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Identification, Estimation, and Testing in Parametric Empirical Models of Auctions within the Independent Private Values Paradigm

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

Stephen G. Donald and
Harry J. Paarsch
Stephen G. Donald
Affiliation:
Boston University
Harry J. Paarsch
Affiliation:
University of Western Ontario
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Abstract

Recent advances in the application of game theory to the study of auctions have spawned a growing empirical literature involving both experimental and field data. In this paper, we focus on four different mechanisms (the Dutch, English, first-price sealed-bid, and Vickrey auctions) within one of the most commonly used theoretical models (the independent private values paradigm) to investigate issues of identification, estimation, and testing in parametric structural econometric models of auctions.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Econometric Theory , Volume 12 , Issue 3 , August 1996, pp. 517 - 567
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1996

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