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Durkheim, Wittgenstein and the Norms of Thought

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2024

Razmig Keucheyan*
Affiliation:
Université de Paris-IV
*
Razmig Keucheyan, Maison de la recherche de Paris 4, ISHA, 28 rue Serpente, 75006 Paris Email: rkeucheyan@hotmail.com
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Abstract

In their respective fields of philosophy and sociology, Ludwig Wittgenstein and E´mile Durkheim are known for having associated two types of norms usually considered to be distinct: social norms and cognitive norms. They shared the same idea that the rules which govern the activity of the mind – for examples the laws of logic – are fundamentally linked to those which subtend social activity. For Wittgenstein and Durkheim, cognitive norms are thus a type of social norm.

The objective of this article is to compare the way in which Wittgenstein and Durkheim thematise the relationship between social norms and cognitive norms. It begins by clarifying the author’s understanding of ‘‘cognitive norms’’. It then presents Durkheim’s and Wittgenstein’s analyses of these norms, and it finally attempts to define some of the similarities and differences existing between their approaches to this problem.

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Copyright
Copyright © ICPHS 2012

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