Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-7pwfn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-15T12:59:25.456Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

A Methodological Assessment of Multiple Utility Frameworks

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2008

Timothy J. Brennan
Timothy J. Brennan
Affiliation:
George Washington University
Get accessRights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

One of the fundamental components of the concept of economic rationality is that preference orderings are “complete,” i.e., that all alternative actions an economic agent can take are comparable (Arrow, 1951; De-breu, 1959). The idea that all actions can be ranked may be called the single utility assumption. The attractiveness of this assumption is considerable. It would be hard to fathom what choice among alternatives means if the available alternatives cannot be ranked by the chooser in some way. In addition, the efficiency criterion makes sense only if one can infer that an individual's choice reflects the best, in expected welfare terms, among all choices that individual could have made (Sen, 1982a). The possibility that a rearrangement of resources could make someone “better off” without making others “worse off” can be understood only if the post-rearrangement world is comparable with the pre-rearrange-ment world.

Information

Type
Essays
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 5 , Issue 2 , October 1989, pp. 189 - 208
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1989

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

REFERENCES

Akerlof, G. 1982. “The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance.” American Economic Review 72:307–19.Google Scholar
Arrow, K. 1951. Social Choice and Individual Values. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Baier, A. 1986. “Trust and Antitrust.” Ethics 96:231–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Barry, B. 1970. Political Argument. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
Barry, B. 1978. Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Becker, G. 1976. The Economic Approach to Human Behavior. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blum, L. A. 1988. “Gilligan and Kohlberg: Implications for Moral Theory.” Ethics 98:472–91.Google Scholar
Boland, L. 1981. “On the Futility of Criticizing the Neoclassical Maximization Hypothesis.” American Economic Review 71:1031–36.Google Scholar
Boulding, K. E. 1967. “The Basis of Value Judgments in Economics.” In Human Values and Economic Policy, edited by Hook, S., pp. 55–72. New York: New York University Press.Google Scholar
Brandt, R. B. 1967. “Personal Values and the Justification of Institutions.” In Human Values and Economic Policy, edited by Hook, S., pp. 22–40. New York: New York University Press.Google Scholar
Caldwell, B. 1983. “The Neoclassical Maximization Hypothesis: Comment.” American Economic Review 73:824–27.Google Scholar
Debreu, G. 1954. “Representation of a Preference Ordering by a Numerical Function.” In Decision Processes, edited by Thrall, R. M., Coombs, C. H., and Davis, R. L., pp. 159–66. New York: Wiley.Google Scholar
Debreu, G. 1959. Theory of Value. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
De V. Graaff, J. 1959. Theoretical Welfare Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Dworkin, R. 1977. “DeFunis v. Sweatt.” In Equality and Preferential Treatment, edited by Cohen, M., Nagel, T., and Scanlon, T., pp. 63–83. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Dworkin, R. 1981. “What is Equality? Part I: Equality of Welfare.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 10:185–246.Google Scholar
Elster, J. 1979. Ulysses and the Sirens. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Elster, J. 1983. Sour Grapes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Elster, J. 1985. “Weakness of Will and the Free-Rider Problem.” Economics and Philosophy 1:231–65.Google Scholar
Etzioni, A. 1986. “The Case for a Multiple-Utility Conception.” Economics and Philosophy 2:159–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Frankfurt, H. M. 1971. “Freedom of Will and the Concept of a Person.” Journal of Philosophy 68:5–20.Google Scholar
Georgescu-Roegen, N. 1966. “Choice, Expectations, and Measurability.” In Analytical Economics, pp. 184–215. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Harsanyi, J. 1983. “Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior.” In Utilitarianism and Beyond, edited by Sen, A. K. and Williams, B., pp. 39–62. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., and Thaler, R. H. 1986. “Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics.” In Rational Choice: The Contrast Between Economics and Philosophy, edited by Hogarth, R. and Reder, M., pp. 101–16. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Kavka, G. 1982. “The Paradox of Future Individuals.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 11:93–112.Google Scholar
Ladd, J. 1967. “The Use of Mechanical Methods for the Solution of Ethical Problems.” In Human Values and Economic Policy, edited by Hook, S., pp. 157–69. New York: New York University Press.Google Scholar
Levi, I. 1986. “The Paradoxes of Allais and Ellsberg.” Economics and Philosophy 2:23–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Margolis, H. 1981. “A New Model of Rational Choice.” Ethics 91:265–79.Google Scholar
Margolis, H. 1982. Selfishness, Altruism, and Rationality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
McCloskey, D. 1983. “The Rhetoric of Economics.” Journal of Economic Literature 21:481–517.Google Scholar
Mill, J. S. 1962. Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Essay on Bentham. Cleveland: Meridian Books.Google Scholar
Moore, G. E. 1976. Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Northrup, F. S. C. 1959. The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities. New York: Meridian Books, Inc.Google Scholar
Parfit, D. 1982. “Future Generations: Further Problems.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 11:113–72.Google Scholar
Penz, G. P. 1986. Consumer Sovereignty and Human Interests. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Pincoffs, E. L. 1986. Quandaries and Virtues. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.Google Scholar
Posner, R. 1983. The Economics of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Postema, G. J. 1987. “Collective Evils, Harms, and the Law.” Ethics 97:414–40.Google Scholar
Quinn, W. 1987. “Reflection and the Loss of Moral Knowledge: Williams on Objectivity.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 16:195–209.Google Scholar
Rousseau, J.-J. 1967. The Social Contract and Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, New York: Washington Square Press.Google Scholar
Sagoff, M. 1986. “Values and Preferences.” Ethics 96:301–16.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schelling, T. 1984. “Ethics, Law, and the Exercise of Self-Command.” In Choice and Consequence, pp. 84–112. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Sen, A. K. 1982a. “Behavior and the Concept of Preference.” In Choice, Welfare, and Measurement, pp. 54–73. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Sen, A. K. 1982b. “Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory.” In Choice, Welfare, and Measurement, pp. 84–106. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Stigler, G. J., and Becker, G. S. 1977. “De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum.” American Economic Review 67:76–90.Google Scholar
Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D. 1986. “Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions.” In Rational Choice: The Contrast Between Economics and Psychology, edited by Hogarth, R. and Reder, M., pp. 67–94. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Williams, B. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Wolf, S. 1982. “Moral Saints.” Journal of Philosophy 79:419–39.Google Scholar