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Plato On Truth And Falsity In Names1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

J. V. Luce
Affiliation:
Trinity College, Dublin

Extract

In Cratylus 385 b-c Plato argues that if statements () can be true or false, names (),2 as parts () of statements, are also capable of being true or false. From Aristotle onwards this view has often been challenged,3 and R. Robinson put the case against it trenchantly when he wrote:4

This argument is bad; for names have no truth-value, and the reason given for saying that they do is a fallacy of division. No one in the dialogue points out that it is bad. … Nevertheless it is fairly probable that Plato saw or at least felt that it is a bad argument, quite different in quality from those he later produces against the nature-theory.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 1969

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