Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-7pwfn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-14T20:06:31.239Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Epistemic Subjectivism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Roger White
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the 'Save PDF' action button.

Epistemic subjectivism, as I am using the term, is a view in the same spirit as relativism, rooted in skepticism about the objectivity or universality of epistemic norms. I explore some ways that we might motivate subjectivism drawing from some common themes in analytic epistemology. Without diagnosing where the arguments go wrong, I argue that the resulting position is untenable.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 4 , Issue 1 , February 2007, pp. 115 - 129
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

References

REFERENCES

Boghossian, Paul. 2006. Fear of Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
BonJour, Laurence. 1985. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Field, Hartry. 1982. “Realism and Relativism.” Journal of Philosophy 79: 553–567.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Foley, Richard. 1987. The Theory of Epistemic Rationality. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldman, Alvin. 1980. “The Internalist Conception of Justification.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5: 27–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harman, Gilbert. 1973. Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Harman, Gilbert. 1986. Change in View. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Harman, Gilbert and Thomson, Judith Jarvis. 1996. Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
James, William. 1897. “The Will to Believe.” Pp. 13–33 in James, William, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Kelly, Thomas. 2003. “Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66: 612–640.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kitcher, Philip. 1992. “The Naturalist's Return.” The Philosophical Review. 101: 53–114.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kornblith, Hilary. 1993. “Epistemic Normativity.” Synthese 94: 357–376.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Laudan, Larry. 1990. “Aimless Epistemology?” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 57: 44–59.Google Scholar
Luper, Stephen. 2004. “Epistemic Relativism.” Philosophical Issues 14: 271–295.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lycan, William. 1988. Judgment and Justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Nozick, Robert. 1993. The Nature of Rationality. Princeton: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Owens, David. 2003. “Does Belief Have an Aim?” Philosophical Studies 115: 283–305.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Papineau, David. 1999. “Normativity and Judgement.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society supplementary vol. 73: 17–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Quine, W. V. and Ullian, J. S.. 1978. The Web of Belief. New York: McGraw-Hill.Google Scholar
Quine, W. V. 1986. “Reply to Morton White.” Pp. 662–665 in Hahn, L. E. and Schilpp, P. A., eds. The Philosophy of W. V. Quine. La Salle: Open Court.Google Scholar
Stich, Stephen. 1998. “Reflective Equilibrium, Analytic Epistemology and the Problem of Cognitive Diversity.” Pp. 95–112 in DePaul, Michael and Ramsey, William eds. Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and it Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.Google Scholar
Vahid, Hamid. 2004. “Varieties of Epistemic Conservatism.” Synthese 141: 97–122.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Velleman, J. David. 2000. “On the Aim of Belief.” Pp. 244–281 in Velleman, David J., The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2002. “The Aim of Belief.” Philosophical Perspectives 16: 267–297.Google Scholar
Williams, Bernard. 1973. “Deciding to Believe.” Pp. 136–151 in Williams, Bernard, Problems of the Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
White, Roger. 2005. “Epistemic Permissiveness.” Philosophical Perspectives 19: 445–459.CrossRefGoogle Scholar