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A Problem about Identity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 June 2010

J. J. MacIntosh
Affiliation:
University of Calgary

Extract

1. The problem: Here are three plausible but incompatible propositions:

(1) The answer to Locke's question (23):

Could we suppose two distinct incommunicable consciousnesses acting the same body, the one constantly by day, the other by night … I ask … whether the day and the night man would not be two as distinct persons as Socrates and Plato ?

is yes.

(2) I am a human being. More generally, human persons are human beings.

(3) Identity is not relative.

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Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1974

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