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Should Social Preferences Be Consistent?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2008

John Broome
John Broome
Affiliation:
University of Bristol
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Extract

Should social preferences conform to the principles of rationality we normally expect of individuals? Should they, for instance, conform to the consistency axioms of expected utility theory? This article considers one fragment of this question.

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Essays
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Economics & Philosophy , Volume 5 , Issue 1 , April 1989, pp. 7 - 18
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1989

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References

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