² Three scholars who give weight to Simmias' words are Monique, Dixsaut,Platon Phédon: traduction nouvelle, introduction et notes(Paris,1991),343–345, who contrasts Simmias, who is aware of the need to apply the recollection to himself, with Kebes, who uses the not to draw implications about his own learning but to argue to immortality;Google ScholarCarlo Huber, Anamnesis bei Plato(Munich,1961),347–352, who argues that recollection is fully understood only through reflection on one's own learning; andGoogle ScholarC. J. Rowe, Plato Phaedo(Cambridge,1993),163–164, who takes the point of the repeated reference to Simmias' being reminded to be that in the Phaedo's account of recollection something acts as a reminder.Google Scholar

³ These points are drawn from Wilkes, K.V., ‘Conclusions in the Meno’,Archivfur Geschichte der Philosophie (1979),143–153, at 146–147.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴ J. L. Ackrill, ‘Anamnesis in the Phaedo: Remarks on 73c–75c’, pp. 177–195 inGoogle ScholarLee, E. N., Mourelatos, A. P. D., and R., Rorty,Exegesis and Argument(Assen,1973),187.Google Scholar

⁵ This is my reason for rejecting Ackrill's account of Plato's strategy: to set up sufficient conditions for recollection that do not include the necessary condition of prior knowledge; to argue that the sufficient conditions obtain when one comes to knowledge of the Equal itself; to conclude that one thereby recollects the Equal itself; and thence to infer that the necessary condition, prior knowledge of the Equal itself, obtains

⁶ Dominic, Scott,Recollection and Experience: Plato's Theory of Learning and its Successors(Cambridge, 1995).Google Scholar

⁷ Ackrill explicitly cites the distinction between being put in mind of r and thinking about r (n. 4, pp. 185–6) but refuses to count thinking about r as recollecting

⁸ Gosling, J. C. B.,‘Similarity in Phaedo 73 seq’,Phronesis 10(1965),151–161, is the best-known argument for this interpretationCrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁹ Scott (n. 6), has shown how throughout the argument from 74a9–76e7 every occurrence of the first-person plural, even in its context the statement at 74blO–l 1 that we began to perceive at birth, refers to those who believe in Ideas and engage in dialectical discussions. The conclusions about pre-existence of ‘our’ souls may then be generalized to cover all human souls, on the grounds that while only a few engage in recollection, all are capable of it, even though the distractions of this life normally prevent them from doing what they are capable of

¹⁰ The reason why Socrates leaves it open whether the Equal is similar or dissimilar to perceived equal objects is probably that he thereby takes account of its being analogous to the everyday case of perception from similars in that a particular kind of comparative judgement about what is perceived and what is recollected accompanies the recollection, but the distinctive relation between Ideas and perceived objects is neither straightforwardly similarity nor dissimilarity

¹¹ I take this possibility up below when I make use of Brown's argument that Plato is alluding to disputes among mathematicians about the definition of equality. See Brown, Malcolm S.,‘The Idea of Equality in the Phaedo’, Archivfur Geschichte der Philosophic 54(1972),24–36.Google Scholar

¹² Scott (n. 6, pp. 59–60) correctly argues that Socrates' description of the comparative judgement makes it unlikely that he is talking about our everyday application of such concepts as equality. But he then passes without sufficient supporting reasons, so far as I can see, to the conclusion that Socrates is therefore talking about learning

¹³ Simmias' hesitation over which alternative to accept may be intended by Plato to emphasize the importance of the alternative he is brought by Socrates' arguments to accept, as it may also emphasize the difference between this and the everyday cases.

¹⁴ The imperfect is problematic; it implies at least the uncompleted approximation of perceived objects to ideas. The past tense may perhaps be used because Socrates is referring to what was clear, (76a 1) at an earlier stage of the argument

¹⁵ Prauss,Platon und der logische Eleatismus(Berlin,1966),111–112, shows that what Plato takes the perceptible features to be referred or compared to at 76el–2 is ‘nicht die Idee als solche, sondern die Idee als vorgewuBte; oder genauer das Wissen von jener Idee’. If my arguments are accepted, then Wissen has to be qualified as the state of recovered knowledge, which may well be belief and the holding to some firm hypothesis, at any stage in the process of relearning.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Lee Edward N., ‘The Second “Third Man”: an Interpretation’, in Moravcsik, J. M. E., Patterns in Plato's Thought(Dordrecht/Boston,1973),101–122.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁷ As Dixsaut (n. 2, p. 345), expresses it, ‘En parlant de manque, d'aspiration, d'amour et d'images, il indique… le mouvement delâme qui, dans ce qui est là, voit ce qui precisement n'est pas là et qui ne manque qu'a celui qui le désire’ (my emphasis).

¹⁸ Platon has Phaedo qualify his statement that Plato was ill by the word . Why does Plato have him express this qualification? Perhaps he is implying that Phaedo was mistaken and that Plato had another reason for not being there. It would not be too fanciful to suggest that he was already preparing to live as a philosopher without Socrates.

¹⁹ M. Gueroult, ‘La meditation de l'âme sur l'ame dans le Ph‘don’, Revue de metaphysique et de morale (1926), 469–91.Google Scholar

²⁰ An exception is Dixsaut (n. 2, p. 18), ‘L'enjeu du Phedon n'est pas de nous enseigner comment mourir, ou meme comment vivre: il est de nous faire concevoir notre âme d'une certaine facon.’