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Epistemic Identities

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

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Abstract

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This paper explores the significant strengths of Fricker's account, and then develops the following questions. Can volitional epistemic practice correct for non-volitional prejudices? How can we address the structural causes of credibility-deflation? Are the motivations behind identity prejudice mostly other-directed or self-directed? And does Fricker aim for neutrality vis-à-vis identity, in which case her account conflicts with standpoint theory?

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Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010