Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-mnklg Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-12T05:55:02.327Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Imperfect Choice and Self-Stabilizing Rules

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2008

Ronald A. Heiner
Affiliation:
Brigham Young University

Extract

A recent paper by David Levy (1987) focuses on “utility enhancing consumption constraints.” Levy concludes by noting that his analysis stays within standard utility maximizing theory, in contrast to my analysis of rule-governed behavior (Heiner, 1983, 1985a, 1985b, 1986, 1988a, 1988b, 1988c) which allows imperfect decisions that don't always maximize utility. I wish to show how our two theories can be integrated, thereby representing complementary, rather than conflicting, explanations. In the process, I argue that imperfect decisions are an essential factor in the stability of any rule that constrains freedom of choice. I also briefly discuss certain intrinsic problems with achieving “self-stabilizing” rules applied to moral teachings.

Information

Type
Essays
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1989

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable