Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-7pwfn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-16T09:15:14.657Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Conspiracy Theories and the Conventional Wisdom

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the 'Save PDF' action button.

Conspiracy theories should be neither believed nor investigated - that is the conventional wisdom. I argue that it is sometimes permissible both to investigate and to believe. Hence this is a dispute in the ethics of belief. I defend epistemic “oughts” that apply in the first instance to belief-forming strategies that are partly under our control. But the belief-forming strategy of not believing conspiracy theories would be a political disaster and the epistemic equivalent of self-mutilation. I discuss several variations of this strategy, interpreting “conspiracy theory” in different ways but conclude that on all these readings, the conventional wisdom is deeply unwise.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007