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PREFERENCES VS. DESIRES: DEBATING THE FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE OF CONATIVE STATES

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 May 2015

Armin W. Schulz*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas 3083 Wescoe Hall, Lawrence, KS 66045, USA. Email: awschulz@ku.edu; URL: http://people.ku.edu/~a382s825/
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Abstract:

I address an overlooked question about the structure of the cognitive/conative model of the mind that underlies much of the work in economics, psychology and philosophy: namely, whether conative states are fundamentally monistic (desire-like) or comparative (preference-like). I argue that two seemingly promising sets of theoretical considerations – namely, the structure of Rational Choice Theory, and considerations of computational efficiency – are unable to resolve this debate. Given this, I suggest that a consideration that speaks in favour of the preference-based view is the fact that it makes it easier to explain certain empirically observed patterns in decision making.

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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 
Figure 0

Table 1.Utility assignments to simple outcomes.

Figure 1

Table 2.Primary preference assignments to simple outcomes.

Figure 2

Table 3.Intransitive primary preference assignments to simple outcomes.