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McGinn's Cognitive Closure*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

Philip P. Hanson
Affiliation:
Simon Fraser University

Extract

Can we succeed in giving consciousness a naturalistic explanation, that is, an explanation in “broadly physical terms” (p. 23)? This is the “problem of consciousness” which, along with other aspects of the mind-body problem, is explored by McGinn in a collection of eight independently written but related, sometimes overlapping papers, all but two previously published. The papers span a decade and divergent approaches. The resulting juxtaposition of two contrasting “resolutions” of the problem by the same author invites their comparison.

Information

Type
Critical Notices/Études critiques
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1993

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