^{page 315 note 1} Quoted in New York Times, 04 22, 1968, p. 28.Google Scholar

^{page 315 note 2} Quoted in Monteiro, John B., Corruption: Control of Maladministration (Bombay: Manaktalas, 1966), p. 20.Google Scholar

^{page 315 note 3} Wertheim, W. F., East-West Parallels: Sociological Approaches to Modern Asia (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965), pp. 116–19.Google Scholar

^{page 316 note 1} Wertheim, W. F., op. cit., p. 115.Google Scholar

^{page 316 note 2} Between 1610 and 1640 roughly one-half of the total royal revenue came from the sale of offices. For a thorough discussion of such administrative patterns in Europe see: Swart, K. W., Sale of Offices in the Seventeenth Century (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1949).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 316 note 3} In England, for example, parliamentary seats could be purchased by bribing small borough electorates until the Redistribution Act of 1885 and thereafter through large con tributions to a political party. ‘Many of the merchants who had gone out to India from Manchester found bribery to be just as useful in the Commons as in Calcutta, and sometimes they combined to purchase a borough.’ Wraith, Ronald and Simpkins, Edgar, Corruption in Developing Countries (London: Allen and Unwin, 1963), p. 67. The office was of course expected to yield a profit.Google Scholar

^{page 316 note 4} The most detailed but not entirely dispassionate effort thus far is Wraith, and Simkins, , op. cit.Google Scholar See also McMullan, M., ‘A Theory of Corruption’, The Sociological Review (Keele), 9 (07 1961), 132–52;CrossRefGoogle ScholarWertheim, W. F.op. cit., pp. 103–31;Google ScholarGreenstone, J. David, ‘Corruption and Self Interest in Kampala and Nairobi’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, VIII (01 1966), 199–210;CrossRefGoogle ScholarLeys, Colin, ‘What is the Problem About Corruption?’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 3, 2 (1965), 215–30;CrossRefGoogle ScholarNye, J. S., ‘Corruption and Political Develop ment: A Cost-Benefit Analysis’, American Political Science Review, LXI, 2 (06 1967), 417–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Portions of Weiner, Myron, The Politics of Scarcity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962) are also relevant.Google Scholar

^{page 317 note 1} Some of the more prominent examples include: Key, V. O., The Techniques of Political Graft in the United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Libraries, 1936);Google ScholarHof-stadter, Richard, The Age of Reform (New York: Random House, 1955)Google Scholar; and Banfield, Edward C. and Wilson, James Q., City Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965).Google Scholar

^{page 318 note 1} This perspective is most obvious in McMullan, M.Google Scholarop. cit., and Wraith, and Simkins, , op. cit.Google Scholar

^{page 318 note 2} A careful statement of this narrower definition is contained in Nye, J. S., op. cit., p. 419. ‘Corruption is behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence.’Google Scholar

^{page 318 note 3} Wertheim, , op. cit., p. 111.Google Scholar

^{page 319 note 1} See Wade, John, The Black Book (London: 1820),Google Scholar cited in Harrison, J. F. C., ed., Society and Politics in England: 1780–1960 (New York: Harper, 1965), pp. 93–8.Google Scholar

^{page 319 note 2} Report of the Committee on Prevention of Corruption, Chairman, K. Santhanam (Delhi: Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, 1964), p. 6.Google Scholar

^{page 319 note 3} Those who are familiar with American practices in this respect will find recognizable similar patterns in the Philippines. It would not be easy, I might add, to convince an Indian or Malaysian civil servant that such patterns are not ‘corrupt’.

^{page 320 note 1} With the separation of ownership and operation in the modern corporation, stockholders are entitled to bring stockholders’ suits in such instances. Nevertheless, ‘corruption’ in private business became an enormous problem in the West after the introduction of limited liability.

^{page 320 note 2} The private sector also averts much corruption by the use of the price system. The relative scarcity of a good or service in the private sector generally raises its price while public sector standards of allocation often assign values to such things as licenses and franchises that are well below what they would bring on the open market. In such circumstances a part of the difference between market value and official value is occasionally offered to public officials in the form of bribes. Thus corruption is often evidence that the market has penetrated areas from which it is officially excluded. For an analysis along these lines see Robert Tilman, ‘Administration, Development, and Corruption: The Emergence of Black-Market Bureauc racy’, a paper presented to the Southern Political Science Association annual meeting, November 1967.

