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Discrimination and Testimonial Knowledge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

John Greco
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Abstract

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Sanford Goldberg has called our attention to an interesting problem: How is it that young children can learn from the testimony of their caregivers (their parents, teachers, and nannies, for example) even when the children themselves are undiscriminating consumers of testimony? Part One describes the importance and scope of the problem, showing that it generalizes beyond tots and their caregivers. Part Two considers and rejects several strategies for solving the problem, including Goldberg's own. Part Three defends a solution, positing a previously unnoticed social dimension to knowledge.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 4 , Issue 3 , October 2007 , pp. 335 - 351
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

References

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