This issue of Episteme is devoted to the topic of epistemic relativism. It includes a symposium on Paul Boghossian's treatment of epistemic relativism in chapters 5 through 7 of his new book, Fear of Knowledge (2006). The symposium centers on Boghossian's argument against epistemic relativism in chapter 6 of that book. In their contributions to the symposium, Gideon Rosen and Ram Neta offer criticisms of Boghossian's argument, and Neta argues for a version of epistemic relativism. In addition to the symposium, Jonathan Weinberg, Michael Williams, and Roger White supply stand-alone articles on related topics. The purpose of this introduction is to situate epistemic relativism in the constellation of relativist views, to distinguish several forms of epistemic relativism, and to remark briefly on how the versions of relativism discussed in the articles in this issue fit these forms of relativism.