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Interpreting Knowledge in the Backward Induction Problem1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Ken Binmore
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Abstract

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Robert Aumann argues that common knowledge of rationality implies backward induction in finite games of perfect information. I have argued that it does not. A literature now exists in which various formal arguments are offered in support of both positions. This paper argues that Aumann's claim can be justified if knowledge is suitably reinterpreted.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 8 , Issue 3 , October 2011 , pp. 248 - 261
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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