not recovered Singara since 360 seems preferable.

37 On Ammianus′ account of the effects of this clause between 363 and 378, cf. Chiron26 (1996), 275ff.

38 Cf. for Constantius: Amm. 14.10.1; 17.13.1, 27f., 30; 19.11.1; Jul. Or.1.7C, 9D, 35A; for Julian: Amm. 15.8.1, 6f.; 16.11.11; 17.1.llff., 8.4f., 9.1, 10.4, 9 (cf. 18.2.6); 18.2.3ff., 19; 20.10.3; 21.13.13; Lib. Or.12.40f., 48, 13.24,18.31 (cf. 16); Jul. Ep. Ath.279D (cf. 280D); for Valentinian: Amm. 28.2.1fF.; 29.4.1,6.2 (cf. 29.6.5fF.; 30.5.11,6.3); 30.3.2ff., 7.5f; forGratian: Amm. 31.10.2ff., 18(cf. 11).