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Defining Self-Deception

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2010

Jennifer Radden
Affiliation:
University of Massachusetts, Boston

Extract

In this paper I shall first expose a weakness shared by several philosophical discussions of self-deception: I shall show that these discussions have failed to give it a complete analysis. The apparent phenomenon of self-deception is all too familiar, and yet its adequate characterization in general terms is wanting. More exactly, I shall argue that to understand self-deception statically, as these accounts have done, has been—and must be—to fail to give a characterization of it as a state of mind, sufficient to distinguish it from other mental states not born of self-deception.

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Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1984

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