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Soul as Subject in Aristotle's De Anima

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

Christopher shields
Affiliation:
Colby College, Maine

Extract

In the largely historical and aporetic first book of the De Anima (DA), Aristotle makes what appear to be some rather disturbing remarks about the soul's status as a subject of mental states. Most notably, in a curious passage which has aroused the interest of commentators, he seems to suggest that there is something wrong with regarding the soul as a subject of mental states:

Thus, saying that the soul is angry is the same as if one were to say that the soul builds houses and weaves: for it is perhaps better to say not that the soul pities or learns or thinks, but that the man does [these things] with his soul. (DA 408bll–15)

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 1988

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