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The Authority of Expressive Self-Ascriptions*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 April 2009

A. Minh Nguyen
Affiliation:
Eastern Kentucky University
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Abstract

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What explains first-person authority? What explains the presumption that an utterance is true when it is a sincere intelligible determinate first-person singular simple present-tense ascription of intentional state? According to Rockney Jacobsen, self-ascriptions each enjoy a presumption of truth because they are systematically reliable. They are systematically reliable because they are typically both truth-assessable and expressive. Such self-ascriptions, if sincere, are certain to be true. This article presents a defence and a critique of Jacobsen's theory. It is argued that the purported prevalence of expressive self-ascriptions is at best contingent. This contingency cannot explain why self-ascriptions are necessarily authoritative.

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Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2008