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Value Based on Preferences

On Two Interpretations of Preference Utilitarianism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2008

Wlodek Rabinowicz and
Jan Österberg
Wlodek Rabinowicz
Affiliation:
Lund University
Jan Österberg
Affiliation:
Uppsala University
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Extract

What distinguishes preference utilitarianism (PU) from other utilitarian positions is the axiological component: the view concerning what is intrinsically valuable. According to PU, intrinsic value is based on preferences. Intrinsically valuable states are connected to our preferences (wants, desires) being satisfied.

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Type
Essays
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Economics & Philosophy , Volume 12 , Issue 1 , April 1996, pp. 1 - 27
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1996

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