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Making Interpersonal Comparisons Coherently

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2008

Martin Barrett and
Daniel Hausman
Martin Barrett
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin, Madison
Daniel Hausman
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin, Madison
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Extract

Many ethical theories, including in particular consequentialist moral the ories, require comparisons of the amount of good possessed or received by different people. In the case of some goods, such as monetary income, wealth, education, or health, such comparisons are relatively unproblematic. Even in the case of such goods there may be serious empirical measurement problems, but there appear to be no difficulties in principle. Thus Cooter and Rappoport (1984) maintained that there was no serious difficulty of making interpersonal utility comparisons for an earlier generation of economists who regarded utility as an index of “material welfare.”

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Type
Essays
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Economics & Philosophy , Volume 6 , Issue 2 , October 1990, pp. 293 - 300
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1990

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References

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