Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-tnkh4 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-16T21:46:00.386Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Trade and environment: policy linkages

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 November 2000

BRIAN R. COPELAND
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC Canada V6T 1Z1. Tel: (604) 822-8215. Email: copeland@econ.ubc.ca
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the 'Save PDF' action button.

This paper develops a simple model to investigate linkages between trade and environmental policy. In the case of purely local pollution, trade liberalization without constraints on environmental policy induces a non-cooperative game between countries in pollution policy. Without any agreement on environmental policy, trade negotiations are unlikely to lead to a point on the Pareto frontier. When pollution is global, countries may be expected to disagree on linkages between trade agreements and environmental agreements. Countries importing pollution-intensive goods have an incentive to try to link trade agreements with environmental agreements, while countries exporting pollution-intensive goods have an incentive to try to obtain a binding commitment to free trade prior to negotiations over global pollution.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© 2000 Cambridge University Press