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Consequentialism, rationality and the relevant description of outcomes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2001

Bruno Verbeek
Affiliation:
Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University
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Abstract

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Instrumental rationality requires that an agent selects those actions that give her the best outcomes. This is the principle of consequentialism. It may be that it is not the only requirement of this form of rationality. Considerations other than the outcomes may enter the picture as well. However, the outcome(s) of an action always play a role in determining its rationality. Seen in this light consequentialism is a minimum requirement of instrumental rationality. Therefore, any theory that tries to spell out the implications of instrumental rationality, in particular expected utility theory, should subscribe to the principle of consequentialism. Or so it seems.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© 2001 Cambridge University Press