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Equality, Proportionality, and the All-Affected Principle

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2026

Jonas Hultin Rosenberg*
Affiliation:
Uppsala University and University of Copenhagen

Abstract

The question of who ought to be included in the demos is distinct from, and yet related to, the question of how to distribute decision-making power among those who are included. Political equality is the most common answer to the former question within democratic theory. In democratic practice, it is usually realized through one person one vote. Within democratic theory, there is not as much agreement as to what the answer to the latter question should be. The answer that has attracted most attention within the scholarly literature is that all those who are affected should be included. However, prominent scholars have argued that this all-affected principle is incompatible with political equality and therefore an unattractive answer to the question of inclusion. This article challenges this critique and argues that it is based on a misconception of political equality and a narrow reading of the all-affected principle.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Berghahn Books 2019

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