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On the redistributive impact of privatizing a resource under imperfect enforcement

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 November 2006

STEFAN AMBEC
Affiliation:
INRA-GAEL, University of Grenoble, BP 47, 38040 Grenoble Cedex 9, France. Email: ambec@grenoble.inra.fr
LOUIS HOTTE
Affiliation:
University of Ottawa, CRED and University of Namur. 200 rue Wilbrod, Ottawa, Ont., Canada, KIN 6N5. Email: lhott3@uottawa.ca
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Abstract

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We consider the redistributive effects of privatizing a resource previously exploited under free access. We assume that illegal extraction is punished but that the sanction is bounded by individuals' wealth. First, we show that a segment of intermediate-wealth individuals is the most adversely affected from the regime change, while the poorest segment is not only less severely affected, but may actually gain from it. Next, we show how the authorities may prefer to choose an intermediate enforcement level in order to maximize the political acceptability of the regime switch among the local community.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
2006 Cambridge University Press