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Plato and Allegorical Interpretation1
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 February 2009
Extract
Allegorical interpretation of the ancient Greek myths began (as I showed in C.R. XLI., pp. 214–15) not with the grammarians, but with the philosophers. As speculative thought developed, there grew up also the belief that in mystical and symbolic terms the ancient poets had expressed profound truths which were difficult to define in scientifically exact language. Assuming that the myth-makers were concerned to edify and to instruct, the philosophers found in apparent immoralities and impieties a warning that both in offensive and in inoffensive passages one must look beneath the surface for the true significance of the tales. Thus allegory was originally positive, not negative, in its aim; its purpose was not so much to defend the poetic traditions against charges of immorality as to make fully explicit the wealth of doctrine which ex hypothesi the myths contained. Those who wrote to defend the poets could, if they chose, make some use of the results of the allegorical method; passages to which exception had been taken could be shown by allegorical treatment to be quite consistent with the view that the poets were wise and divinely inspired. But the first dim beginnings of allegory can be traced to another and a weightier motive—namely, the desire of speculative thinkers to appropriate for their own use some at least of the mythical traditions. Nor is there any reason to doubt that the same motive was the main driving force in the later history of allegorical interpretation. Objectionable passages were, indeed, regarded as among the richest in deeper meaning; but the leading allegorists applied their method to offensive and inoffensive passages alike.
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- Copyright © The Classical Association 1929
References
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page 142 note 3 Tatian, , ad Graec. 21Google Scholar.
page 143 note 1 See Diels, , F. der V. I., p. 414Google Scholar; Gomperz, , G.T. I., pp. 378, 574Google Scholar.
page 143 note 2 Philodemus in Diels, ibid.., p. 418 (Homer intended ‘Zeus’ to mean ‘air’).
page 143 note 3 Syncellus, , Chron. 140cGoogle Scholar (Diels, Ibid., p. 414). (Zeus=mind, Athena=art; the first is probably one of Anaxagoras' own, in view of his doctrine of νοῦσ.)
page 143 note 4 Fr. 2 (Diels): Tritogeneia means that wisdom (Athena) consists of three parts (cf. C.Q., January, 1929, p. 43); fr. 30: Zeus=air; cf. fr. 24.
page 143 note 5 Plato, , Charm. 163dGoogle Scholar; Crat. 384b. It seems probable that Prodicus used his etymologies to support his rationalistic views concerning the gods(Cic. N.D. I. 118).
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page 143 note 7 See Gomperz, , G.T. I., pp. 258, 563Google Scholar.
page 143 note 8 Symp. III. 6.
page 143 note 9 530d.
page 143 note 10 He may be the same person as the Glaucon mentioned by Aristotle, Poet. 1461b, as protesting against overhasty interpretation and condemnation of passages in the poets. If this is so, he probably used allegory for defensive purposes.
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page 143 note 12 Prot. 316d.
page 143 note 13 Crat. 4O7ab.
page 143 note 14 Cf. Phaedrus 229c sqq.
page 143 note 15 Adam on Rep. 378d, 24.
page 144 note 1 Frr. 28, 40, 42, 57, 104 (Diels).
page 144 note 2 Die platonische Homerkritik und hre Nachwirhung (Philologus LXXXII., pp. 121 sqq.). See pp. 124–125 and n. 13.
page 145 note 1 Thus the allegorists might be accused of blasphemy (Plutarch, Amat. 757c).
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page 147 note 1 Rep. 383a; cf. 389e.
page 147 note 2 Laws 682a.
page 147 note 3 Ibid., Meno 99.
page 148 note 1 Meno 98a; Apol. 22bc; Phaedr. 278c (cf. Rep. 490b). Cf.Ion 534d; and Francis Thompson:
‘We speak a lesson taught we know not how,
And what it is that from us flows
The hearer better than the utterer knows.’
page 148 note 2 Apol. 22bc: φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἑ ν θ ο υ σ ι ά ξ ο ν τ ε ς. Cf, Meno 99e: οῠτε διδακτὸν ἀλλὰ θείᾳ μοἰρᾳ … ᾰνευ νοῦ.
page 148 note 3 The commonsense view, and the Homeric account of the matter. Phemius is self-taught, but the gods have implanted lays in his heart (Od. XXII. 347; cf. Finsler, , Homer I.2, p. 267)Google Scholar.
page 148 note 4 Ion 533e sqq.; Phaedr. 2415a; Laws 719C.
page 148 note 5 See Adam on Rep. 601e, 32.
page 148 note 6 Cf. Rep. 506c on οἱ ἄνευ νοῦ ἀληθές τι δοξάξοντες.
page 148 note 7 Rep. 492e–3a.
page 148 note 8 v. 27; cf. Strabo I. 2, 9.
page 148 note 9 Rep. 382ea.
page 149 note 1 Laws 719c (the inspired poet contradicts himself and the laws); 682a (κατὰ θεόν πως εἰρημένα κατὰ φύσιν). One can only suppose that the inspired poet when wrong has the symptoms of inspiration without the reality. (Cf. Phaedo 69c, [Longinus], On the Sublime III. 2: οὐ βακχεὐουσι ἀλλὰ παίξουσι).
page 149 note 2 Rep. 398a.
page 149 note 3 Rep. 401C: τοǺς εὐφυῶς δυναμένους. Cf. Phaedr. 269–70: oratory requires a natural gift (φύσις) as well as practice (μελέτη) and knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). Hence Aristotle took his distinction between the εὐφυής and the μανικός (Poet. 1455a, 32).
page 149 note 4 Put most clearly in the pseudo-Platonic, Alcibiades II. 147bcdGoogle Scholar.
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page 149 note 6 Apol. 22c.
page 149 note 7 E.g. Bacon in the Advancement of Learning (Cowl, , Theory of Poetry in England, p. 302)Google Scholar.
page 149 note 8 Apol. 21b (αἰνίττεται); Phaedo 69c; Laws 719. Cf. Heraclitus (fr. 93, Diels) who finds a parallel for his obscure and symbolic style in the practice of the oracle of Delphi. Cf. also Pindar, the Muse's prophet (fr. 150), whose arrows are only for the wise (Ol. II. 83).
page 150 note 1 De Dis et Mundo, c. 3.
page 150 note 2 Cf. Lysis 214b.
page 150 note 3 Ion 533d sqq.
page 150 note 4 prot. 347e.
page 151 note 1 Phaedr. 277–8.
page 152 note 1 De Antro Nympharum 28.
page 152 note 2 Phaedr. 229e ᾰγροικός τις σοφία.
page 152 note 3 Two modern examples will make my meaning clear: (1) The derivation of Saxon from Issac's son, which ‘proves’ that the Anglo-Saxons (whoever they may be) are Israelites; (2) the derivation of atonement from at-one-ment so frequently cited to ‘prove’ that the doctrine contains no idea of reparation. Etymologies are no argument. But when those on which argument is based are wrong, the humour of the situation is increased. ‘Atone’ (pace the N.E.D.) comes from the legal phrase testibus idoneis (see Wiener, L., Commentary to the Germanic Laws, Harvard, 1915, pp. 167–8)Google Scholar.
page 154 note 1 Cf. Seneca, , Epist. 88Google Scholar, 5: ‘demus illis Homerum philosophum fuisse; … ergo illa discamus quae Homerum fecere sapientem.
page 154 note 2 Prot. 347cd; Phaedr. 278a.
page 154 note 3 Cf. Enn. IV. 3, 14, and Whittaker, T., The Neoplatonists, p. 98Google Scholar.
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