^{page 321 note 1} Brasz, H. A., ‘Some Notes on the Sociology of Corruption’, Sociologia Neerlandica, 1, 2 (Autumn 1963), 111–28Google Scholar, and Tilman, Robert, op. cit.Google Scholar

^{page 321 note 2} While most corruption involves two parties, there are situations in which a public official lets a contract, say, to himself in his private capacity while violating regulations. Here one individual enacts both roles. Key calls this ‘auto-corruption’, op. cit., p. 391.Google Scholar

^{page 322 note 1} See Swart, , op. cit.,Google Scholar Chapter 3, and Mayes, Charles R., ‘The Sale of Peerages in Early Stuart England’, The Journal of Modern History, XXIX, 1 (03 1957), 21–35.CrossRefGoogle ScholarWraith, and Simkins, , op. cit., pp. 55–86, also provide a brief account. The assumption that during this period wealth had first to be translated into status before it could beget political authority was not necessarily the case.Google Scholar

^{page 321 note 2} A full account of this pattern can be found in Skinner, G. William, Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community of Thailand (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958)Google Scholar, passim. For an abbreviated account see Riggs, Fred W., Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966), pp. 245–54.Google Scholar

^{page 323 note 1} Soukup, James R., ‘Japan’, pp. 737–56Google Scholar in Rose, Richard and Heidenheimer, Arnold J., eds., Comparative Studies in Political Finance: A Symposium, Journal of Politics, 25, 4 (11 1963).Google Scholar

^{page 323 note 2} Ibid., pp. 749–50.

^{page 324 note 1} A further article, in preparation, will deal more elaborately with corruption and political development.

^{page 324 note 2} One need hardly point out that the opposition party operates at a substantial dis advantage in trying to sway a skeptical electorate oriented to short-term material gain. It can only offer promises of later rewards.

^{page 324 note 3} The ‘pork-barrel’ variant is also widespread in developing nations, particularly in rural areas. Many rural development programs in new nations are more accurately analyzed as organizations geared to provide patronage and electoral inducements rather than to raise rural productivity.

^{page 324 note 4} For an excellent discussion along these lines see Zolberg, Aristide R., Creating Political Order: The Party States of West Africa (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), pp. 160–61.Google Scholar See also Banfield, and Wilson, , op. cit., pp. 337–40.Google Scholar

^{page 326 note 1} Here we are assuming, of course, that there are no compunctions about corruption and no costs attached to such an act—e.g., probability of arrest. Whether the bureaucrat ‘sells’ influence, given a fixed reward, depends as well on the probability of being caught, the penalty if caught, and his moral scruples.

^{page 327 note 1} Politicians may occasionally even pass legislation that restricts the private sector so as to retain the proper ideological stance while, at the same time, private firms continue operation almost unimpeded through corruption in which politicians may share.

^{page 327 note 2} For a brief discussion of the East African pattern see Greenstone, J. David, ‘Corruption and Self-interest in Kampala and Nairobi’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, VIII, 2 (01 1966), 199–210.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For contrasting Southeast Asian patterns, Riggs, , op. cit.,Google Scholar and Baterina, Virginia F., ‘A Study of Money in Elections in the Philippines’, Part I, Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review, XX, 1 (03 1955), 39–86; Part II, XX, 2 (June, 1955), pp. 137–212, provide descriptions of Thai and Philippine practices.Google Scholar

^{page 328 note 1} Huntington, Samuel P., ‘Political Development and Political Decay’, in Welch, Claude E. Jr., ed., Political Modernization: A Reader in Comparative Political Change, pp. 207–41.Google Scholar

^{page 330 note 1} The term ‘parochial’ is one of convenience for underdeveloped nations. It is conceivable that favors could be done on the basis of working-class ties, for example, that one could hardly call parochial, but the unlikelihood of this occurring warrants ignoring such complications.

^{page 330 note 2} The term ‘pay’ is not entirely accurate since market corruption is not confined exclusively to cash transactions. Payment in kind—extending, say, even to army commanders bidding for patronage by offering to supply some army trucks to take voters to the polls—is intended to fall within its meaning.

^{page 330 note 3} Wraith, and Simkins, , op. cit., p. 66.Google Scholar

^{page 331 note 1} Weiner, Myron, op. tit., p. 236.Google Scholar

^{page 331 note 2} Report of the Railway Corruption Enquiry Committee, 1953–55, ‘Kripalani Committee’ (Delhi: Government of India, Ministry of Railways, 1956), p. 48.Google Scholar

^{page 332 note 1} Wurfel, David, ‘The Philippines’, pp. 757–73Google Scholar in Rose, and Heidenheimer, , eds., op. cit., pp. 770–1. Wurfel gives an excellent account of the role of money in Philippine elections.Google Scholar

^{page 332 note 2} Steffens, Lincoln, The Shame of the Cities (New York: Hill and Wang, 1963), p. 139.Google Scholar

^{page 332 note 3} Ibid., pp. 203, 205.

^{page 333 note 1} See A. H. and G. Somjee, ‘India’, in Rose, and Heidenheimer, , op. cit., pp. 686–702.Google Scholar

^{page 333 note 2} Wertheim, , op. cit., p. 122.Google Scholar

^{page 335 note 1} Changes of a substantial nature in the personnel who run the Thai government occur when a successful ‘coup-group’ ousts the previous ruling coalition. For a discussion of this pattern see Wilson, James A., Politics in Thailand (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 254–9.Google Scholar The National Assembly has occasionally wielded some power but never for long.

^{page 335 note 2} For a careful assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of such regimes in Africa see Zolberg, op. cit., passim.

^{page 336 note 1} Many development programs, particularly community development programs, in new nations serve important electoral functions for governing parties. Many of the anomalies that confound the observer when they are analyzed as rational economic efforts to raise produc tivity disappear once they are seen as, above all, an effort to build an effective electoral machine on a particularistic base. One perceptive analyst of Indonesia's nationaliza tion program when parties flourished concluded, ‘On the whole, their measures of Indo- nesianization failed to bring about any major increase in the power of Indonesian nationals within the economy, a fact which suggests that the patronage function of these measures may have been more important than their policy aspect’. Feith, Herbert, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 557.Google Scholar

^{page 336 note 2} A proportional representation system, of course, lessens the distributive pressure.

^{page 336 note 3} Heard, Alexander, The Costs of Democracy (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), p. 68.Google Scholar

^{page 336 note 4} The party in power has a tremendous advantage in that it can use state funds to reward some of the electorate and can often do this quite legally. 'Out' parties, even if they can secure the financial backing, will ordinarily have to resort to simple bribery, since promises are seldom adequate.

^{page 337 note 1} Wurfel, , op. cit., p. 761.Google Scholar

^{page 337 note 2} Ibid., p. 763.

^{page 337 note 3} Ibid., pp. 761–2.

^{page 337 note 4} Ibid., p. 769.

^{page 337 note 5} Other nations that exhibit some of the same characteristics are: Lebanon, Malaysia, Ceylon, Chile, Uruguay, and parts of India. The differences are due, for the most part, either to less intense electoral competition or to stronger ideological concerns among the electorate.

^{page 337 note 6} Steffens, , op. cit., p. 165.Google Scholar

^{page 338 note 1} Steffens, , op. cit., p. 152.Google Scholar See also McKitrick, Eric L., ‘The Study of Corruption’, Political Science Quarterly, 72, 4 (10 1957), 502–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 338 note 2} Banfield, and Wilson, , op. cit., p. 115.Google Scholar

^{page 338 note 3} Former Liberal Party leader Avelino, Jose, The Manila Chronicle, 01 18, 1949,Google Scholar cited in Baterina, , op. cit., p. 79.Google Scholar

^{page 338 note 4} One should be aware, of course, that the stable machine, due to its moderation and con cern for the long run, may actually make corrupt arrangements more durable.

^{page 338 note 5} Feith, , op. cit., p. 422.Google Scholar

^{page 339 note 1} Wertheim, , op. cit., p. 127.Google Scholar

^{page 339 note 2} See for example Report of the Commission of Inquiry [into allegations against S. Partap Singh Kairon, Chief Minister of the Punjab] (New Delhi: Home Ministry, June 11, 1964) for an account of a well-oiled political machine.

^{page 339 note 3} If, instead of four cells, the table were to be conceived of as continua along two dimensions, more precise distinctions would be possible; e.g., between the greater electoral competition in the Philippines than in Malaysia or even pre-1958 Indonesia, for that matter. The table also assumes that elections per se have no appreciable effect on levels of corruption. For a particularistic electorate in which the distribution of rewards is of more concern than standards of probity, this seems a safe assumption.

^{page 339 note 4} One hesitates to use South Vietnam here since the vast amounts of military aid and social disorganization resulting from the war make it a very special case. Nonetheless, the instability of the regime has an independent effect over and above these factors. The Diem regime in the more stable days of, say, 1956 had imposed a degree of predictability, limited though it was, that present-day military cliques cannot achieve.

^{page 339 note *} I am very grateful to Edward Friedman, Fred Hayward, and Crawford Young for their searching comments on an earlier version of this paper.